(October 31, 1949)
To Comrade Lin Biao and also to Zi Hui, Jianying, Chen Geng, and Liu and Deng:
The remnants of the enemy at sea between Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Macao have not yet been cleared. Chen’s corps is about to enter Guangxi for operations, and both internal and external enemies may be watching Guangzhou.
If Bai Chongxi’s forces are cut off from their escape routes to Yunnan and Annam by Cheng Zihua and Chen Geng, they might flee eastward into Guangdong. Therefore, before the Guangxi issue is completely resolved, Deng Hua’s corps (two armies) must devote all its strength to holding the line from Guangzhou (with the main force) through Shaoguan, with a portion stationed in Shixing, and should not advance into the Leizhou Peninsula, let alone attack Hainan Island. The South China Bureau’s decision to have Deng Hua’s corps quickly leave Guangzhou and move south is inappropriate. We must wait until the Guangxi problem is settled, then transfer one or two armies from the Fourth Field Army out of Guangxi to reinforce Guangzhou and Shaoguan.
[1]
Lin Biao was at that time Commander of the Fourth Field Army and concurrently Commander of the Central China Military Region.
[2]
Zi Hui refers to Deng Zihui, who served as the Second Political Commissar of the Fourth Field Army and the Central China Military Region. Jianying refers to Ye Jianying, First Secretary of the CPC South China Bureau and Commander and Political Commissar of the Guangdong Military Region. Chen Geng was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Fourth Corps of the Second Field Army.
[3]
Liu and Deng refer to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who respectively held the posts of Commander and Political Commissar of the Second Field Army at the time.
[4]
Bai Chongxi was the Chief of Staff of the Nationalist Government’s Central China War Zone Command.
[5]
Cheng Zihua was the Commander of the 13th Corps of the Fourth Field Army.
[6]
Annam refers to Vietnam.
[7]
Deng Hua’s corps refers to the 15th Corps of the Fourth Field Army, commanded by Deng Hua.
[8]
Shaoguan was then known as Shaozhou, corresponding to today’s Shaoguan in Guangdong.

Only after these measures are taken can Deng Hua’s corps proceed southward. (2) The nation’s defense priorities are three regions centered on Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. After the Second Field Army enters Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Xikang, the Third Field Army will be limited to defending East China, focusing primarily on the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing area, while keeping a strong contingent prepared to seize Taiwan; it will have no capacity to simultaneously support North China. Currently, in North China, only Yang Chengwu’s 20th Corps—comprising three armies and six second-tier divisions—is positioned along the Beijing–Tianjin–Shanhaiguan line. Should any trouble arise, this force would be quite insufficient. Apart from ordering the First Field Army’s 19th Corps (three armies totaling 100,000 men) under Yang Dezhi to be stationed in the Baoji–Tianshui–Pingliang area, ready to be deployed at any time, the Fourth Field Army plans, once the Guangxi issue is resolved, to position five armies in Guangdong and Guangxi to assume responsibility for the defense of these two provinces with Guangzhou as the center; three armies will be stationed in Henan to stand ready to reinforce North China at short notice; and the remaining units will be concentrated in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, with their main forces aligned along the railway lines, enabling them to maneuver northward or southward as needed. Over the next three to five months, in addition to completing bandit-suppression missions in various provinces, if the Fourth Field Army can achieve the following: first, resolve the Guangxi problem; second, restore and secure the Yuehan and Xianggui railways (which is extremely important); and third, utilize rail transport to complete the aforementioned defensive deployment, then its overall plan will be flawless. I urge you to pay close attention to the repair and safeguarding of the Yuehan and Xianggui railways.
(3) Chen Geng and Cheng Zihua must simultaneously advance toward Liuzhou and Nanning in order to successfully annihilate Bai’s forces. It appears that Lu Daoyuan’s corps is preparing to move south from Guilin into the Liuzhou area, presumably with the intention of retreating to Yunnan. Meanwhile, my own forces have just dealt with the enemy in Guangdong and need several days of rest before they can resume operations. Please inform us when Cheng and Chen intend to begin their campaign into Guangxi. (4) According to those with experience, the road from Baise into Yunnan is plagued by miasma—a virulent epidemic—which severely hinders military marches. Therefore, after resolving the Guangxi situation, Chen Geng’s forces should prepare to enter Yunnan via Liuzhou and Guiyang, rather than necessarily taking the Baise route.
Xikang refers to the former province of Xikang, which encompassed parts of present-day western Sichuan Province and eastern Tibet Autonomous Region, and was abolished in 1955.
[2]
Yang Chengwu was at that time Commander of the 20th Corps of the North China Military Region.
[3]
Yang Dezhi’s corps refers to the 19th Corps of the First Field Army, commanded by Yang Dezhi.
[4]
Yuehan refers to the Yuehan Railway, connecting Guangzhou and Wuhan, now part of the Beijing–Guangzhou Railway line.
[5]
Lu Daoyuan was then the commander of the Nationalist Army’s 11th Corps.

(5) Please advise on your views.
Mao Zedong
October 31st