(1) I have instructed Peng Dehuai [2] that after he goes to Tokchon to study the situation, he should construct two to three defensive lines in the area north of the Pyongyang–Wonsan railway line and south of the Tokchon–Nyongwon highway line.
If the enemy attacks, we shall divide and annihilate them in front of the positions. If the U.S. forces in Pyongyang and the puppet forces in Wonsan attack from two directions, we shall strike the more isolated and weaker route.
The current resolve is to fight the puppet forces, and we may also engage certain isolated U.S. forces.
If time permits, we shall continue to strengthen the fortifications. Within six months, if the enemy holds fast in Pyongyang and Wonsan and does not come out, our forces shall likewise refrain from attacking Pyongyang and Wonsan.
Only after our forces are fully equipped and trained, and possess overwhelming superiority over the enemy both in the air and on the ground, shall we proceed to attack Pyongyang, Wonsan, and other places—that is, we shall discuss the question of attack only after six months.
In doing so, we are assured of success and stand to gain considerable advantage.

(2) The U.S. forces are still stationed along the 38th Parallel [3]. It will take time for them to advance to Pyongyang, and further time to move from Pyongyang toward Tokchon.
If the U.S. forces in Pyongyang do not advance toward Tokchon, it is estimated that the puppet forces in Wonsan will also find it difficult to launch an independent attack. This will afford our forces time for deployment and the construction of defensive positions.

(3) Our forces are determined to begin movement on October 19. The vanguard units will need seven days to march 200 kilometers to Tokchon, and after one or two days of rest, they can begin constructing fortifications in the area south of the Tokchon–Nyongwon line by October 28.
The entire force of 260,000 troops will require ten days to cross the Yalu River, meaning the crossing will not be completed until October 28.

(4) In preparation for winning a victory in November when the enemy attacks the Tokchon area, we have decided that it is best to dispatch the full 260,000 troops (twelve infantry divisions and three artillery divisions) for deployment.
After the fortifications are completed and the enemy remains entrenched in Pyongyang and Wonsan, not daring to attack, we shall then withdraw approximately half of the forces back into Chinese territory for training and provisioning, returning them only when a major battle is to be fought.

(5) During the period when half of our forces are constructing fortifications, it will be advantageous for the Korean People’s Army to continue resisting and to delay the advance of the U.S. and puppet forces as much as possible.

Published according to the text in *Mao Zedong’s Military Writings*, Volume 6, Military Science Press and Central Party Literature Press, 1992.

Notes

--- Notes

[1] This is an excerpt from a telegram Mao Zedong sent to Zhou Enlai, who was then in the Soviet Union discussing the issue of aid to Korea.
[2] Peng Dehuai, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army.
[3] The 38th Parallel, see note [5] on page 99 of this volume.