In an effort to justify aggression, Acheson repeated—after a long string of words—such terms as “friendship” and a host of “principles.”
He declared: “The American people and their government have been concerned about China for a very long time in our history.
Although vast distances and widely differing backgrounds separate China and the United States, religious, charitable, and cultural ties between the two nations have consistently strengthened U.S. friendship with China.
This friendship is attested by numerous historical facts, including the use of the Boxer Indemnity funds to finance Chinese students’ education, the abolition of extraterritorial rights during World War I, and wartime and postwar aid to China.
Such a record demonstrates that the United States has always maintained, and continues to maintain, certain fundamental principles in its foreign policy toward China, namely the Open Door policy, respect for China’s administrative and territorial integrity, and opposition to any foreign control over China.”02  Acheson blatantly lied, cloaking aggression in the guise of “friendship.”
The history of U.S. imperialist aggression against China—from its assistance to Britain in the Opium Wars of 1840 onward, to its eventual expulsion by the Chinese people—deserves to be compiled into a concise textbook to educate China’s youth.
The United States was among the first countries to force China to grant it extraterritorial rights, as stipulated in the Treaty of Wanghia signed in 1844—the very first treaty ever concluded between China and the United States, referenced in the White Paper.
Under this treaty, in addition to compelling China to open five ports to trade, the U.S. also exacted a provision allowing American missionaries to operate freely within China.
Compared with other imperialist powers, U.S. imperialism placed particular emphasis on spiritual aggression, extending its activities from religious work to charitable and cultural endeavors.
According to some estimates, the total investment by U.S. churches and charitable organizations in China amounted to US$49.1 million, of which 14.7 percent was spent on medical care, 38 percent on education, and 47.1 percent on religious activities.
Many of China’s renowned institutions—Yenching, Peking Union Medical College, Huiwen, St. John’s, Jinling, Xiangya, Soochow, and Huachi—were founded by American entities.
Dr. John Leighton Stuart became famous for his work in these fields and was subsequently appointed U.S. ambassador to China.
Those in Acheson’s camp well understood that the so-called “religious, charitable, and cultural ties between the two nations, which have consistently strengthened U.S. friendship with China,” had deep roots.
Starting from the conclusion of the 1844 treaty, the United States deliberately cultivated these interests for a full 105 years, ostensibly in order to “strengthen friendship.”
Participating in the Eight-Nation Alliance to defeat China, extracting the Boxer Indemnity, and then using those funds to “finance Chinese students’ education” could likewise be construed as gestures of “friendship.”
The formal “abolition” of extraterritorial rights, coupled with the U.S. Navy Department’s declaration of innocence for the perpetrators of the Shen Chong rape case who were returned to the United States, was likewise presented as a token of “friendship.”
As for the “wartime and postwar aid to China,” the White Paper claims it totaled more than US$4.5 billion, whereas our own calculations indicate a figure exceeding US$5.914 billion; funneling such massive support to Chiang Kai-shek to enable him to kill millions of Chinese citizens was likewise portrayed as an act of “friendship.”
All 109 years of “friendship” extended by U.S. imperialism to China—beginning with the Anglo-American collaboration in the Opium Wars of 1840—and especially the recent years during which it aided Chiang Kai-shek in slaughtering millions of Chinese—were pursued for a single purpose: to “always maintain, and continue to maintain, the fundamental principles of U.S. foreign policy toward China, including the Open Door policy, respect for China’s administrative and territorial integrity, and opposition to any foreign control over China.”
Killing millions of Chinese served precisely these objectives: first, to uphold the Open Door policy; second, to safeguard China’s administrative and territorial integrity; and third, to resist any form of foreign domination.
Today, small pockets of territory—such as Guangzhou and Taiwan—remain open to Acheson and his cohorts, where the first sacred principle is still “maintained”: a narrow gateway.
In contrast, places like Shanghai, which ought to have been fully open, are instead sealed off by a deeply undemocratic rule imposed by the military regime: a closed-door policy.
Meanwhile, in areas like Guangzhou and Taiwan, local administrations and territorial integrity have managed to preserve their “integrity” under the light of the first sacred principle upheld by Acheson, thereby remaining under Chinese control.
Elsewhere, however, misfortune has prevailed: both administration and territory lie in ruins, reduced to a pitiful state.
In certain locales—such as Guangzhou and Taiwan—the third sacred principle has shone forth, enabling them to “oppose any foreign control,” including that of the United States, thus keeping these regions in Chinese hands.
As for the rest of the country, it is a heartbreaking sight: all has been lost, with foreign powers now exercising complete control and the Chinese people reduced to a state of servitude.
As for precisely which external forces are at play, Mr. Acheson has yet to specify in his writing; the remainder of the document makes this abundantly clear, leaving little room for further inquiry.
Whether non-interference in China’s internal affairs constitutes a principle remains unaddressed by Acheson; it seems unlikely.
Such is the logic of the White Paper.
Having read the preface and the entire text of 8 pages, one can readily confirm this highly sophisticated reasoning. (Xinhua News Agency, Peiping, October 30)