Telegram to Zhou Enlai Concerning the Policy and Deployment for the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ Entry into Korea for Combat (October 14, 1950)  (1) I have instructed Peng Dehuai [1] that, after he arrives in Tokchon to study the situation, two to three lines of defensive positions are to be constructed in the area north of the Pyongyang–Wonsan railway line and south of the Tokchon–Ningyŏn highway. Should the enemy attack, they are to be broken up and annihilated before these positions; if U.S. forces from Pyongyang and puppet troops from Wonsan advance on parallel axes, we are to engage and defeat whichever force is more isolated and weaker. Our present resolve is to fight the puppet forces, though certain isolated U.S. units may also be engaged. If time permits, fortifications will continue to be strengthened. Over the next six months, should the enemy hold fast at Pyongyang and Wonsan and refrain from advancing, our forces will likewise not move against those cities. Once our troops have completed their equipment and training, attaining overwhelming superiority over the enemy both in the air and on the ground, then and only then will we proceed to attack Pyongyang, Wonsan, and other objectives—meaning that questions of offensive operations will be revisited after six months. We believe this course of action is both assured of success and highly advantageous.

(2) The U.S. forces are still positioned along the 38th Parallel. It will take them time to advance to Pyongyang, and further time to push on from there toward Tokchon. If the U.S. forces at Pyongyang do not press toward Tokchon, it is likewise unlikely that the puppet troops at Wonsan will be able to launch an independent offensive. This will afford our forces the necessary time to deploy and construct defensive works.

(3) Our forces are scheduled to begin moving on October 19. The leading echelon, marching 200 kilometers on foot to Tokchon, will require seven days; following a rest period of one or two days, work can commence on October 28 to establish defensive positions in the area south of the Tokchon–Ningyŏn line. The entire force of 260,000 men will need ten days to cross the Yalu River, meaning that the crossing will not be completed until October 28.

(4) In order to prepare for a decisive victory in November should the enemy launch an offensive against the Tokchon sector, we have decided it is best to commit all 260,000 troops—comprising twelve infantry divisions and three artillery divisions—to the advance. Once the fortifications are in place and the enemy remains entrenched at Pyongyang and Wonsan, refusing to come out to fight, roughly half of the force may be withdrawn back into Chinese territory for training and resupply, to be brought forward again when the time comes for a major operation.

(5) While half of our forces are engaged in constructing defensive works, the Korean People’s Army should continue to resist, delaying the advance of the U.S. and puppet forces as long as possible; this would be to our advantage. Printed from the “Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong” (internal edition). (Based on the approved original manuscript.)  Notes  [1] Peng Dehuai, who at that time served as Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.