Attention Must Be Paid to the Issues Concerning the Operation Against Dinghai
(November 14, 1949)

Comrade Su Yu,[1] and to inform Chen and Rao:[2]
The enemy forces in the Zhoushan Archipelago total fifty thousand, with considerable combat effectiveness. Is your attack using two and a half armies sufficient? In light of the setbacks in the operations at Kinmen Island and recently at an island near Dinghai,[3] you must pay serious attention to the issues of troop strength, disposition, state of preparedness, and the timing of the attack for the operation against Dinghai. If preparations are not thorough, it is better to postpone the date. I suggest you send a responsible officer directly to the vicinity of Dinghai to carry out an inspection tour. How do you respond?
Mao Zedong
November 14

[1] Su Yu, then Deputy Commander of the Third Field Army and the East China Military Region.
[2] Chen and Rao refer to Chen Yi and Rao Shushi, then respectively Commander and Political Commissar of the Third Field Army and the East China Military Region.
[3] In late October 1949, a unit of the Tenth Corps of the Third Field Army, lacking sufficient preparations for amphibious operations, hastily launched the operation against Kinmen and suffered heavy losses. On November 3, 1949, the 61st Division of the 21st Army of the Third Field Army, in the operation to attack Dengbu Island near Dinghai (present-day Zhoushan, Zhejiang), underestimated the enemy’s stubborn resistance on the island and the rapid arrival of enemy reinforcements, was counterattacked by enemy garrison forces, reinforcements, and combined naval and air forces, and was forced to withdraw from combat.