CCP Central Military Commission Circular on the Lessons Learned from the Failed Attack on Kinmen Island (October 29, 1949)

To the Front Committees of All Field Armies and to All Major Military Regions:

According to a telegram dated October 28 sent by Comrades Su Yu, Yuan Zhongxian, and Zhou Junming[1] of the Third Field Army to Comrades Ye and Chen[2] of the Tenth Corps, as well as to the Fujian Provincial Party Committee, it states: “We have received your telegram of 8:00 a.m. on the 27th. You landed three regiments on Kinmen Island and engaged in two days and nights of fierce combat against three enemy divisions. Lacking reinforcements, all your troops heroically sacrificed their lives, which is deeply regrettable. This loss is the greatest since the beginning of the Liberation War. The primary causes were underestimation of the enemy and impatience. When you previously planned the attack on Xiamen, you also intended to capture Kinmen with a single division—this was itself an expression of underestimation and haste. At that time, we had already cabled you, urging you to concentrate your forces first on Xiamen and only then to shift them to Kinmen; we stressed not to disperse your strength. However, this warning did not receive your due attention, leading to the present failure.  In addition to earnestly reviewing the lessons of this experience, we further request that you boost morale, continue your efforts, make thorough preparations, and carry out meticulous planning. Only when there is absolute certainty of success should another offensive be launched. We also ask the Fujian Provincial Party Committee to exert every effort to resolve issues concerning shipping and other logistical support for that army. As for the scattered personnel, we still hope that measures will be taken to continue collecting and reuniting them.”

This communication is hereby forwarded. Please immediately convey its contents to the responsible comrades in all corps and armies, so that they may give it the most serious consideration.

Now that the end of the entire Liberation War is drawing near, there is a particular risk among cadres at all levels—especially those at or above the military-level—that attitudes of underestimating the enemy and impetuousness may arise. The Kinmen incident must serve as a profound warning. It is imperative to educate the corps still engaged in combat, firmly preventing any tendency toward overconfidence or rashness, and instead proceeding steadily and according to plan to annihilate the remaining enemy forces and complete the liberation of the whole country. This is of paramount importance.

Issued by the CCP Central Military Commission on October 29, based on Mao Zedong’s manuscript.

Su Yu was then Deputy Commander of the Third Field Army of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

Yuan Zhongxian was then Acting Chief of Staff of the Third Field Army.

Zhou Junming was then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Third Field Army.

[ ] Ye refers to Ye Fei, who at the time served as Commander of the Tenth Corps of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Chen refers to Chen Qingxian, who at the time served as Chief of Staff of the Tenth Corps.