Telegram to Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang [1] Regarding the Situation on the Korean Front (October 23, 1950) To Peng, with copy to Gao: We have received your telegram of the 22nd, at the hour of the Dog [2]. Your line of action is prudent, and we should proceed from a solid, steady basis, undertaking only what is feasible.
As for the military aspect of the Korean situation, it hinges on the following points.
First, whether the campaign now being prepared can, by exploiting complete surprise, annihilate two, three, or even four puppet army divisions (Division No. 3 will follow Division No. 6, and Division No. 1 may also reinforce). If this proves to be a major victory, the enemy will have to redeploy; Sinuiju, Sunchon, Jeongju, and other places will not be occupied—at least for a time—and Divisions No. 1 and No. 3 will withdraw from the Hamhung area back to the Wonsan region, while Chosin can be held.
Whether Sinanju and Sunchon can be defended, however, may become problematic, and the section of railway from Seongchon to Yangdeok, left undefended, will present a wide gap open to enemy penetration.
Under our current strength, the enemy would immediately fall into a passive position.
On the other hand, if this surprise operation yields only a modest success—if the main forces of Divisions No. 6, 7, and 8 are not swiftly destroyed, or if they manage to escape, or even hold out awaiting reinforcements; if reinforcements arrive from Divisions No. 1 and No. 3 along with a portion of U.S. troops, forcing us to retreat from our positions—the situation will shift in the enemy’s favor, and holding Hichon and Chosin will likewise become difficult.
Second, to what extent do enemy aircraft inflict casualties among our troops and impede our operations?
If we can master night marches and night combat to a high degree, even with the enemy’s large air force, we may still avoid heavy losses and severe disruption.
In that case, our forces could continue engaging in field battles and seizing numerous isolated strongpoints—meaning that, apart from major cities such as Pyongyang, Wonsan, Seoul, Daegu, and Busan, and their immediate surroundings, where we lack air support and thus cannot attack, the remaining enemy units could be individually eliminated, even if the United States were to send several more divisions.
This would create the possibility of compelling the United States to enter into diplomatic negotiations with us, or else waiting until our own air and artillery capabilities are sufficient to take these cities one by one.
Should enemy air power cause us such heavy casualties and obstruction that we are unable to conduct effective operations, then, for the next six months to a year, before our air assets are ready, our forces will find themselves in a very difficult position.
Third, if the United States were to transfer another five to ten divisions to Korea, and if, prior to that, our forces have failed to destroy several U.S. and puppet divisions in mobile warfare and in engagements against isolated strongpoints, the situation will again turn against us; conversely, success in this regard would work to our advantage.
All of these factors can be tested and confirmed during the present campaign and over the coming months.
I believe we should strive for a complete victory in this campaign, endeavoring to maintain high morale and carry out vigorous operations despite enemy air raids, and seek to destroy as much of the enemy’s strength as possible before additional U.S. or other reinforcements arrive in Korea, so that their reinforcements cannot keep pace with their losses.
In short, we should aim for every possible victory, proceeding from a firm and reliable foundation.
Mao Zedong, October 23 (read and then destroyed). Printed from the manuscript.
Included in the “Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong” (internal edition).

Notes [1]: Peng Dehuai was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army.
Gao Gang was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army. [2]: Refers to Peng Dehuai’s telegram of October 22, 1950, sent at the hour of the Dog, concerning the current campaign plan and addressed to both Mao Zedong and Gao Gang.
The telegram stated: Over the next six months, our basic policy is to hold the mountainous regions north of Chosin, Hichon, and Kugyeong, as well as the river crossings at Changden Estuary, Jigan, and Linjiang, buying time to prepare for a counteroffensive.
At present, we lack air superiority; coastal cities along both the east and west coasts, including Sinuiju, cannot be defended under the enemy’s combined naval, land, air, and tank bombardment, and should therefore be deliberately abandoned in order to disperse enemy forces and reduce unnecessary attrition.
Our current campaign plan involves using one corps to pin down the enemy while concentrating three corps to seize opportunities to destroy two or three puppet divisions, thereby expanding and consolidating our control over the mountainous areas north of the Wonsan–Pyongyang line and developing guerrilla warfare in South Korea.