Urge Stricter Supervision of Bandit Suppression in Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hunan and Consolidate Guangdong’s Defenses

(December 29, 1950)

Deng, Tan, Zhao, Su:[1]

(1) Your report of December 24 summarizing the experience of autumn bandit suppression has been received and read. It is very good and highly illuminating, and has been forwarded to the East China, Southwest, and Northwest regions for reference.

(2) Bandit suppression in the three provinces of Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hunan must still be pressed with stricter supervision. It is imperative to complete the bandit suppression tasks thoroughly before May 31, so that one army from Guangxi (is the 45th Army suitable?) and the 21st Army Corps can be concentrated in the Wuzhou area in early June, awaiting orders to move into Guangdong to deal with possible contingencies.[2] Hunan should prepare one army to be concentrated on the line of Chenzhou, Hengzhou,[3] and along the railway no later than May, preferably in March or April, and await orders. In short, should any incident occur in Guangdong, the Fourth Field Army must assume sole responsibility for handling it independently, ensuring victory over any invading Taiwanese bandit troops and consolidating Guangdong’s defenses. Plan the bandit suppression work and troop dispositions according to this policy.

Mao Zedong
December 29

[1] Deng, Tan, Zhao, and Su refer to Deng Zihui, Tan Zheng, Zhao Erlu, and Su Jing, who were then respectively the Second Political Commissar, Third Political Commissar, Chief of Staff, and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Central-South Military Region.
[2] This refers to the possibility that the Kuomintang army from Taiwan might land and invade Guangdong.
[3] Hengzhou is present-day Hengyang, Hunan.