On the Complete Annihilation of Laban’s Regiment and the Garrison at Qixi[1]
(October 11, 1950)

Chen Geng:

Your telegram of the 9th has been noted. To secure the complete victory of the Border Campaign, it is essential to boost morale and completely annihilate Laban’s[2] regiment and the garrison at Qixi. When attacking Qixi, French forces from Lang Son and other areas may still send reinforcements. This possibility must be anticipated in advance, and preparations should be made to block or strike such reinforcements.

Central Military Commission

October 11

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[1] Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.
[2] Gao refers to Gao Gang, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region. Deng refers to Deng Hua, then Commander and Political Commissar of the 13th Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.
[3] The October 9 telegram refers to the message sent by Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang to Mao Zedong on October 9, 1950. The telegram stated: The entire army has only one regiment of anti-aircraft weapons, totaling 36 guns, which cannot provide cover for hundreds of heavy artillery pieces in firing positions. Request the dispatch of another regiment from Guangzhou or other military regions to the Northeast for immediate use. When our forces go into combat, how many fighter planes and bombers can the Military Commission deploy for coordination? When can they be deployed, and who will be in command? Urgently request instructions. The October 10 telegram refers to the message sent by Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong on October 10, 1950. The telegram stated: Preparations for the deployment of the Volunteer Army are insufficient, and there is significant concern about U.S. imperialist tanks, especially their air force. The lack of air force and anti-aircraft cover during artillery movement into positions raises even greater concerns. Request the urgent dispatch of one or two anti-aircraft artillery regiments. The railway bridges at Andong and Ji’an have no anti-aircraft installations whatsoever; once combat begins, both bridges will be completely destroyed, causing severe transportation difficulties. According to your original instructions, deployment is set for the 15th, with the four armies and three artillery divisions to assemble in the following areas by the 20th, or at the latest the 22nd, to seize the opportunity to destroy a portion of the enemy. The 40th Army will assemble at Unsan, the 42nd Army at Maengsan and Deokcheon, the 39th Army at Huichon, the 38th Army at Kanggye, the Artillery Command with two divisions at Jeoncheon, and another division at Bukjin and Onjong. The original plan was to deploy two armies and two artillery divisions first, but there is concern that if the Yalu River railway bridges are bombed, it will be difficult to concentrate superior forces, leading to a loss of combat opportunities. Therefore, it has been decided to assemble all forces south of the river, altering the original plan.

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central People’s Government and addressed to Chen Geng, then Deputy Commander of the Southwest Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army and Commander of the Yunnan Military Region. At the time, Chen Geng was dispatched to Vietnam as a representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to assist the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the headquarters of the Vietnam People’s Army in organizing and commanding the Border Campaign against the French invading forces.
[2] Laban was then the commander of the French forces stationed in the Qixi area of Vietnam. During the Vietnam Border Campaign, he was ordered to lead four companies of foreign troops as reinforcements to the north to relieve the French forces encircled by the Vietnam People’s Army in the Coc Xa mountain area.