Telegram to Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua [1] Regarding the Deployment for the Swift Encirclement and Annihilation of the Enemy’s 6th and 8th Divisions (October 22, 1950)

Peng and Deng:   (1) We have received your telegram of 4:00 p.m. on the 21st.

(2) According to a report from the commander of the enemy’s 2nd Corps at 4:30 p.m. on the 20th, the 6th Division is currently assembling between Sunchon and Sinchang-ri and is slated to advance to Sinuiju. The 8th Division is concentrating between Kangdong and Seongchon and is to move on to Manpo Town. That same day, the corps’ chief of staff ordered the main force of the 7th Division to assemble between Seongchon and Sunchon for rest and reorganization, but strictly forbade any advance into Sunchon. The 2nd Corps headquarters is located at Samdung.  Based on this information, if enemy aircraft have not yet detected our troop movements within the next few days, the 6th Division will pass through Sinanju and push forward to Pokchon and areas west of it, while the 8th Division will advance to Kunuri and regions north of it. The 7th Division will remain in the Sunchon area as a reserve. Should the 6th and 8th Divisions continue their advance on the 21st, the 6th Division may reach Sinanju and the 8th Division Kunuri by today, the 22nd. Therefore, our marching routes must avoid the line running through Jeongju, Pokchon, and Kunuri, as well as an area approximately twenty kilometers north of that line; instead, we should take northern routes. Otherwise, we risk being discovered prematurely, prompting the enemy to halt its advance or even withdraw. In this campaign, however, the most advantageous course would be to encircle and annihilate the enemy forces in and north of Pokchon and Kunuri. Please promptly finalize the deployment along these lines; delay could prove fatal.

(3) Furthermore, according to a report from the commander of the enemy’s 1st Corps at 10:00 a.m. on the 20th, the U.S. X Corps commander has ordered the Capital Division of that corps—currently positioned in Hamhung—to advance north toward Ch’ongjin. The 3rd Division is concentrated in Hamhung. It was also stated that the U.S. X Corps headquarters is moving toward Hamhung with the mission of directing operations of the enemy’s 1st Corps (the U.S. X Corps was originally formed from the U.S. 1st Marine Division, previously stationed in Seoul, and the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, formerly based in Daegu, which were landed by sea at Wonsan). From this, it appears that the enemy does not intend to move toward Ch’angjin for the time being, which works to our advantage. Nevertheless, your earlier instruction to dispatch one division to occupy Ch’angjin and to deploy sufficient forces to secure Myohyang-san and Heungch’on-dong remains highly necessary; please implement it without delay. In addition, troops should also be sent to control Taehyak-san so as to effectively sever communication between the eastern and western enemy forces. After our forces initiate combat on the western front, the eastern enemy units may attempt to reinforce their comrades.

(4) If we can simultaneously encircle both the enemy’s 6th and 8th Divisions, that would be most favorable for the overall situation. My 40th Army should undertake the encirclement of one division, while the 39th Army should encircle the other. When the fighting becomes critical, in addition to the inevitable reinforcement by the 7th Division, I anticipate being able to continue destroying the enemy. At present, the enemy’s 1st Division stationed in Pyongyang also represents a potential reinforcing force, and you should accordingly prepare to counter it. Although the eastern enemy units might also attempt to come to the aid of their comrades, their greater distance makes such reinforcement unlikely. The likelihood of reinforcement by the U.S. forces in Pyongyang is even lower.

Mao Zedong  7:00 a.m., October 22  Printed from the manuscript. Included in Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong (internal edition).  Notes [1] Peng Dehuai was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Deng Hua was then Commander and Political Commissar of the 13th Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.