Reply to the Report on Bandit Suppression Experience of the East China Military Region [1]
(December 7, 1950)

Chen, Tang, Zhang, Zhou, and for the information of the East China Bureau:

Your December 4 report on bandit suppression experience [2] is excellent and most gratifying. It has been forwarded to the central bureaus and military regions of Central-South, Southwest, and Northwest China, as well as to Guangdong and Guangxi provinces for reference.

Mao Zedong
December 7

[1] This is a telegram from Mao Zedong to Chen Yi, Second Secretary of the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander of the East China Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army; Tang Liang, Deputy Director of the Political Department; Zhang Zhen, Chief of Staff; and Zhou Junming, Deputy Chief of Staff.
[2] This refers to the report on the bandit suppression experience of the East China Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army, issued by Chen Yi, Tang Liang, Zhang Zhen, and Zhou Junming on December 4, 1950. Its main content is as follows:
After bandit gangs have been encircled, attacked, and dealt annihilating blows, the remaining bandits will inevitably fall into confusion, become shaken, disperse, go into hiding, and carry out underground activities. It is therefore necessary to follow up by launching comprehensive, mass-based stationary suppression, search and arrest operations, combining these with land reform, mobilizing the masses, vigorously waging a political offensive, and resolutely digging deep to remove the roots, so that the bandits can be gradually wiped out gang by gang. The bandits eliminated in Jiangsu, Shandong, and Zhejiang were for the most part seized through search-and-suppression operations, case-solving, and arrests. In Fujian, after the large bandit and special-agent gangs were annihilated, the number of bandits surrendering collectively or individually has recently been growing daily. However, when we clear out bandit gangs, we must organize tightly and leave no gaps through which bandits and special agents can flee. Moreover, from encirclement and assault to stationary suppression and search-and-suppression, there must be no interruption; otherwise, we will be placed in a passive position in our bandit suppression. The troops must be constantly educated, especially in policy and discipline, to maintain high morale at all times and ensure a resolute spirit in dealing with scattered and hidden bandits. In the course of bandit suppression, difficulties encountered by the troops must be promptly resolved. Secondly, after the bandits and special agents on the mainland have been struck, the bandit side will inevitably actively organize external forces to support them; therefore, effective pursuit and suppression operations against sea bandits must be carried out, requiring coordination between the navy and air force, and the clearing of sea bandits must be closely integrated with the clearing of bandit gangs. We have come to realize that correctly grasping and implementing policies is extremely important. Key bandit chieftains and die-hard elements must be resolutely suppressed, so as to shake the interior of the bandit and special-agent forces and support the masses in their struggle against bandits. In accordance with the instructions of the 22nd, we shall report our specific bandit suppression experience to the various regions, and also draw upon the experience of those regions to carry out bandit suppression work in East China.