Telegram Regarding the Southwest Bureau’s Planning for the Advance Into and Administration of Tibet (January 2, 1950) To the Central Committee, Comrade Dehuai [1], with request to forward to Comrades Xiaoping, Bocheng, and Helong [2]: (1) We have received and acknowledged Comrade Dehuai’s telegram dated December 30 concerning the situation in Tibet and routes into Tibet.
This telegram is hereby forwarded by the Central Committee to Comrades Liu, Deng, and He for their consideration. (2) Although Tibet’s population is small, its international significance is extremely high.
It is imperative that we occupy Tibet and transform it into a people’s democratic region.
Given the considerable difficulties involved in advancing into Tibet from Qinghai and Xinjiang, the task of both entering Tibet and administering it should be assigned to the Southwest Bureau. (3) Since passage from the northwest into Tibet is feasible only from mid-May to mid-September—roughly four months each year—with the remaining eight months blocked by heavy snow, the same time constraints likely apply to entry via Xikang.
If no advance is made between mid-April [3] and mid-September this year, any such operation would have to be postponed until 1951.
In my view, barring insurmountable obstacles, we should strive to commence the advance into Tibet in mid-April and to secure control over the entire region by October.
To this end, I propose: (a) That Comrades Liu, Deng, and He convene at the earliest opportunity (for example, in mid-January) to deliberate on matters such as the units to be deployed and the cadres responsible for leading the administration of Tibet, and to immediately begin making all necessary preparations; (b) That we promptly seize Kangding and use it as a base from which to plan the invasion of Tibet; (c) That within the next three and a half months [4]—from early January to mid-April—the designated forces advance from Kangding along two routes toward the border area between Xikang and Tibet, constructing motor roads or cart tracks to facilitate movement and preparing to launch the invasion around mid-April; (d) That we gather Tibetan personnel and train cadres; (e) Reports indicate that Tibet possesses only about six thousand troops, scattered across the territory.
It thus appears unnecessary to deploy the three armies I suggested in my previous telegram; rather, a single well-equipped army or four divisions—totaling approximately forty thousand men—should suffice, provided they receive specialized political training and are outfitted with superior weaponry; (f) Troops serving in Tibet might be rotated every three years to maintain morale. (4) The advance into and administration of Tibet represent a glorious yet arduous mission for our Party.
The Southwest region has just been secured, and the comrades of the Southwest Bureau are already exceedingly busy.
Now, they are being entrusted with this additional responsibility.
However, given the importance and timeliness of this task, I offer the foregoing suggestions.
I respectfully request that the Southwest Bureau consider their feasibility and provide a prompt reply.
Mao Zedong 4:00 a.m., January 2, from afar [ ] Printed from the manuscript.
Notes [1] Dehuai refers to Peng Dehuai, then First Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Commander of the First Field Army of the People’s Liberation Army, and Commander of the Northwest Military Region. [2] Xiaoping refers to Deng Xiaoping, then First Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Political Commissar of the Second Field Army of the PLA, and Political Commissar of the Southwest Military Region.
Bocheng refers to Liu Bocheng, then Second Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander of the Second Field Army of the PLA.
Helong was Third Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander of the Southwest Military Region of the PLA. [ ] Here, “April” and the subsequent three occurrences of “April” should, according to Mao Zedong’s telegram of January 10, 1950, regarding the advance into and administration of Tibet, all read “May.” [4] Similarly, “three and a half months” should, per the January 10, 1950, telegram, be “four and a half months” (from early January to mid-May). [ ] Refers to the Soviet Union.


Telegram to the Central Committee Concerning Zhou Enlai’s Trip to the Soviet Union for Negotiations (January 2–3, 1950) To the Central Committee: (1) An important development has occurred in our work here over the past two days.
Comrade Stalin has agreed to invite Comrade Zhou Enlai to Moscow to sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, as well as agreements on loans, trade, civil aviation, and other matters.
Yesterday, January 1, it was decided to publish my interview with a TASS reporter, which appeared in today’s newspapers (the 2nd); you have undoubtedly received copies.
This afternoon at 8:00 p.m., Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan [1] came to see me to seek my views on the Sino-Soviet treaty and related issues.
I outlined three possible approaches: (a) To conclude a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.
This course would yield substantial benefits.
It would enshrine Sino-Soviet relations in a formal treaty, inspiring enthusiasm among Chinese workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the left wing of the national bourgeoisie while isolating the right wing.
Internationally, it would provide us with greater political leverage against imperialist powers and enable us to reassess existing treaties between China and various imperialist states. (b) To issue a brief communiqué through the official news agencies of both countries merely stating that the authorities had exchanged views on the old Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and other matters, reaching consensus on key points without delving into specifics, thereby effectively postponing resolution of the issue for several years.
Under this scenario, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai would not need to travel. (c) To adopt a declaration outlining the main principles of bilateral relations without formalizing them into a treaty.
Again, Zhou could remain in China.
After I thoroughly analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of these three options, Comrade Molotov declared that option (a) was preferable and that Zhou could come.
I further inquired whether the new treaty would replace the old one.
Molotov confirmed that it would.
We then calculated the timing for Zhou’s arrival and the signing of the treaty.
I stated that my telegram would reach Beijing on January 3, Zhou would require five days to make preparations, departing from Beijing on January 9 aboard a train that would take eleven days to arrive in Moscow.
Upon his arrival, he would have roughly ten days—from January 20 until the end of the month—to conduct negotiations and sign the various treaties, after which I would return home together with Zhou in early February.
We also discussed my planned visits abroad, agreeing to pay respects at Lenin’s Mausoleum, tour Leningrad and Gorky City, and inspect an arms factory, the underground railway (suggested by Molotov and Mikoyan), and collective farms, among other sites.
Additionally, we considered arrangements for meetings with Soviet leaders (to date, I have yet to visit any of them individually). (2) Upon receipt of this telegram, please ensure all preparations are completed within five days.
We hope that Zhou Enlai, accompanied by the Minister of Trade and other essential aides and documentation, will depart Beijing on January 9 by train (rather than by air) for Moscow, with Comrade Dong Biwu [2] temporarily assuming the duties of Premier of the Government Council.
No public announcement should be made until Zhou arrives in Moscow. (3) Please carefully consider whether the above plan is feasible, whether five days constitute sufficient preparation time, whether an additional day or two might be needed, and whether it would be advisable to invite Comrade Li Fuchun [3] or other colleagues to assist.
A prompt reply would be appreciated.
Mao Zedong 11:00 p.m., January 2


To the Central Committee: Your telegram of 11:00 p.m. yesterday has been received.
Comrade Zhou Enlai’s trip to the Soviet Union must be formally approved at a meeting of the Government Council, with a report explaining that the purpose of the visit is to negotiate and sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance (which may involve some modifications compared to the old treaty regarding the Lushun-Dalian issue, though the specific details remain subject to negotiation.
The fundamental spirit of the new treaty will continue to focus on defending against potential aggression by Japan and its allies, as well as recognizing Mongolia’s independence). Other agreements to be concluded include a loan agreement (our request stands at US$300 million, to be disbursed over several years; we have refrained from seeking a larger sum because borrowing less over the current period is more advantageous), a civil aviation agreement (which would help establish our own aviation industry), and a trade agreement (defining the scope of barter with the Soviet Union would guide our production development while facilitating future trade deals with other countries). Furthermore, a symposium should be convened for government council members currently in Beijing to deliver a similar briefing.
In both meetings, it should be emphasized that this initiative will place the People’s Republic in a more favorable position, compelling capitalist nations to acknowledge China’s authority and forcing them to unconditionally recognize China, abrogate their previous treaties, and enter into new ones, thereby deterring any rash actions.
Mao Zedong 4:00 a.m., January 3, printed from the manuscript.
Notes [1] Molotov and Mikoyan were both then Vice Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. [2] Dong Biwu was then Vice Premier of the Government Council of the Central People’s Government. [3] Li Fuchun was then Vice Chairman of the Northeast People’s Government.