Soliciting Suggestions on the Question of Strategy
for Dealing with Rich Peasants

(March 12, 1950)

Source: Xuanji, V, pp. 13-14. Available English Translation: SW, V, pp.
24-25.

This is a circular that Mao sent to the Central-South Bureau, the East China
Bureau, the South China Subbureau, and the Northwest Bureau of the CPC
Central Committee. In addition to specifying the conditions under which the
Party could deal with the problem of the rich peasants, conditions which at this
time justified restraint, this circular also illustrates the type of decision-making
process that Mao favored; nevertheless this document is more important as an
introduction to the issue of agricultural policy in the early 1950s.

Please report to us by telegraph the suggestions that you are soliciting at the
meetings now being held by comrades in positions of responsibility in the
provinces concerning the question of the strategy for dealing with the rich
peasants,' that is, [the strategy whereby] during the land reform movement
scheduled to begin this coming winter in several southern provinces and in
certain areas in the northwest we are not only to refrain from dealing with the
capitalistic rich peasants, but moreover, to refrain from dealing with the semifeudal rich peasants as well, and instead, to wait a few more years before we
Tesolve the problem of the semifeudal rich peasants.” Please give some
thought to whether or not it would be more advantageous to do things in this
way. The reasons for doing this are: first, the land reform is unprecedentedly
large in scale and it is easy for ultra-Left deviations to occur. If we deal only
With the landlords but not the rich peasants, we can isolate the landlords even
More, protect the middle peasants, and prevent indiscriminate beatings and
pions; otherwise, it will be very difficult to prevent these things. Second,
at the past, land reform in the north was carried out during wartime, and the

mosphere of war had overwhelmed the atmosphere of land reform. Now
ous: ite basically no more war so the land reform will be particularly conspicu-landlords nt on society will appear particularly great, and the clamors of the
tic S will also be particularly shrill. If we do not touch the semifeudal

em ants for the time being but wait a few more years before we deal with
teint be shown to be more justified. That is to say that we would have
sie? Nitiative politically. Third, our united front with the national bourgeoi-
4s already taken shape politically, economically, and organizationally,



and yet the [alliance with the] national bourgeoisie is closely tied to the ques- 4
tion of land. In order to stabilize the national bourgeoisie, it seems more #
appropriate not to touch the semifeudal rich peasants for the moment. 4

I brought up the question of not touching the rich peasants for the time q
being at the meeting of the Political Bureau last November,’ but I did not 4
make a detailed analysis; nor did I make a decision. Now it is time to make a q
decision. After a decision has been made, it is necessary to revise the Land 4
Law and other documents related to land reform and promulgate them,” so as |
to facilitate the study [of them] by the cadres [responsible for] land reform a
from the provinces in the new [liberated] areas. Only then can we facilitate q
getting the land reform started after this year’s autumn [harvest]. Otherwise, §
we would miss our opportunity and be forced into a passive position. Because {
of this, I am asking comrades, not only those from the Central-South Bureau, 4
but also those from the East China Bureau, the South China Subbureau, the q
Southwest Bureau, and the Northwest Bureau as well, to discuss this prob- {
lem. I am also asking you to transmit this telegram to your subordinate provin- 4
cial and municipal [Party] committees for discussion, to collect both support- 4
ing and opposing opinions, and to report them quickly to the Central:
Committee by telegram, to serve as a basis for our considerations in deciding 4
what policy to adopt. This is very important. q

Notes

1. According to the class analysis of the CPC there are five main classes in China’s rural society: landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and workers. The political and eco- 2 :
nomic characteristics of each of these classes was outlined in Mao’s 1928 article, “Analysis of 4
Classes in Chinese Society,” a substantially revised version of which is translated in SW, I, pp. %
13-21. These classes are further defined in “How to Analyze Class Status in the Countryside”. 4
appended to the Land Reform Law of the People’s Republic of China, June 1950, pp. 19-24, «4
translated in T. Chen (1967), pp. 204-205; see also Y. Lau (1977), pp. 110-111, 565-566. In 4
particular, see the Resolution of the Government Administration Council on the Drawing of Class ;4
Distinctions in the Countryside, passed by the 44th meeting of the GAC on August 4, 1950, and q
published in RMSC (1951), “Shen” section, pp. 48-66. Sections A(2), B(2), (3), (4), (5), (12),
(13), (14) dealt specifically with the identity and variations in that identity of rich peasants. a
According to the Land Reform Law, rich peasants were classified on the basis of the amount and
nature of their landholding and labor hiring (or even labor purchasing in some extraordinary 4
cases). The classification of other segments of the peasant population is done on the basis of 4
assessing their income level. Although the land reform program returned the ownership of land to +
the peasants, it did so on an individual basis. Consequently, rich peasants (those who held rela- 4
tively larger quantities of land) had greater access to the means of agricultural production and thus 4
continued to hold an inherent advantage over the rest of the peasant population. For more on this
distinction, one should consult section 4 and footnotes 6 and 7 of Mao’s article “The Present Situ-ation and Our Tasks” (see Xuanji, IV, pp. 1146-1147, 1158, and SW, IV, pp. 164-165, 175).

