Our Army Can Defeat the Well-Equipped American Forces[1]

(December 18, 1950)

To all Central Bureaus, the Great Military Regions, and to be forwarded to all subordinate Sub-Bureaus, Military Regions, Provincial and Municipal Party Committees, Provincial and Municipal Military Commands, Army Groups, and Armies, and to inform the Military Academy:

I am forwarding to you the "Summary of the Combat Experience of the 38th Army of Our Volunteer Forces in the Second Campaign"[2]. This is extremely important experience, and I hope you will study it carefully. The combat experience of the Volunteer Forces has proven that our army is fully capable of defeating the American forces, which possess highly superior equipment and command of the air.

(signed) Our Army Can Defeat the Well-Equipped American Forces
Central Military Commission
December 18

Notes

--- Notes

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to all Central Bureaus, the Great Military Regions, and others.
[2] This refers to the combat experience of the 38th Army in the Second Campaign, as described in a telegram sent on December 16, 1950, by the Headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteer Forces to all Armies for further transmission to Divisions, the Artillery Command, and the 9th Army Group, with a report to the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee. Its contents were: 1. Carrying sufficient dry rations is the main guarantee for the smooth progress of a campaign; 2. As mountain roads are narrow, it is better for units at or above the regimental level to move forward side by side along parallel roads; 3. Upon reaching attack positions, Army, Division, Regiment, and Battalion levels should all organize strong observation posts, establish telephone communications, and promptly understand battlefield conditions; 4. The vanguard of encircling (outflanking) units should be reinforced with artillery firepower; when encountering enemy resistance, use artillery bombardment supported by small units to encircle and eliminate or drive off the enemy, allowing the main force to continue advancing; 5. To thoroughly destroy the enemy, troops should not fear fatigue and should employ large-scale encircling outflanking maneuvers, vigorously thrust behind enemy lines, and sever their retreat routes; 6. When launching an attack, elite troops should first be used to break through enemy positions and seize enemy artillery, depriving the enemy of support and enabling our forces to smoothly annihilate them; 7. Against encircled enemy attempting breakout, three methods of attack should be employed—striking the head, hitting the waist, and attacking the tail—striving first to throw the enemy into disorder, then wiping them out group by group and segment by segment; 8. When carrying out blocking missions, to reduce casualties, force deployment should adopt defense in depth, with the first-line strength not exceeding one-third; 9. After battle, organize small squad and platoon units to search the mountains by sectors, and set up blocking forces on key transportation routes to prevent scattered enemy escapes.
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