Telegram to Peng Dehuai [1] et al. Regarding the Operational Deployment of the 42nd Army (December 1, 1950) Peng, Deng, Pu, and Hong [2], also Song and Qin [3]:  (1) The ROK II Corps is concentrating toward Samdung; the U.S. 24th Division is moving from Pyongyang into the Samdung area. The ROK I Division has now reached Sunchon and there are reports that it may advance toward Sunchon and Chisan. Meanwhile, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division has not yet crossed the Taedong River in the Sunchon–Chisan region. Therefore, our 42nd Army should not cross the Taedong River either but instead remain east of the river, operating toward Sungchon and Samdung to engage the remnants of the ROK II Corps and the U.S. 25th Division, thereby threatening Pyongyang from the flank. Please make a decision accordingly.  (2) The main body of the U.S. 7th Division, together with one regiment of the ROK III Division, is advancing westward from Hyesan, attempting to cut our supply line between Huchang and Ch’angjin. Order Song and Qin to have the division stationed at Huchang move eastward to intercept this enemy force, ensuring that it cannot push further west.

Mao Zedong, December 1, 12:00 p.m. Printed from the manuscript. Included in Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong (Internal Edition).

Notes  [1] Peng Dehuai was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.  [2] Deng refers to Deng Hua; Pu refers to Pak Il-woo. Both were then Deputy Commanders and Deputy Political Commissars of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Hong refers to Hong Xuezhi, who was then a Deputy Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.  [3] Song refers to Song Shiyun, who was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Ninth Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Qin refers to Qin Jian, who was then Chief of Staff of the Ninth Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.