--- Notes

CCF Military Commission’s Endorsement on the Summary of Combat Experience Gained by the 38th Army during the Second Phase of the War (December 18, 1950) To all Central Bureaus and Major Military Regions, with further transmission to their respective Sub-bureaus and Military Areas, to the Party Committees and Military Areas of all provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, to the Corps and Armies, and for information to the Military Academy:  We hereby forward to you the summary of combat experience compiled by the 38th Army of our Chinese People’s Volunteers in the Second Phase of the War [1]. This is an extremely important set of lessons; please give it careful study.
The combat experience of the Volunteer Army has demonstrated that our forces are fully capable of defeating the highly well-equipped U.S. military, even one that enjoys air superiority.
Issued by the Central Military Commission on December 18, based on a manuscript penned by Mao Zedong.
Notes [1] Refers to the telegram dated December 16, 1950, from the Command of the Chinese People’s Volunteers to various armies, divisions, artillery commands, and the Ninth Corps, with copy to the Military Commission, concerning the 38th Army’s combat experience in the Second Phase of the War.
The key lessons summarized therein are as follows:

1. Carrying sufficient dry rations is the primary guarantee for the smooth conduct of a campaign.

2. In mountainous terrain, roads are small and narrow; it is best for units at regimental level and above to move along parallel routes, advancing side by side.

3. Upon reaching the attack position, corps, divisions, regiments, and battalions should all establish robust observation posts, maintain telephone communications, and keep abreast of the battlefield situation.

4. The vanguard of flanking forces should be reinforced with heavy artillery fire.
When encountering enemy resistance, immediate and sustained artillery bombardment should be employed, supported by small units tasked with encircling and annihilating or driving out the enemy, thereby enabling the main force to continue its advance.

5. To completely destroy the enemy, troops must not fear fatigue but instead execute broad flanking envelopments, thrust deeply into the enemy rear, and cut off their lines of retreat.

6. When launching an attack, priority should be given to deploying elite units to break through the enemy’s defenses and seize its artillery positions, thereby depriving the enemy of fire support and facilitating our own successful annihilation of its forces.

7. Against enemy forces attempting to break out, three methods—striking the head, the waist, and the tail—should be employed, aiming first to disrupt the enemy formation and then to destroy it in separate segments.

8. When conducting blocking operations, in order to minimize casualties, forces should be deployed in depth, with no more than one-third of the total strength positioned on the front line.

9. Following combat, small squads composed of platoons and sections should be organized to systematically search the mountains by sector, while blocking detachments should be posted at key transportation nodes to prevent scattered enemy remnants from escaping.