Telegram to Peng Dehuai [1] et al. Approving the Operational Deployment on the Eastern and Western Fronts (December 5, 1950) To Peng and Song [2], with notification to Gao [3]:  (1) The operational plan outlined in Peng’s telegram of December 4 at 24:00 is very sound; please implement it without delay. The summary of experience contained in your telegram of December 4 at 18:00 [4] is also excellent. The annihilation of over 20,000 enemy troops on the western front this time constitutes a major victory. Kim Il-sung has already returned to Korea. With regard to the employment of Fang Hushan’s unit [ ], please submit your recommendations directly to Kim.  (2) The deployment proposals set forth in Song, Tao, and Qin’s telegram of December 4 at 22:05 are most commendable; please proceed with their execution immediately. In addition to wiping out the encircled enemy forces and preparing to defeat any relief columns, if the main body of a single corps could further destroy two regiments of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division in the Sacheong-ri area, the strategic significance would be immense.

Mao Zedong, 7:00 a.m., December 5 Based on the original verbatim record preserved in the Central Archives of the CPC. Included in Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong (internal edition).

Notes  [1] Peng Dehuai was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.

[2] “Song” refers to Song Shiyun, who at that time served as Commander and Political Commissar of the Ninth Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.

[3] “Gao” denotes Gao Gang, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.

[4] This refers to the lessons learned described in Peng Dehuai’s telegram of December 4 at 18:00 addressed to Mao Zedong, Gao Gang, and Song Shiyun. They may be summarized as follows: First, given the vast disparity in technical equipment between our forces and the enemy, we should strictly avoid engaging in fixed-position warfare. Instead, we should employ protracted maneuvers to draw the enemy into unfavorable positions, seizing the opportunity to launch a vigorous assault while they are still establishing themselves and their fire support has not yet been fully deployed. Second, we must make full use of night combat, initiating attacks at dusk and bringing them to a conclusion by dawn. Third, we should infiltrate deep behind enemy lines, first destroying their artillery positions and command posts, thereby threatening their logistical supply lines.

[ ] refers to the Korean People’s Army’s Fifth Corps, under the command of Corps Commander Fang Hushan.

[ ] indicates that “Song” stands for Song Shiyun; “Tao” represents Tao Yong, then Deputy Commander of the Ninth Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteers; and “Qin” denotes Qin Jian, then Chief of Staff of the Ninth Corps.