Telegram to Peng Dehuai [1] et al. Regarding Winning the First Battle Abroad for the Chinese People’s Volunteers (October 21, 1950) Ni Chai [2], hereby forwarded to Comrade Peng Dehuai, with copies to Deng Hong Han Xie [3] and Gao He [4]:

(1) The puppet Capital Division is advancing from Hamhung toward Chosin. The Third Puppet Division appears set to move up to Hamhung. The Sixth Puppet Division has shifted its route via P’o-yŏ to the north, with its first objective being Tokchon; its second objective may be Hich’on. The Seventh and Eighth Puppet Divisions are initially heading toward Sunchon–Kumyang–Anju, with a possible subsequent move toward Taech’on–Ryong(su)seong. The ultimate destination of these five divisions lies along the line connecting Kanggye and Sinuiju. Up to this moment, neither the U.S. forces nor the puppet troops have anticipated the entry of our Volunteer Army into the war, hence their bold decision to split into eastern and western columns and press forward without hesitation.

(2) It is estimated that the Capital and Third Puppet Divisions will require approximately seven days to reach Chosin, after which they will turn toward Kanggye. Should our first engagement not target these two divisions, it would suffice for a single division of the 42nd Army to be positioned in the Chosin area to block the enemy. Meanwhile, the main body of the 42nd Army should be deployed south of Mongsan—specifically along the likely advance route of the Sixth Puppet Division—in order to sever the railway link between Wonsan and Pyongyang, thereby pinning down enemy forces at both locations and preventing them from reinforcing northward. This would enable us to concentrate three major field armies to annihilate the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Puppet Divisions one by one.

(3) If a portion of the Korean People’s Army can mount a strong delaying action against the Sixth Puppet Division (which is relatively stronger) as it advances along the railway from P’o-yŏ to Tokchon, then this enemy unit may not capture Tokchon until around October 24 or 25. Should the entire 40th Army manage to arrive by the 23rd in the Tokchon–Ningwon area, it could outflank the Sixth Puppet Division from the east and swing around to the southern railway line, thus freeing up the front for another unit—say, the 38th or 39th Army—to engage directly. However, if our arrival is delayed, the enemy will seize Tokchon first.

(4) This operation presents an excellent opportunity to destroy several puppet divisions, secure our first victory abroad, and begin to reverse the course of the Korean War. I urge Peng and Deng to carefully plan and execute the deployment.

(5) The battle is likely to last seven to ten days, including the pursuit phase. Does our army have sufficient dry rations? I call upon all units to remain highly motivated, to be prepared for sacrifice and hardship, and to strive for complete victory.

(6) Peng and Deng should stay together and avoid separation. Mao Zedong, 2:30 a.m., October 21, based on the manuscript. Printed from the original draft. Included in the “Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong” (internal edition). Notes [1] Peng Dehuai was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. [2] Ni refers to Ni Zhiliang, who served as China’s Ambassador to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the time. Chai denotes Chai Junwu, now known as Chai Chengwen, then First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in the DPRK. [3] Deng refers to Deng Hua, then Commander and Political Commissar of the 13th Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Hong stands for Hong Xuezhi, and Han represents Han Xianchu, both of whom were Deputy Commanders of the 13th Corps at the time. Xie designates Xie Fang, Chief of Staff of the 13th Corps. [4] Gao refers to Gao Gang, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army. He denotes He Jinyuan, who served as Deputy Commander of the same region.