Telegram Regarding the Issuance of a Foreign Ministry Statement Denying the Legitimate Status of the Former Kuomintang Government’s Representative on the UN Security Council (January 7, 1950)Enlai and the Central Committee:This morning at 1 o’clock, Vyshinsky[1] came to discuss three matters: (1) He can accommodate our request to purchase aviation gasoline. (2) He can meet our demand for surveying and repairing the Xiaofengman Hydroelectric Dam.
Replies to these two requests may be handed over to me tomorrow, the 8th. (3) He suggested that our Foreign Ministry issue a statement to the United Nations Security Council, denying the continued legitimacy of Chiang Ting-fu, the representative of the former Kuomintang government, as China’s representative on the Security Council.Vyshinsky stated that if China were to release such a statement, the Soviet Union would take action: namely, if Chiang Ting-fu remained as China’s representative on the Security Council—reportedly even slated to serve as this year’s president of the Council—the Soviet Union would refuse to attend Security Council meetings.
Vyshinsky sought my opinion on this matter.
I immediately replied that the Chinese Foreign Ministry could indeed issue such a statement.
I further noted that my telegram would reach Beijing on January 7, and a statement signed by Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai could be dispatched either on January 8 or January 9.I asked whether, in addition to sending this statement to the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General, it should also be simultaneously transmitted to the Security Council’s permanent members—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France.
He replied that it could be sent; the Soviet Union would act based on China’s telegram.That concludes this matter.
He made this proposal in his capacity as Foreign Minister, seeking my opinion, and I have formally expressed my agreement.
Upon receipt of this telegram, please proceed promptly to ensure that this statement is dispatched before Enlai departs on the 9th.
In addition to sending it to the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council, please also notify the foreign ministries of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France via telegram, attaching a copy of the message to the UN.
Please report back on how this matter is being handled, and let me know whether it will be possible to send the statement by January 9.Mao Zedong6:00 a.m., January 7Based on the manuscript, printed.Notes[1] Vyshinsky was then the Soviet Foreign Minister.Telegram Concerning the Dispatch of the Drafted Letter to the United Nations (January 7, 1950)Shaoqi, Enlai:I hereby draft the letter from Zhou to the President of the UN General Assembly, the UN Secretary-General, and the governments of the ten member states of the UN Security Council (excluding Yugoslavia)[1]. Please dispatch it exactly as written.Mao Zedong12:00 noon, January 7Based on the manuscript, printed.Notes[1] The full text of Zhou Enlai’s January 8, 1950, letter to the United Nations reads as follows:To Mr. Rómulo, President of the United Nations General Assembly; to Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations; with copies forwarded to the governments of the Security Council’s permanent members—the Soviet Union, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Ecuador, India, Cuba, Egypt, and Norway:The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China considers it illegal for representatives of the reactionary remnants of the Chinese Nationalist Party to remain on the United Nations Security Council and advocates their expulsion from the Council.
This communication is hereby transmitted, with the earnest hope that your esteemed bodies will adopt and implement these views.Minister of Foreign Affairs, Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of ChinaZhou EnlaiBeijing, January 8, 1950£² 1

Telegram Concerning the Transfer of Personnel from the Fourth Field Army for Productive Work and Other Matters (January 9, 1950)To Comrade Lin Biao[1] via the Central Committee, and to the Northeast Bureau:Your two telegrams dated January 4 have both been received.(1) I fully concur with the proposal to transfer more than 100,000 personnel from the Fourth Field Army to Northeast China and Rehe Province to engage in productive work, thereby alleviating the shortage of arable land in central and southern China.
Last month, while passing through Shenyang, I had suggested to Comrade Gao Gang[2] that two armies from the Fourth Field Army be transferred to Northeast China for production purposes, and Comrade Gao Gang had expressed his agreement.
Unless the Northeast Bureau raises any objections, we may proceed with the transfer arrangements to ensure they are completed in time for spring plowing.
Specific details are to be negotiated directly between the Fourth Field Army and the Northeast Bureau, and you are requested to inform us accordingly.The Fourth Field Army’s January 3 telegram requesting the transfer of the cavalry division currently stationed in Henan Province to Northeast China may be addressed concurrently.Please have the Central Committee forward the Fourth Field Army’s January 4 telegram to the Northeast Bureau for consideration.(2) As for the unified reorganization of the national defense forces, we currently lack specific opinions.
We plan to convene a national military conference this spring or summer to discuss this issue.
The Fourth Field Army has put forward a proposal to reorganize its field armies after the war, making necessary localized and timely adjustments according to its tasks of bandit suppression, training, and production.
This is a sound suggestion; please submit your detailed plan to us.Mao ZedongJanuary 9Based on the manuscript, printed.£² 2
Notes[1] Lin Biao was then Commander of the Fourth Field Army of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Commander of the Central-South Military Region.[2] Gao Gang was then Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.£² 3

