Comrade Lin Biao [2] (Forwarded by the Central Committee): We have received your telegram of 1400 hours on the 10th [3].


(1) Congratulations on your great victory in annihilating Bai Chongxi [4].


(2) I approve your deployment: Chen Geng [5] is to rest briefly and then enter Yunnan; the units of the Fourth Field Army now in Guangxi are to take twenty days’ rest, with most of them engaged in mopping-up operations against bandits. Meanwhile, the 43rd and 40th Armies are to prepare for an attack on Qiongya [6].


(3) Amphibious operations differ fundamentally from all previous campaigns conducted by our army. Special attention must be paid to tidal conditions and wind direction. It is essential to concentrate sufficient transport capacity to carry at least one full army—forty to fifty thousand men—in a single lift, together with supplies for more than three days, land ahead of the enemy, establish a secure beachhead, and then advance independently without reliance on further reinforcements. Since the tide permits only one round trip of transport ships every twelve hours, and since the enemy may use its naval and air forces to cut off our supply lines, failure to seize the opportune moment to land an entire army in one go, enable it to press forward independently, set up a base, and secure food supplies would result in a breakdown of logistics and heavy losses. After capturing Xiamen, Ye Fei’s Third Field Army Corps [7], unaware of these considerations, committed three and a half regiments—nine thousand men—to an assault against thirty thousand enemy troops on Kinmen Island. Lacking reinforcements and food, they were encircled and annihilated. You must carefully study this lesson. Although the enemy on Hainan Island may be somewhat weaker than that on Kinmen, complacency would be unwise.
Please convey these instructions to Deng and Lai [8], as well as to the 40th and 43rd Armies. Moreover, I urge you to consult with Su Yu [9] to gather a comprehensive account of experience in amphibious warfare, so as to avoid repeating the Kinmen disaster.


(4) The Hunan Provincial Government may be reorganized after the establishment of the Central-South Military and Administrative Commission. However, apart from his appointment as Vice Chairman of the Central-South Commission, Cheng Qian [10] should continue to head the Hunan Military and Administrative Committee, even if it has no specific tasks at present. Maintaining this institutional presence, albeit nominal, can serve a useful purpose. I discussed this point directly with Cheng while he was in Beijing, so please take note.


(5) With regard to the relative proportions and interrelationships among urban and rural areas, public and private sectors, industry and commerce, and labor and management, I have already asked Comrade Deng Zihui [11] to convey my views to you. Please let me know your opinions on the matter. As for the military’s participation in production, once you return to Hankou, please arrange for a coordinated plan to be drawn up and implemented.


(6) The primary focus of work across the six provinces of Central South China has shifted from military affairs to economic development and land reform. I hope that you will establish the Central-South Military and Administrative Commission around January of next year, concentrating your efforts on leading economic work throughout the region and actively preparing the conditions for land reform.


Mao Zedong, December 18th, From a Distance, Printed from the Manuscript.


Notes [1] From this document until “Refutation of Acheson’s Shameless Fabrications,” dated January 20, 1950, all were written by Mao Zedong during his visit to the Soviet Union.
[2] Lin Biao was then First Secretary of the CPC Central Committee’s Central-South Bureau, Commander of the People’s Liberation Army’s Fourth Field Army, and Commander of the Central China Military Region.
[3] Refers to Lin Biao’s telegram of December 10, 1949, to Mao Zedong concerning the situation in the Guangxi Campaign and troop movements.
[4] Refers to the Guangxi Campaign launched in early November 1949 by the main force of the Fourth Field Army together with a portion of the Second Field Army. This campaign destroyed over 173,000 members of Bai Chongxi’s group who had fled into Guangxi (only about 20,000 escaped into Vietnam), thereby liberating the entire province of Guangxi. Bai Chongxi was appointed Chief of the Nationalist Government’s Central China Military and Political Headquarters in April 1949.
[5] Refers to the PLA’s Fourth Corps, commanded by Chen Geng, who also served as its Political Commissar.
[6] Qiongya refers to Hainan Island.
[7] Ye Fei was then Commander of the PLA’s Tenth Corps.
[8] Deng refers to Deng Hua (1910–1980), a native of Chenzhou County, Hunan Province (now part of Chenzhou City), who at the time served as Commander of the PLA’s Fifteenth Corps. Lai refers to Lai Chuanzhu (1910–1965), a native of Gan County, Jiangxi Province, who at the time was Political Commissar of the PLA’s Fifteenth Corps.
[9] Su Yu was then Deputy Commander of the PLA’s Third Field Army and Deputy Commander of the East China Military Region.
[10] Cheng Qian (1882–1968) was a native of Liling, Hunan Province. A veteran Nationalist leader and high-ranking general, he led a revolt in Changsha together with Chen Mingren in August 1949. At that time, he served as a member of the Central People’s Government Committee and Director of the Hunan Military and Administrative Committee.
[11] Deng Zihui was then Third Secretary of the CPC Central Committee’s Central-South Bureau, Second Political Commissar of the PLA’s Fourth Field Army, and Second Political Commissar of the Central China Military Region.