Telegram to the Southwest Bureau on the Question of Occupying Qamdo This Year (August 23, 1950)

To the Southwest Bureau, and to be passed on to the Northwest Bureau:

Your telegram of August 20 has been received.

(1) Your plan to strive to occupy Qamdo this year and to strive to leave three thousand men to consolidate Qamdo is a good one. You may make active preparations in accordance with this. Once it is determined at the end of this month or the beginning of next that the highway to Garzê is open and unobstructed, you may implement the advance, with the aim of occupying Qamdo in October. This will be advantageous for winning a political change in Tibet and for the advance to Lhasa next year.

(2) India has now issued a statement recognizing Tibet as Chinese territory, only hoping for a peaceful resolution without the use of military force. Britain, which originally did not permit the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing, has now given its permission. If our army can occupy Qamdo in October, it may be possible to urge the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing to negotiate and seek a peaceful resolution (of course, other possibilities also exist). We are now adopting the policy of striving to have the Tibetan representatives come to Beijing and of reducing Nehru's [1] fears. When the Tibetan representatives arrive in Beijing, we plan to use the established ten points [2] as the conditions for negotiation, striving to have the Tibetan representatives sign, so that the ten points become an agreement consented to by both sides. If this can be achieved, then the advance to Lhasa next year will be smoother. Your stationing only three thousand men there for the winter after occupying Qamdo, not advancing to Lhasa this year, and withdrawing the main force back to Garzê, may, from the Tibetan side's perspective, be seen as a measure of our goodwill toward them.

(3) The matter of the thirty aircraft is under preparation, but it requires time; in the short term you should not count on it.

(4) For your sixteen thousand men to advance from Garzê to Qamdo, all grain will rely on what the troops carry and what yaks transport. Among them, three thousand men must have grain for the winter, and the main force of thirteen thousand men planned for withdrawal must have at least three months' grain for the round trip. Does Garzê already have this much grain, and do the troops and yaks have such great transport capacity? We still hope you will investigate and report.

(5) It may be possible to purchase a portion of grain and meat in Qamdo and other places. Have you prepared a quantity of gold and silver and goods needed by the Tibetan people, such as silk and tea, to take with you?

Mao Zedong
August 23

Published based on the manuscript.

Notes

[1] Nehru was at that time Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs of the Government of India.

[2] Refers to the ten conditions for negotiations with Tibet, drafted by the Southwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on May 27, 1950, and later approved by the Central Committee. These ten conditions were: (1) The Tibetan people shall unite and drive the aggressive forces of British and American imperialism out of Tibet. The Tibetan people shall return to the great family of the motherland of the People's Republic of China. (2) The practice of Tibetan national regional autonomy. (3) The various existing political systems in Tibet shall be maintained as they are, and no changes will be made. The status and powers of the Dalai Lama will not be changed. Officials at all levels will continue to hold office as usual. (4) The practice of freedom of religion, the protection of lama monasteries, and respect for the religious beliefs and customs and habits of the Tibetan people. (5) The existing military system in Tibet shall be maintained and not be changed. The existing Tibetan army shall become a part of the national defense armed forces of the People's Republic of China. (6) The development of the Tibetan nation's spoken and written language and school education. (7) The development of Tibet's agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, and commerce, and the improvement of the people's livelihood. (8) All matters of reform concerning Tibet will be resolved entirely according to the will of the Tibetan people and through consultation by the Tibetan people and Tibetan leading personnel. (9) With regard to officials who were formerly pro-British, pro-American, or pro-Guomindang, as long as they sever their relations with British and American imperialism and the Guomindang and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they will all continue in their posts, and their past will not be investigated. (10) The Chinese People's Liberation Army shall enter Tibet to consolidate national defense. The People's Liberation Army shall abide by all the policies listed above. The expenses of the People's Liberation Army shall be supplied entirely by the Central People's Government. The People's Liberation Army shall practice fair trade.