Telegram Concerning the Forwarding of the Central Committee’s Directives on Land Reform and Grain Collection to the Regional Committees (January 10, 1950)Comrade Shaoqi:The directives issued by the Central Committee on January 4 regarding land reform, grain collection, and related work are excellent.
Please consider whether each regional committee should forward these directives to the respective provincial committees for study, and require those provincial committees to submit their opinions to both the regional committees and the Central Committee.
After receiving these telegrams, please compile them and report back to me.Mao ZedongJanuary 10Based on the manuscript, printed.£² 4

Telegram to Chen Yun and Bo Yibo[1] Concerning Railway Construction and Other Matters (January 10, 1950)Chen Yun, Bo Yibo:(1) I have received your telegram dated January 7[2], which contains very useful information, and I look forward to continuing to receive such reports.(2) All of your plans are sound.
It is highly necessary to employ the military to construct the Tian-Lan, Tian-Cheng, Cheng-Yu, Xu-Kun, Dian-Qian, Qian-Gui, and Xiang-Gui railway lines.
I urge you to begin organizing and implementing these projects without delay.(3) Since October 1 of last year, numerous specialized meetings have been held under the leadership of the Central Financial and Economic Commission.
Aside from railways, steel, and agriculture—topics already mentioned in your January 7 telegram—I currently have no materials summarizing the outcomes of the other meetings.
Could you please prepare a separate report detailing these matters within a few days?
I wonder if you have the time to do so.
If not, perhaps your secretaries could draft the reports for your review before submission.
They need not be overly lengthy; a few hundred words per topic would suffice.Mao ZedongJanuary 10Based on the manuscript, printed.Notes[1] Chen Yun was then Vice Premier of the State Council and Director of the Central Financial and Economic Commission.
Bo Yibo was then Deputy Director of the same commission.[2] Refers to the January 7, 1950, report submitted by Chen Yun and Bo Yibo to Mao Zedong and the Central Committee concerning various aspects of finance and the economy.£² 5

