The Entire Main Force Should Withdraw to the Rear for Rest and Reorganization
(December 26, 1950)
Peng and Piao,[1] and for the information of Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Gao Gang[2]:

(1) The telegram sent by Peng and Piao on December 26 to Wu and Zhou for transmission to Comrade Kim Ung and others[3] has been read and noted. Your handling of the matter is correct.

(2) After the conclusion of this campaign, the entire main force (including the Second and Fifth Army Groups of the People’s Army) should withdraw to appropriate areas conducive to rest and reorganization, rest and reorganize for one to two months, replenish with new recruits, restore physical strength, sum up experience, prepare grain and ammunition, repair roads, make up shortages in clothing, bedding, shoes, and socks, rectify discipline, improve relations between Chinese comrades and Korean comrades (those who treat Korean comrades with a bad attitude should be subjected to strict criticism, and serious cases should be punished by removal from office), and improve...

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[1] Peng and Piao refer to Peng Dehuai and Pak Il-u, who at the time served respectively as Commander and Political Commissar, and Deputy Commander and Deputy Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.
[2] Gao Gang, at the time served as Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region.
[3] Refers to the telegram sent at 13:00 on December 26, 1950, by Peng Dehuai and Pak Il-u to Wu Ruilin, Commander of the 42nd Army of the Volunteer Army, and Zhou Biao, Political Commissar, and others. The telegram stated: If you have already found or can find Comrades Kim Ung, Pang Ho-san, and Choe Hyon, frontline commanders of the Korean People’s Army, please consult with them on the following issues: (1) The puppet First and Third Army Groups in the Chuncheon, Hongcheon, Yangyang, Gangneung, and Wonju areas have already completed their defensive deployments, with considerable depth. Will it be difficult for those two army groups (the Second and Fifth Army Groups of the Korean People’s Army) to pass through the enemy’s depth by crossing the great mountains? (2) What is the situation regarding supply issues, ammunition, and troop fatigue? (3) If it is not easy to pass through the enemy’s depth, is it possible to temporarily refrain from advancing southward, that is, to coordinate with the victory of this campaign and then decide based on the situation?