The Deng Hua Corps May Detach One Division
to Coordinate with the Liang Guang Column in Mopping Up the Enemy on the Southern Front
(November 9, 1949)

Comrade Lin Biao, the South China Sub-Bureau, and for the information of Chen Geng[1]:

According to a telegram of the 6th from the Party Committee of the Southern Front Area of Guangdong, there are only a little over four thousand enemy troops in Zhanjiang, and one of our main force divisions, coordinating with the Southern Front Column, could annihilate the enemy in Zhanjiang, completely liberate the Leizhou Peninsula, and thereby strengthen the Southern Front as a base for supporting the liberation of Guangxi and Qiongya. I have told you that before the Guangxi problem is resolved, the task of the main force of the Deng[2] Corps is to defend the Guangzhou area and the Guangzhou-Shaoguan line[3], and that it should not proceed to the Southern Front. This is correct, and you have already concurred. However, if one division is sent, the Southern Front problem can be resolved, and this would be both permissible and necessary. For the Deng Corps (not the Fourth Corps) to detach one division (it could be its strongest division) to the Southern Front to coordinate with the Liang Guang Column[4] in mopping up the enemy on the Southern Front would have many advantages. If you also agree, this disposition may be carried out.

Mao Zedong
November 9

[1] Chen Geng was then commander and concurrently political commissar of the Fourth Corps of the Second Field Army.
[2] The Deng Corps refers to the Fifteenth Corps of the Fourth Field Army. Deng Hua was corps commander.
[3] The Guangzhou-Shaoguan line refers to the railway between Guangzhou and Shaoguan, that is, a section of the present-day Beijing-Guangzhou line.
[4] The Liang Guang Column refers to the Guangdong-Guangxi Border Column. Liang Guang was commander and concurrently political commissar of the column.