Telegram Concerning the Advance into and Administration of Tibet (January 10, 1950)To the Central Committee, with copy to Liu, Deng, and He[1], as well as the Northwest Bureau:(1) I fully approve Liu and Deng’s plan, outlined in their January 7 telegram, to advance into Tibet.
Now that the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan have all recognized us, conditions are favorable for this operation.(2) According to Comrade Peng Dehuai[2], who estimated a four-month timeframe starting from mid-May, there remains a full four months—from mid-January to mid-May—for preparation. (My previous telegram[3], which stated three and a half months, was inaccurate.)
As long as Liu, Deng, and He intensify their supervision of Zhang Guohua[4] and the 18th Army, sufficient time remains for preparations.(3) A leading Party body should be established to administer Tibet.
Please have the Southwest Bureau draft a proposal specifying its name and membership, and submit it to the Central Committee for approval.
This leading body should be formed swiftly, tasked with planning all aspects of the operation and formulating an implementation plan, which will then be reviewed and approved by both the Southwest Bureau and the Central Committee.
The Southwest Bureau will conduct inspections of its work every two weeks or monthly.The first step is to complete, within three and a half months, a comprehensive assessment of the situation, training of cadres, reorganization of troops, and construction of roads leading from the point of entry to the border region between Kham and Tibet.
Some investigative work and cadre training will only be feasible after occupying areas along the Kham-Tibetan border.
To promote divisions among the Tibetan people, it is imperative to seize the area near the Kham-Tibetan border before mid-May.(4) Regarding the assistance required from the Northwest Bureau, the Southwest Bureau and the Northwest Bureau should negotiate directly on a case-by-case basis.
The Northwest Bureau should also formulate plans for all matters where it can and ought to provide support, guiding its subordinate units accordingly.£² 6
(5) As for the reconnaissance work that falls under the Central Committee’s responsibility, I instruct Comrade Nie[5] to ensure that the Second Bureau[6] pays close attention to this task.Mao ZedongJanuary 10Based on the manuscript, printed.Notes[1] Liu refers to Liu Bocheng, then Second Secretary of the CPC Southwest Bureau and Commander of the Second Field Army of the PLA.
Deng refers to Deng Xiaoping, then First Secretary of the CPC Southwest Bureau, Political Commissar of the Second Field Army, and Political Commissar of the Southwest Military Region.
He refers to He Long, then Third Secretary of the CPC Southwest Bureau and Commander of the Southwest Military Region.[2] Peng Dehuai was then First Secretary of the CPC Northwest Bureau, Commander of the First Field Army, and Commander of the Northwest Military Region.[3] Refers to Mao Zedong’s January 2, 1950, telegram concerning the Southwest Bureau’s planning for the advance into and administration of Tibet, found on pages 208–209 of this volume.[4] Zhang Guohua was then Commander of the 18th Army of the Fifth Corps of the PLA.[5] Nie refers to Nie Rongzhen, then Acting Chief of the General Staff of the PLA.[6] Refers to the Second Bureau of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission.£² 7

Telegram to Lin Biao[1] Concerning Operations on Hainan Island (January 10, 1950)To Comrade Lin Biao via the Central Committee:(1) I have received your telegram dated January 6, as well as Deng Lai Hong’s[2] telegram of January 5, which was forwarded to you.(2) Since it is now impossible to complete preparatory work before the Lunar New Year, there is no need to force the issue.
Please instruct Deng Lai Hong to shift focus from relying on northerly winds to preparing ships equipped with modified engines.
The South China Branch and the Guangdong Military Region should make every effort over the next few months to install machinery on several hundred large vessels. (Please inquire with the South China Branch to determine whether this is feasible and report back.)
Our goal should be to resolve the Hainan Island issue during the spring and summer seasons.(3) There are key differences between Hainan Island and Kinmen Island: first, we have the cooperation of Feng Baiju[3]; second, the enemy’s combat strength is relatively weak.
If we can successfully land 20,000 troops at once, accompanied by a corps-level command structure (whereas on Kinmen Island, three separate regiments operated independently without a unified commander), we will be able to establish a foothold and allow follow-up forces to advance.(4) Please arrange for direct radio communication between the 15th Corps and Feng Baiju, and place Feng Baiju under the command of Deng Lai Hong.
This will enable them to thoroughly ascertain the enemy’s troop deployments and naval presence across Qiongshan, Chengmai, Lingao, and Wenchang counties, and to closely monitor any changes.(5) Simultaneously, personnel trained on both the Leizhou Peninsula and Hainan Island should secretly infiltrate the aforementioned enemy-held counties and carry out subversive activities, enticing certain units to revolt during combat.
If we can achieve this condition, the challenge of crossing the sea will become much easier.
Under current circumstances, inciting several enemy units to rebel should be quite feasible.
I urge Comrades Jianying, Fangfang[4], and Feng Baiju to pay particular attention to this task and exert maximum effort.
The South China Branch should hold discussions to formulate concrete counter-espionage strategies and strive to achieve results within three to four months.Mao ZedongJanuary 10Based on the manuscript, printed.Notes[1] Lin Biao was then Commander of the Fourth Field Army of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Commander of the Central-South Military Region.[2] Deng refers to Deng Hua, then Commander of the 15th Corps of the PLA.
Lai refers to Lai Chuanzhu, then Political Commissar of the 15th Corps.
Hong refers to Hong Xuezhi, then First Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the 15th Corps.[3] Feng Baiju was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Qiongya Column of the PLA.[4] Jianying refers to Ye Jianying, then First Secretary of the CPC South China Branch.
Fangfang refers to another official holding the position of Third Secretary of the CPC South China Branch.£² 9