Telegram to Zhou Enlai Regarding Our Army’s Entry into Korea for Combat (October 13, 1950) (1) Following consultations with the Politburo members, we unanimously concluded that it would be advantageous for our forces to be deployed to Korea. In the initial phase, we could focus solely on engaging the puppet troops; our army is confident in its ability to defeat them. By establishing a base area in the extensive mountainous regions north of the Wonsan–Pyongyang line, we could greatly encourage the Korean people. During this first stage, merely annihilating a few puppet army divisions would bring about a favorable shift in the Korean situation. (2) Adopting such an active policy would be highly beneficial to China, to Korea, to the East, and to the entire world. Conversely, if we refrained from sending troops and allowed the enemy to advance right up to the Yalu River, thereby emboldening domestic and international reactionaries, it would prove detrimental to all parties involved—most notably to Northeast China, where the entire Northeast Border Defense Force would become pinned down, and South Manchuria’s [1] power supply would fall under enemy control. In summary, we believe that participation in the war is not only advisable but imperative; the benefits of intervention are immense, whereas the costs of non-intervention would be catastrophic. Printed according to the “Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong” (internal edition). (Based on the approved original document.) Notes [1] South Manchuria was an older term referring to areas east of the Shenyang–Dalian railway line, including Zhuanghe, Dandong, Tonghua, Linjiang, Qingyuan, and Liaozhong southwest of Shenyang.

Telegram to Chen Yi [1] Concerning the Ninth Corps’ Assembly and Standby Position in the Tai’an–Qufu Area (October 14, 1950) Comrade Chen Yi: Your telegram of 10 p.m. on the 12th has been received. (1) It is permissible for the trailing units of the Song Corps [2] to have completely left the Shanghai–Changshu region by Youjian hour. The Song Corps should continue to follow the previously determined plan to assemble and undergo training in the Tai’an–Qufu area for a period before being placed on standby for deployment to Northeast China. (2) The anti-aircraft artillery regiment must still proceed immediately to Northeast China. (3) Please inform us when the Shanghai People’s Representative Conference will convene. Mao Zedong October 14, 1 a.m. Printed from the manuscript. Notes [ ] Chen Yi was at that time Commander of the East China Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Mayor of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government. [2] Refers to the Ninth Corps of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, commanded by Song Shilun as both commander and political commissar.

Telegram to Zhou Enlai Concerning the Situation in Korea and Our Army’s Participation in the War [1] (October 14, 1950) Comrade Enlai: A. The Situation in Korea: (1) The U.S. 1st Division, 2nd Division, 24th Division, the British 25th Brigade, and the puppet army’s 1st Division have assembled north of Seoul along the 38th parallel in the Kaesong–Kumchon area, preparing to launch an offensive against Pyongyang. According to today’s reports, the U.S. 2nd Division is moving toward the vicinity of Kumchon to establish a foothold. Based on this, it appears that the U.S. has yet to make a final decision regarding whether or when to attack Pyongyang. (2) The puppet army’s Capital Division and 3rd Division have already reached Wonsan, while the 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions are gradually concentrating in the Wonsan area, receiving supplies by sea. (3) The U.S. 1st Marine Division is stationed in Seoul, the U.S. 25th Division along the Daejeon–Suwon line, the U.S. 7th Division along the Daegu–Busan line, and the headquarters of the U.S. Eighth Army in Daejeon. Two puppet army divisions remain blocked in various parts of the south, leaving most of North Korea relatively devoid of enemy presence. (4) Under Kim Il-sung’s command, the remaining combat-capable Korean units are holding firm along the 38th parallel. Over 50,000 southern guerrillas have withdrawn north of the 38th parallel, with the majority remaining in South Korea. These forces have successfully recaptured the port of Uljin. B. After studying the situation in Andong [3], Comrade Peng Dehuai believes that if our army could advance one corps approximately 200 kilometers northeast of Pyongyang into the mountainous region of Deokchon County, while positioning the remaining three corps and three artillery divisions in Hichon, Jeonchon, and Ganggye north of Deokchon, then, first, it might cause the U.S.-puppet forces to hesitate and halt their further advance, thus ensuring that at least the mountainous areas north of the Pyongyang–Wonsan line remain free from enemy occupation. In this way, our troops could avoid direct combat and gain time for equipment preparation and training. Second, should the enemy forces from Wonsan and Pyongyang launch a northward offensive into these mountainous regions, our army could deploy sufficient forces to contain the enemy near Pyongyang while concentrating its main strength to destroy the puppet troops advancing from the Wonsan direction. Once one or two, perhaps even three, complete puppet army divisions were eliminated, the overall situation would significantly ease. Both Peng and Gao Gang [4] are confident in their ability to defeat the puppet forces. Like myself, they also regard participation in the war as both necessary and advantageous. C. Gao has returned to Shenyang today to actively arrange all preparations for combat, while Peng remains in Beijing awaiting your reply. Mao Zedong 3 p.m. on the 14th, printed based on a copy preserved in the Central Archives. Notes [1] This telegram was included in this book with certain portions omitted. [2] Peng Dehuai was at that time Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. [3] Andong corresponds to present-day Dandong City. [4] Gao Gang was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.£µ ９