ON THE DECISION TO SEND VOLUNTEERS
TO FIGHT IN KOREA*
(October 1, 1950)
(1) We have decided to send part of our troops, in the name of volunteers,
to Korea to fight against the armed forces of the United States and its lackey
Syngman Rhee® and to aid the Korean comrades. We deem this essential. If
all of Korea were occupied by the Americans and the Korean revolutionary
forces suffered a fundamental defeat, the U.S. aggressors would grow more
rampant, which would run counter to the interests of the whole of the East.
(2) We deem that since we decide to dispatch Chinese troops to fight
against the Americans in Korea, then first, this must be capable of resolving
the problem, i.e., be prepared to wipe out and drive away the aggressor troops
of the U.S. and other countries in Korea, and second, as Chinese troops
(though sent in the name of volunteers) will fight American troops in Korea,
we should be prepared for the U.S. declaring a state of war with China and at
least using its air force to bomb a number of big cities and industrial bases in
China and its navy to attack our coastal regions.
(3) The first of the two above questions is whether the Chinese troops
will be able to annihilate the U.S. troops in Korea, thus effectively solve the
Korean issue. If only our troops can wipe out the U.S. troops in Korea, mainly
their Eighth Army (a veteran army with combat capability), then though the
second question (the U.S. declaring war on China) may still remain a grave
one, the situation will become favorable to the revolutionary front and China.
In other words, with the Korean issue concluded in fact with victory over the
U.S. armed forces (in form the issue may not yet be concluded with the United
States for a considerably long time refusing to acknowledge Korean victory),
even if the United States has declared war against China, that war probably
will not be very large in scale, nor a prolonged one. In our view, the most
disadvantageous scenario would be Chinese troops failing to annihilate large
* This is the main part of a telegram from Mao Zedong to J. V. Stalin.
numbers of the U.S. troops in Korea, resulting in a stalemate of troop
confrontation, while the United States would have entered a state of war
against China openly, thus frustrating China's plan of economic reconstruct
tion, which has already begun, and causing dissatisfaction among the Chinese
national bourgeoisie and some other people (who are very afraid of war).
(4) In the present circumstances we have decided to move from October
15® 12 divisions (five or six are not sufficient), which have previously been
mustered in southern Manchuria,® and into appropriate areas in northern
Korea (not necessarily up to the 38th Parallel®). On the one hand, these troops
will fight enemy troops that dare to attack areas north of the 38th Parallel,
initially only fighting defensive battles, annihilating small contingents of
enemy troops and sizing up all aspects of the situation. On the other hand,
we are awaiting the arrival of Soviet weaponry for reequipment of our troops
with a view to going over to the counteroffensive in cooperation with the
Korean comrades and wiping out the U.S. aggressor troops.
(5) According to our knowledge, each U.S. army (composed of two
infantry divisions and one mechanized division) is equipped with 1,500 pieces
of artillery of various types, including tank guns and AA guns, with calibers
ranging from 7 cm to 24 cm. Our army (composed of three divisions) has
only 36 such heavy guns. The enemy has control of the air, while the first
batch of the Chinese Air Force now undergoing training will be able to go into
operation with some 300 combat aircraft only in February 1951. Therefore,
at the present moment our troops do not have the certainty of annihilating a
whole U.S. army in one campaign. However, since the decision has already
been taken to fight the Americans, we should be prepared, when the U.S. high
command concentrates a whole army to fight a campaign against us on the
battlefield, to counter the enemy with a military strength four times as strong
(i.e., countering one enemy army with four of our armies) and with firepower
one-and-a-half to two times as strong (i.e., countering the 1,500 pieces of
enemy artillery of over 7-cm caliber with 2,200 to 3,000 pieces of our artillery
of similar caliber), and should have the certainty of annihilating one enemy
army thoroughly and completely.
(6) In addition to the above-mentioned 12 divisions, we are moving 24
divisions from areas south of the Yangtze River and from the Shaanxi-Gansu
area along the Longhai, Tianjin-Pukou and Beining railway lines as the second
and third batches of forces for aiding Korea, to be put into operation one by
one next spring and summer in view of the evolving situation.
(From the original manuscript)