Telegram to Peng Dehuai [1] et al. Regarding the Capture of the Sunchon–Sokchon Line (December 2, 1950)

Peng, Deng, Pu, and Hong [2], with copy to Gao [3]:

After adjusting your dispositions, resting for a few days, and ascertaining the enemy’s deployment, please consider employing four to five armies to attack the Sunchon–Sokchon line. Use the necessary forces to break through and penetrate south of this line in order to pin down the bulk of the enemy, while concentrating the main force to annihilate one U.S. division (currently the 1st Cavalry Division) in the Sunchon–Chisan area. Seize the Sunchon–Sokchon line and a strip of territory south of it, then establish defensive positions south of that line, garrisoned by a portion of your forces—approximately one army—so that the main body can be shifted to operations between Pyongyang and Wonsan. To this end, the 66th Army should probably not move east until after the conclusion of the present campaign. The 42nd Army, meanwhile, could, following a few days of rest, advance toward the Sandung area east of Pyongyang to engage small enemy detachments. Please consider whether the above plan is feasible and make your decision accordingly.

Mao Zedong  December 2  Printed from the manuscript. Included in Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong (internal edition).

Notes  [1] Peng Dehuai was at the time Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.

[2] Deng refers to Deng Hua; Pu refers to Park Il-woo; both were at the time Deputy Commanders and Political Commissars of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Hong refers to Hong Xuezhi, who was then Deputy Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.

[3] Gao refers to Gao Gang, who at the time served as Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army of China. ７£°