2. Those rich peasants whose income were substantially derived from extracting surplus value
from hired labor on their land are called capitalist rich peasants. In addition to farming their own
land or hiring labor to farm their land, some rich peasants also lease out parts of their landholdings, sometimes even leasing land or making loans at exorbitant rates of interest. Those who lease
out more land than they themselves farm or farm by hired labor are known as semifeudal rich
peasants.


JANUARY — MARCH 1950 / 69

rm “national bourgeoisie” describes that segment of the bourgeoisie that stands in dis-the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie. It is a segment whose
articularly obvious in a semicolonial, semifeudal society such as modern China
mid-nineteenth century. It is characterized by its patriotic tendencies and by its rela-

.onificant ties to either foreign imperialistic capital or to comprador capital and to the
tively a adalis™. The national bourgeoisie is a very important segment of Chinese society. Its

as first defined by Mao and other Communist leaders in the article “The Chinese Rev-charac nd The Chinese Communist Party” (see SW, II, pp. 320ff). In this article, written in the
olutio

Yanan days,
by imperialism an

3, The te
tion from

since the

Mao suggested that the national bourgeoisie had a dual character; it was oppressed
d the forces of feudalism, and therefore it was a revolutionary force in this

ct; however, it still had ties to imperialism and feudalism, and therefore it did not have the
respect, to oppose imperialism and feudalism thoroughly and was therefore also a target of the
ction. Thus, at that time, Mao suggested a cautious policy toward the national bourgeoisie,
deeming it a possible but at best wavering ally of the revolutionary forces. .

In December 1947, in the article “The Present Situation and Our Tasks,” Mao made a further
differentiation within the national bourgeoisie. He claimed that there were two wings of the
national bourgeoisie, a moderate pro-people patriotic wing which could become a force in the
democratic nationalist revolution, and a pro-Chiang Kai-shek die-hard rightist wing which had
become enemies of the people. This distinction paved the way to the formulation established in
early (January to March) 1948 and expressed in Mao’s articles “Several Important Problems in
the Party’s Policy at the Present Moment” (Jan. 18, 1948) and “On the Question of the National
Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry” (March 1, 1948). In this formulation, a considerable
segment of the national bourgeoisie can and should be won over to the side of the people’s revolutionary forces. They will not be the leaders of the national democratic revolution, and they should
eventually undergo socialist transformation. However, on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, a further alliance between the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie may be formed, an alliance whose degree of consolidation and effectiveness is crucial to
the success of the revolution. This became a standard formulation for the CPC’s policies regarding the socialist transformation of capitalism in the early years of the PRC.

4. Nothing appears to be known in the West about this meeting to which Mao refers.

5. This refers to the Land Law or rather an “outline program” of a land law (tudi fa dagang)
adopted by the National Conference on Land Policies of the CPC on September 13, 1947. This
was eventually promulgated as the “Outline of the Land Law of China” on October 10, 1947. It
was primarily based on the principle of returning landownership to the individual peasants. This
document and the announcement of its promulgation can be found in Mo Takuto Shu, vol. 10, pp.
87-90 and 85-86 respectively. For a synopsis see note 4 of Mao’s essay or report to the Central
Committee of the CPC in December 1947, entitled “The Present Situation and Our Tasks” (see
Xuanji, IV, p. 1157, and SW, IV, p. 174). After Liberation, as indicated here, the new situation
scmanded a revision of this law and a reviewing of this principle. In June 1950, at the Second

Ssion of the First National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Confer-