To Peng Dehuai, Deng Hua, and Hong Xuezhi:

(1) Your operational disposition at 7:00 today is entirely correct. Resolutely execute it accordingly. (2) Pay full attention to enemy paratroop units landing in our rear areas. Control necessary armed forces and vehicles under your command and the logistics department, ready at all times to wipe out these airborne enemies. A group of enemy intelligence personnel has already landed east of Unsan and reportedly is advancing toward the Yalu River. (3) The dispatch of the 40th Army eastward must proceed as planned to cut off the enemy’s retreat route between Tokchon and Kunu-ri. The 40th Army must cross the line on the evening of the 25th and reach the area between Tokchon and Kunu-ri by the morning of the 26th at the latest, establishing a blocking position to prevent the enemy from fleeing westward from Tokchon. On the morning of the 26th, coordinate with the 38th Army and the 42nd Army to encircle and annihilate the enemy’s Pseudo 7th and 8th Divisions. (4) After the 40th Army moves east, it must resolutely block the U.S. 2nd Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, which may reinforce eastward, so as to ensure that our 38th Army and 42nd Army first annihilate the Pseudo 7th and 8th Divisions and create favorable conditions for a subsequent operational turning movement against the American enemy. (5) If the 40th Army moves east, simultaneously order the 39th Army, 66th Army, and 50th Army to advance to appropriate areas to pin down the U.S. 2nd Division, U.S. 24th Division, and others attempting to reinforce eastward. If the 40th Army’s eastward movement cannot be completed in time, order the 39th Army and 40th Army each to actively employ one division to engage the enemy from the front, preventing their eastward reinforcement. After the operation to annihilate the enemy’s Pseudo II Corps succeeds, coordinate with the main force to jointly annihilate the American enemy. (6) If the People’s Army’s 5th Corps and its 4th and 7th Divisions are still near Nyongbyon, it would be best for them to move south according to the original plan to safeguard the left flank of our 42nd Army. (7) In addition, in the disposition of the 9th Army Group on the eastern front to annihilate the 5th and 7th Regiments of the U.S. 1st Marine Division, employing only one division (the 60th Division) to outflank to the Hwangchoryong line appears insufficient, because this division must simultaneously undertake the task of blocking the enemy (the 11th Regiment of the U.S. 1st Marine Division) from reinforcing northward. Please also find ways to strengthen it to facilitate the annihilation of the enemy. (If the People’s Army’s 2nd and 5th Divisions originally at Sachang-ri are still in place, it is also hoped they can be ordered to attack toward Huksu-ri to ensure the flank security of our outflanking force toward Hwangchoryong.) (8) Whether the above items are feasible, please decide according to the situation. If time is pressing, the launch of the operation may be postponed by one or two days.

Central Military Commission
23rd, 21:00

(24 November 1950)
Peng, Deng, Pak, Hong, and inform Gao, He:

1. The 38th Army and 42nd Army shall encircle and annihilate the enemy in the Tokchon, Nyongwon, and Maengsan areas. The 40th Army shall insert between Tokchon and Kunu-ri, first annihilate the Pseudo II Corps, and separately pin down the enemy west of the Chongchon River.
2. You should employ one division on the evening of the 26th to encircle and annihilate the Pseudo 26th Regiment at Sachang-ri and Huksu-ri. After success, attack and advance toward Sangha-tong and Haha-tong south of Hwangchoryong, firmly occupy that line, and block the enemy reinforcing from the north. Employ another division to attack and advance from Chang-ri toward Hwangchoryong and Pojang-dong, annihilate the command post of the U.S. 1st Marine Division. After success, attack and advance toward Kosu-ri, coordinating with the main force to encircle and annihilate all of the U.S. 5th and 7th Regiments in the Kosu-ri and Yudam-ni area.
3. Propose that the 26th Army assemble at Changjin and areas to its east as marked on the map, prepare to encircle and annihilate the U.S. 7th Division which may reinforce westward, and prepare to attack the U.S. forces in the vicinity of Rimindong and Pungsan.

--- Notes

[1] Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.
Deng and Pak refer to Deng Hua and Pak Il-u, then both Deputy Commanders and Deputy Political Commissars of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.
Hong refers to Hong Xuezhi, then Deputy Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.
[2] Gao and He refer to Gao Gang and He Jinnian, then respectively Commander and Political Commissar, and Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Northeast Military Region.
[3] The operational disposition proposed in the telegram of 24 November 1950 at 7:00 from Peng Dehuai, Deng Hua, Pak Il-u, and Hong Xuezhi to the 9th Army Group of the Chinese People’s Volunteers and the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee was: