The Situation in Korea and Our Opinion on the Entry of Our Troops into Korea to Participate in the War[1]
(October 14, 1950)

Comrade Enlai:

A. The situation in Korea:

(1) The U.S. 1st Division, U.S. 2nd Division, U.S. 24th Division, the British 25th Brigade, and the puppet 1st Division are assembling in the Kaesong and Kumchon areas on the 38th Parallel north of Seoul in preparation for an attack on Pyongyang. Today’s dispatch reports that the U.S. 2nd Division intends to move near Kumchon to establish a foothold. Judging from this, it seems the U.S. has not yet made a final decision on whether to attack Pyongyang or when to attack it.

(2) The puppet Capital Division and 3rd Division have already reached Wonsan, while the 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions are gradually concentrating toward the Wonsan area, receiving supplies by sea.

(3) The U.S. 1st Marine Division is in Seoul, the U.S. 25th Division is on the Taejon-Suwon line, the U.S. 7th Division is on the Taegu[2]-Pusan line, the U.S. Eighth Army headquarters is in Taejon, and two puppet divisions are blocked in various southern areas. The enemy situation in most parts of Korea is thin.

(4) The various Korean units still capable of fighting, under Kim Il Sung’s command, are firmly engaging the enemy on the 38th Parallel. Over 50,000 troops of the southern People’s Army have withdrawn north of the 38th Parallel, while the greater part remains in South Korea. The People’s Army has recaptured Ulchin Port.

B. Comrade Peng Dehuai[1], after studying the situation in Andong[2], believes that if our forces can advance one corps to the mountainous region of Tokchon County, about 200 kilometers northeast of Pyongyang, and position the remaining three corps and three artillery divisions in the Huichon, Jonchon, and Kanggye areas north of Tokchon, then, first, this might cause the U.S. and puppet forces to have misgivings and halt their continued advance, thus preserving the area north of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, or at least the mountainous region, from enemy occupation. In this way, our troops could avoid fighting and gain time for equipment and training. Second, if the enemy forces at Wonsan and Pyongyang attack northward toward the mountainous areas like Tokchon, our troops could use the necessary strength to pin down the enemy at Pyongyang while concentrating our main forces to destroy the puppet troops attacking from the Wonsan direction. As long as one or two, or two or three, intact puppet divisions can be wiped out, the situation will be greatly relieved. Both Comrades Peng and Gao Gang[3] believe there is full confidence in defeating the puppet troops. Like me, they both consider participation in the war to be necessary and advantageous.

C. Gao returned to Shenyang today to actively arrange all preparations for war participation. Peng remains temporarily in Beijing awaiting your reply telegram.

D. The main issues to consider are:
(1) Whether the Soviet Union can definitively dispatch volunteer air forces for the front lines and protective air forces for major rear cities within two months;
(2) Whether the aircraft, tanks, artillery, and other military equipment the Soviet Union has agreed to assist us with can be obtained through a lend-lease arrangement without disrupting our budget plan (at least 2 billion U.S. dollars for economic and cultural development and general military and administrative expenses).

Mao Zedong
14th, 0300 hours

[1] Peng Dehuai, then serving as Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army.
[2] Andong, former city name, now Dandong, Liaoning.
[3] Gao Gang, then serving as First Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region.