Devote Major Efforts to Preparations for the Liberation of Hainan Island
(January 10, 1950)

To the Central Committee, to be transmitted to Comrade Lin Biao [1]:

(1) Your telegram of January 6 and the telegram from Deng, Lai, and Hong of January 5 [2] have been received and noted.

(2) Since the preparations cannot be completed in time before the old lunar new year, do not force the issue. Please instruct Deng, Lai, and Hong to direct preparations away from reliance on the north wind and towards reliance on boats with converted engines. Have the South China Sub-Bureau and the Guangdong Military Region devote major efforts over several months to installing engines in several hundred large seagoing boats (inquire with the South China Sub-Bureau by telegram whether this matter is feasible), and strive to resolve the Hainan Island question during the spring and summer seasons.

(3) The situation in Hainan Island differs from that of the Jinmen Island in two respects: first, there is coordination by Feng Baiju [3]; second, the enemy troops there have relatively poor combat effectiveness. As long as we can land twenty thousand men at once, accompanied by an army-level command organ going ashore simultaneously (at Jinmen, there were three regiments of different unit designations without a unified commander, with the three regimental commanders each fighting on their own), we will be able to establish a foothold and await the continued advance of follow-up forces. (4) Ask the Fifteenth Army Corps to establish direct radio contact with Feng Baiju, and order Feng Baiju to act under the command of Deng, Lai, and Hong. Have them thoroughly clarify the disposition of enemy troops and the enemy naval situation in the counties of Qiongshan, Chengmai, Lingao, Wenchang, and others, and constantly monitor any changes. (5) At the same time, send personnel (after training) from both the Leizhou Peninsula and Hainan Island to carry out secret subversion work among the enemy troops in the aforementioned counties, to induce several enemy units to revolt when the battle begins. If this condition can be met, the problem of crossing the sea will become much easier. Under current conditions, instigating the revolt of several enemy units should be very possible. Request Comrades Jianying, Fangfang [4], and Feng Baiju to pay particular attention and exert effort on this matter. The South China Sub-Bureau should discuss this, formulate specific methods for subversion, and achieve results within three to four months.

Mao Zedong
January 10

[1] Lin Biao was then First Secretary of the Central-South Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander of the Fourth Field Army and the Central-South Military Region.
[2] Refers to the telegram sent at 13:00 on January 5, 1950, by Deng Hua (Commander), Lai Chuanzhu (Political Commissar), and Hong Xuezhi (First Deputy Commander and concurrently Chief of Staff) of the 15th Army Corps of the People's Liberation Army to Lin Biao, Deng Zihui, Tan Zheng, Xiao Ke, Zhao Erlu, and the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee. The telegram stated: The total enemy strength on Qiongya is estimated at 100,000 to 150,000, with naval and air force support. Therefore, our first wave must land the strength of an entire army simultaneously. Calculating 30 men per boat, over 1,000 boats are needed. However, currently there are very few boats. Some sailing boats must be converted with engines (at least enough for one assault regiment) to facilitate maneuvering. The troops have no experience in amphibious operations; northerners are not accustomed to boats, and only short periods of education and training are unlikely to yield real results. Based on this situation, completing the preparations for such a large-scale amphibious operation before the old lunar new year is realistically impossible and must be postponed. But after the old lunar new year, the wind direction changes, and sailing boats cannot be used. If all boats are converted to engines, this cannot be accomplished in a short time and would be very costly. If only a portion are converted, then the operation would again have to wait for the next winter's north wind.
[3] Feng Baiju was then Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Qiongya Column of the Fourth Field Army.
[4] Jianying, i.e., Ye Jianying, was then First Secretary of the South China Sub-Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Guangdong Military Region. Fangfang was then Third Secretary of the South China Sub-Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.