Your telegrams of October 7 and 8 have been received. (1) The great victory of the Vietnamese army is extremely gratifying. (2) After this victory, the Vietnamese army will surely be able to improve. The Vietnamese army is still young; only through many future combat operations can it gradually learn the various techniques and tactics of close-quarters combat. Chinese comrades helping them must pay attention to their own methods and attitudes, so that they are happy to accept, and must not spoil the relationship. Chinese comrades must at all times examine their own methods and attitudes, and are only permitted to do good, not bad. (3) After the campaign concludes, there must be a rest and consolidation period of twenty days to one month to summarize experience, replenish troops, conduct education on close-quarters combat and political education, select the objective for the next combat operation, and do a good job of planning the next combat operation. (4) This victory was achieved under circumstances where the enemy's high command did not anticipate that the Vietnamese army could concentrate more than 20,000 men at one time and that its combat effectiveness had increased. Having gained this experience, the enemy will necessarily be more cautious. When the Vietnamese army besieges strongpoints, with the exception of very isolated strongpoints such as Lao Cai and others, the garrisons of the strongpoints will surely be increased, and their reinforcement detachments will surely be enlarged; that is, it is necessary to prepare to besiege strongpoints of one to two thousand men and to fight reinforcement detachments of four to five thousand men or more. Therefore, the Vietnamese army must also make new plans, that is, to again concentrate and equip around 20,000 men, among which there should be two artillery regiments including various types of artillery fire such as mountain guns, field guns, anti-tank guns, heavy mortars, howitzers, etc. In short, within the next half year or so, the Vietnamese army must build a regular army with a total of around 50,000 men, and have more than twice the firepower of 10,000 French ground troops (that is, if 10,000 French troops have 100 large and small artillery pieces, then 50,000 Vietnamese troops must have more than 200 large and small artillery pieces), preparing to be able to annihilate 10,000 French troops in one operation. Of course, in the process of building such a powerful military force, as long as it is possible, it is still necessary to fight many smaller-scale battles to temper the combat effectiveness of the troops, and not to attempt to fight large battles too quickly. However, a plan to be able to annihilate 10,000 French troops in one operation should be made now, so that it will be possible to fight large battles after half a year. Please consult with the Vietnamese comrades to formulate this plan during this rest and consolidation period, and report it by telegram for our information.

Military Commission
October 10