Telegram to the Korean Comrades [I]
(September 27, 1950)

Comrades Gao Gang and Deng Hua:
The telegram of September 20, forwarded to the Korean comrades via Ni Zhiliang [2], is hereby relayed to you. Destroy it after reading. The Korean comrades have already agreed to this proposal.

Zhou Enlai
September 27

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong in the name of Zhou Enlai, addressed to Gao Gang, First Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, and Deng Hua, Commander and Political Commissar of the 13th Army Corps.
[2] Ni Zhiliang, then serving as China’s Ambassador to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
[3] Refers to the telegram of September 20, 1950, from Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhiliang for transmission to Kim Il Sung, as revised by Mao Zedong.
The full text of the telegram is as follows:
Your telegram of September 18 received. Please convey to Comrade Kim Il Sung:
We believe your thinking on protracted warfare is correct. The heroism of the Korean army and people is deeply admirable. It is estimated that the enemy may still increase forces in the Inchon area, with the aim of extending the occupation eastward, cutting off north-south communication in Korea, and pressing toward the 38th Parallel. The People’s Army must strive to hold the area north of the 38th Parallel; only by waging a protracted war is this possible. Therefore, please consider how to preserve the main forces to facilitate the piecemeal annihilation of the enemy under the general policy of persisting in self-reliance and protracted struggle. At present, with the main forces exposed before the enemy’s lines and locked in a stalemate, attrition will inevitably be heavy, and if the enemy occupies Seoul, the rear route of the People’s Army risks being severed. Hence, it seems advisable for the main forces of the People’s Army to assemble for mobile operations, seeking out the enemy’s weak points to divide and annihilate them. In combat, forces must be concentrated. In each operation, use a small portion of troops and firepower to pin down the majority of the enemy along separate routes, while employing an absolute superiority of the majority of troops (three to five times) and firepower (more than double) to encircle and annihilate the minority of the enemy that has been divided (for example, one regiment). The greatest taboo in combat is dividing one’s forces evenly; the greatest taboo is merely routing or blocking the enemy without destroying their effective strength. So long as the enemy’s effective strength can be destroyed, even if only one regiment or one battalion is annihilated each time, many a little makes a mickle, and the enemy can gradually be weakened, which is advantageous for protracted warfare. If the U.S. forces have strong firepower configurations and are temporarily difficult to penetrate and divide, then consider first targeting Syngman Rhee’s puppet forces, concentrating the main forces to annihilate one or two of their regiments each time, and one or two of their divisions each month. After half a year, the puppet forces can be completely wiped out, cutting away the claws and fangs of the U.S. imperialists, isolating them, and then destroying them one by one. Under the principle of protracted war, the difficult aspects must be fully estimated. All mobilization and use of human, material, and financial resources must everywhere be planned with a long-term perspective, preventing lower levels from succumbing to a mood of staking everything on a single throw. The enemy seeks a quick decision and fears protraction, while for the People’s Army a quick decision is impossible; only by waging a protracted war can victory be won. The above points are offered from the standpoint of friends and comrades for your reference. Whether they are appropriate, we await your consideration and reply.