Telegram to Peng Dehuai [1] et al. Regarding the Deployment for the Annihilation of the Enemy’s 6th and 8th Divisions (October 23, 1950) To Peng and Deng [2], with copy to Gao [3]:  (1) Your respective telegrams of the 22nd have all been received.  (2) According to the latest intelligence received, the enemy’s 2nd Corps Command Post turned back from Jiangdong to Seongchon on the 22nd.
The 6th and 8th Divisions advanced on the 22nd to the area north of the Sunchon–Seongchon railway line, around Bukchang-ri and Sinchang-ri, apparently intending to deploy both divisions side by side through Tokchon in order to concentrate their attack toward Hichon.
Unless obstructed, it is estimated that these two divisions may reach Tokchon or its vicinity by tomorrow, the 24th.
Therefore, the units under my command stationed around Hyungchondong and Myohyangsan must strive to arrive at the aforementioned locations by dawn on the 24th, and at the latest before dawn on the 25th; otherwise, we shall lose the element of surprise.  (3) As for the operational deployment, the 40th Army will be positioned facing Hichon and in the Wŏnch’ŏn–Unsan areas, the 39th Army in the Unsan–T’aech’on region, and the 38th Army southeast of Hichon.
When the enemy launches its attack toward Hichon, our forces will then move out along several axes to encircle and strike.
This corresponds to the views expressed in Peng’s telegram of 10:00 a.m. on the 22nd and in the joint telegram of Deng, Hong, Han, and Choe [4] at 12:00 noon on the same day, which I consider appropriate.
The overarching principle is to exploit the main force to penetrate behind and to the flanks of the enemy, thereby completely annihilating the 6th and 8th Divisions.  (4) The enemy’s Capital Division has indeed advanced northward toward Pukch’ŏng and Ch’ŏngjin, temporarily bypassing Ch’angjin, while the puppet 1st Division in Pyongyang and the British 27th Brigade are both moving toward Sin’anju.
An American parachute regiment (approximately 2,000–3,000 men) has already landed at Sunchon.
Consequently, once hostilities against the enemy’s 6th and 8th Divisions are initiated, the first wave of reinforcement will likely come from the puppet 7th Division, followed by the puppet 1st Division and the British 27th Brigade (the latter having already been ordered by the U.S. to advance toward Sin’anju). If we can successively destroy all these enemy main forces and, during the subsequent pursuit, encounter the U.S. parachute regiment in the Sunchon area, then this operation, if executed properly, will enable us to annihilate each of the aforementioned enemy formations one by one, secure control over the Sin’anju–Sunchon–Seongchon–Sinyŏp–Yangdŏk railway line and the regions south of it, and extend a portion of our forces into the Koksŏng, Suwŏn, Igyŏng, and Sinsŏk areas, thereby isolating Pyongyang and Wŏnsan from each other and preventing them from communicating.
In that case, we shall be in the initiative, whereas the enemy will be put on the defensive.
Therefore, this campaign must concentrate as much combat power as possible and be prepared to conduct several successive engagements.
For the 42nd Army heading toward Ch’angjin, it would seem sufficient to dispatch only one division accompanied by an artillery regiment, while keeping the bulk of the army in reserve near Sobaeksan.
Please make a decision on this matter, Peng.  (5) I have instructed Yang Chengwu [ ] to transfer the 66th Army to Andong [ ], with the lead division departing Tianjin today and the main body setting out tomorrow.
Upon arrival, one division will be tasked with maintaining traffic along the Sinŭiju–Tongch’ŏn line, while the remainder will serve as a reserve under the command of Peng and Deng in Andong.
After the 66th Army arrives, it will come under the direct command of Peng and Deng.
Deng should assign personnel to brief the unit, convey to them all relevant slogans, mottos, and other directives pertaining to the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and establish radio communication with them.  (6) No troops need to be left behind by the 39th Army in the Sinŭiju–Ch’ŏrsan area.  (7) All reconnaissance teams dispatched by my units must disguise themselves as members of the Korean People’s Army and refrain from identifying themselves as Chinese People’s Volunteers, so as to mislead the enemy.
Mao Zedong, 7:00 a.m., October 23 Based on the manuscript.
Included in Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong (Internal Edition).

Notes  [1] Peng Dehuai, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.  [2] Deng refers to Deng Hua, then Commander and Political Commissar of the 13th Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.  [3] Gao refers to Gao Gang, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army of China.  [ ] Deng refers to Deng Hua.
Hong refers to Hong Xuezhi, and Han refers to Han Xianchu, both of whom were Deputy Commanders of the 13th Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteers at the time.
Choe refers to Choe Fang, then Chief of Staff of the 13th Corps.  [ ] Yang Chengwu, then Commander of the 20th Corps of the People’s Liberation Army of China.  [ ] Andong is present-day Dandong City.