IV

Qiaomu:
Immediately issue a broadcast, to appear in the newspapers tomorrow (the 7th).
Mao Zedong
December 6

Approve the Operational Dispositions for Combat on Both the Eastern and Western Fronts
(December 5, 1950)
Peng, Song,[1] and inform Gao[2]

(1) The operational dispositions described in Peng’s telegram of 24:00, December 4[3] are very good, and it is hoped that they will be carried out accordingly. The summary of experience described in the telegram of 18:00, December 4 is also very good. On this occasion, the Western Front

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[1] Peng and Song refer to Peng Dehuai and Song Shilun, who at the time served respectively as Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Ninth Army Group.
[2] Gao refers to Gao Gang, who at the time served as Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region.
[3] Refers to Peng Dehuai’s telegram of 24:00, December 4, 1950, to Mao Zedong, with copies to Gao Gang, Song Shilun, Deng Hua, and Han Xianchu. The telegram stated:
The enemy on both the eastern and western battlefields has suffered severe blows and may retreat to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line to construct a new defensive line, or may fall back to the old defensive line at the 38th Parallel. Tonight, three divisions are being dispatched—one toward Sunchon, one toward Sukchon, and one advancing south of Songchon to threaten Pyongyang and probe the enemy’s intentions. If the enemy holds Pyongyang, it is proposed that one army, supported by one to two divisions of the People’s Army (to be decided through consultation), feign an attack on Pyongyang from north to south, while five armies are concentrated to first eliminate the enemy in the areas of Songchon, Kangdong, Samdung, Suan, Koksan, and Sinhye. After succeeding in attacking the enemy at Samdung and Kangdong, one army will be used to control Kangdong to secure the rear and flank routes of the main force’s southward advance. When the main force advances south to threaten Seoul, it may compel the enemy at Pyongyang to withdraw southward; as the enemy retreats south, we will pursue and strike them in motion, with the four armies positioned to conduct mobile operations according to the situation in their respective areas.
After the People’s Army’s Fifth Corps, under the command of Fang Hushan, captures Yangdok (where the enemy has approximately one battalion), it will operate between Wonsan and Hamhung (to be decided through consultation with Kim Il Sung) to draw the enemy on the northeastern front into retreating south. After annihilating the encircled enemy, the Song Army Group will seize the opportunity to advance and occupy Hamhung. If the enemy temporarily holds it with heavy forces, one army will be positioned north of Hamhung, while the main force will advance to the area southeast of Sachang-ni and south of Kyogwan-ri. When our main force on the Western Front besieges Pyongyang or crosses the 38th Parallel southward to threaten Seoul, the enemy at Hamhung may retreat south; we will seize the opportunity to attack and annihilate them while they are in motion. If the enemy abandons the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, we will pursue them across the 38th Parallel and seize the opportunity to attack Seoul.