Telegram to Peng Dehuai [1] et al. Regarding the Situation on the Korean Battlefield and Our Troops’ Operational Deployment (December 21, 1950)

Comrade Dehuai, with copy to Comrade Gao Gang [2] and Song and Tao [3]: Your telegram of 2400 hours on the 19th has been received. The reply is as follows:

(1) Under the circumstances you have described, it would be more advisable for the Ninth Corps to rest and reorganize in the Hamhung area, evacuating only the seriously wounded and sick back to Northeast China, while detaching cadres to go to the Northeast to train new recruits.

(2) Yang Dezhi’s unit [4] has now concentrated between Xuzhou and Jinan, held a meeting of cadres, and General Zhu delivered an address. If necessary, there is no problem with its entry into combat in mid-March. For the present, it remains preferable to continue training and reorganization for a period in the Xuzhou–Jinan region. About one month before it is needed, the unit can be moved to the area between Shenyang and Andong [ ], where it can receive reinforcements of new troops (the corps comprises nine divisions, each averaging just over 6,000 men—far short of full strength). Should the equipment promised by our allies [ ] have arrived by then, the units could be reequipped and immediately dispatched to Korea to join the fighting.

(3) Your assessment of the enemy situation is correct. We must make long-term plans.

(4) The United States and Britain are exploiting the lingering old impressions associated with the 38th Parallel in order to carry out their political propaganda and to induce us to accept an armistice. Therefore, it is necessary at this juncture for our forces to cross the 38th Parallel, fight another battle, and then take time to rest and regroup.

(5) I fully concur with your operational approach: at present, the U.S. and British forces are concentrated around Seoul, making an attack unfavorable; we should focus our efforts on engaging the puppet forces. In general terms, once we have annihilated all or most of the puppet army, the U.S. forces will be left isolated and will find it impossible to remain in Korea for any length of time. If we can further destroy several U.S. divisions, the Korean question will be even more readily resolved. With regard to the current campaign, if developments proceed smoothly and food supplies can be secured, it may be possible to seek out and destroy sizable concentrations of puppet troops in the Chuncheon, Gapyeong, and Hongcheon areas.

(6) Before launching the campaign, as far as practicable, troops should be allowed a few days of rest to recover from fatigue before entering combat. This applies both before attacking the puppet First and Sixth Divisions, and again prior to the advance toward Chuncheon. In short, the initiative lies firmly in our hands, enabling us to conduct operations at a measured pace without unduly exhausting our forces.

(7) Should conditions prove unfavorable, it would be appropriate to withdraw in due course to a suitable location for rest and refitting before resuming hostilities; this view is also sound.

(8) It is extremely necessary to increase the number of motor vehicles to expedite the delivery of cotton shoes, greatcoats, padded jackets, and blankets. Comrade Gao Gang is requested to do his utmost to resolve this matter.

Mao Zedong December 21 Based on publication in Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong (Internal Edition). (A manuscript exists.)

Notes [1] Peng Dehuai was at the time Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. [2] Gao Gang was at the time Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army. [3] Song refers to Song Shilun, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Ninth Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Tao refers to Tao Yong, then Deputy Commander of the Ninth Corps. [4] Refers to the Nineteenth Corps of the People’s Liberation Army, under the command of Yang Dezhi. [ ] Andong is today’s city of Dandong. [ ] Refers to the Soviet Union.