Telegram to Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua [1] Regarding Temporarily Avoiding U.S. and British Forces by First Attacking the Puppet Troops (October 26, 1950)  To Peng and Deng, with a copy to Gao [2]: The U.S. 24th Division and the British 27th Armoured Brigade have already crossed the Ch’ongch’on River in the Sin’an-chu area. Please instruct the 39th Army not to advance toward Rongsan-dong or Nyeongbyon. It should temporarily avoid engagement with the U.S. and British forces, if at all possible, so as not to be drawn into a protracted stalemate. Instead, it should move from T’aech’ŏn toward Unsan and northward, seeking out the puppet 1st Division for combat, in coordination with the 40th and 38th Armies, with the primary objective of annihilating the puppet 1st, 6th, and 8th Divisions first, and only then turning to the U.S. and British forces. Should the puppet 1st Division be operating in conjunction with British and American units, it should likewise refrain from engaging that formation for the time being; rather, it should wait until the puppet 6th and 8th Divisions have been destroyed before looking for an opportunity to strike that enemy. Please make your decision in light of the prevailing circumstances.

Mao Zedong, 5:00 a.m., October 26  Printed from the manuscript. Included in Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong (Internal Edition).

Notes [ ] Peng Dehuai was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Deng Hua was then Deputy Commander and Deputy Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. [ ] Gao refers to Gao Gang, who at the time served as Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.