Telegram to Peng Dehuai, Deng Hua, and Hong Xuezhi
(23 November 1950)

Peng, Deng, Hong:

Your telegrams of 1800 hours on the 21st and 1200 hours on the 22nd have both been received. Regarding operations, we have the following suggestions for your consideration: (1) As of this moment, the puppet 7th and 8th Divisions have advanced to the Tokchon-Nyongwon line and are continuing to push northward. Three regiments of the puppet 6th Division have also moved eastward from the Kaechon area to Pukchang-ri and Kachang-ri. Reliable intelligence indicates that a portion of the enemy U.S. 2nd Division has already taken over the defense duties of the puppet 6th Division in the Kaechon area. The U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Division, the British 27th Brigade, and the puppet 1st Division have all reached the line of Kujang-dong, Yongsan-dong, and Pakchon. (2) After we launch our attack on the eastern bank of the Chongchon River, we should anticipate a very strong possibility that the U.S. 2nd Division and 1st Cavalry Division will reinforce eastward (of course, there are also other possibilities: they could continue northward, halt in place, or fall back to defend the Chongchon River bridgehead). (3) Based on this assessment, if the U.S. 2nd Division and 1st Cavalry Division reinforce eastward or dig in at the bridgehead, it will be difficult for our 39th and 40th Armies to achieve the objective of coordinating with the 42nd and 38th Armies to destroy the enemy’s puppet 7th and 8th Divisions. This could consequently affect subsequent operations, and because the flanking assault strength formed by the 42nd and 38th Armies would prove insufficient, it would be hard to develop the overall battle situation.
(4) Therefore, we suggest moving the 40th Army eastward to close up with the 38th Army, thereby reinforcing the assault strength on our left flank. Meanwhile, commit all three divisions of the 42nd Army to first annihilate the puppet 8th Division in the Nyongwon area, then strike toward Maengsan and Pukchang-ri against the puppet 6th Division; commit the full strength of the 38th Army to first annihilate the puppet 7th Division in the Tokchon area; and use the 40th Army to deal with the U.S. 2nd Division and 1st Cavalry Division that could potentially reinforce eastward from the Kujang-dong and Won-ri sector. This would ensure that our 38th and 42nd Armies first annihilate the puppet 7th and 8th Divisions and create favorable conditions for an operational flanking movement in the next phase of operations against the American enemy. (5) If the 40th Army moves eastward, the 39th, 66th, and 50th Armies should simultaneously be ordered to advance to appropriate areas to pin down the U.S. 2nd Division, U.S. 24th Division, and other forces seeking to reinforce eastward. If the 40th Army’s eastward movement cannot be completed in time, then order one division each from the 39th and 40th Armies to take active action, fix the enemy from the front, and block their eastward reinforcement. After the operation to destroy the enemy’s puppet II Corps succeeds, they shall coordinate with the main force to jointly annihilate the American enemy. (6) If the People’s Army’s 5th Corps and its 4th and 7th Divisions are still near Nyongbyon, it would be best for them to move southward according to the original plan to protect the left flank of our 42nd Army. (7) Additionally, in the deployment of the East Front’s 9th Army Group to destroy the 5th and 7th Regiments of the U.S. 1st Marine Division, committing only one division (the 60th Division) to outflank to the Hwangchoryong line also seems insufficient. Because that division must simultaneously undertake the task of blocking the enemy (the 11th Regiment of the U.S. 1st Marine Division) from reinforcing northward, please also find a way to strengthen it to facilitate the destruction of the enemy. (If the People’s Army’s 2nd and 5th Divisions originally at Sachang-ri are still in place, it is also hoped that they can be ordered to advance toward Huksu-ri to ensure the flank security of our force outflanking toward Hwangchoryong.) (8) Whether the above items are feasible, please decide in light of the situation. If time is too pressing, the start of the campaign may be postponed by one or two days.

Central Military Commission
2100 hours, 23rd