Peaceful liberation of Suiyuan had been under negotiation for over half a year, and only now has the first step been achieved.
On September 19, Dong Qiwu [2] and his colleagues issued a proclamation announcing their uprising, to which Comrade Zhu and I promptly replied [3].


The next step is to move forward with cooperation, which is of great importance.
We must resolutely implement the Central Committee’s telegram on this matter; it constitutes the Party’s fundamental policy toward Suiyuan.
This directive applies not only to them but also, and especially, to the Communists themselves.
Suiyuan falls within the scope of regional autonomy for Inner Mongolia, and at the league level, people’s government committees are to be established.
With regard to the Yikezhao League, the North China Bureau should consult with the Northwest Bureau to secure their agreement to place it under Suiyuan’s administration [4]. The seat of the Yikezhao League government may be located in Dongsheng or another suitable site.
Similarly, a people’s government committee should be formed for the Ulanqab League.
Military sub-districts are to be set up in both the Yikezhao and Ulanqab Leagues.
Government committees in these two leagues must include representatives from both the Mongol and Han ethnic groups, and arrangements should be made through consultation with them.
A military–political committee is to be established for Suiyuan, reporting directly to the Central Committee.
The provincial government and the military region will come under the leadership of this committee.
Fu Zuoyi [5] will serve as its chairman, while Ulanhu [6] will be vice-chairman, providing unified leadership over military, political, economic, and cultural–educational affairs in Suiyuan.
Fu Zuoyi bears primary responsibility, as the area under his command is more populous—home to 1.2 million people—compared with the 800,000 inhabitants of the liberated eastern part of Suiyuan; moreover, he commands a larger force.
The military region itself is likewise to be unified, with Fu Zuoyi as commander, Ulanhu and Yao Zhe [7] as deputy commanders, and Bo Yibo [8] as political commissar.
Comrade Fu may nominate additional deputy commanders and vice-chairmen of the military–political committee.
The provincial government will be headed by Dong Qiwu as governor, with Kui Bi [9] serving as vice-governor.
The government too is to operate as part of the united front, requiring close and effective cooperation.
You must ensure that all comrades fully understand the necessity and significance of such cooperation: what benefits it brings and why it is essential.
Ultimately, everything we do is for the welfare of the people.
During the war, our struggle was waged to liberate the masses; similarly, peaceful liberation and subsequent work of uniting and transforming former adversaries are also aimed at advancing the people’s interests.
Upon your return, convene a party congress or a meeting of cadres.
Comrade Bo Yibo should go there to deliver a lecture lasting about an hour, spending several days in total so that comrades can thoroughly discuss this issue.
Since this concerns the united front, Comrade Fu must also play his part.

The policy of uniting and transforming those who participated in the Suiyuan uprising has long been established.
Practical work should proceed according to the four principles and three steps proposed by Comrade Fu [10], carried out in a methodical manner, with the aim of achieving tangible results that can serve as an example for the entire country.
It is crucial that we cooperate to get things done well.
Former enemies have now become friends.
Of course, even after establishing cooperative relations, we should anticipate certain difficulties and recognize that this process will require arduous effort and struggle.
Ideally, it could be completed within a year; if not, two years would still be acceptable.
Without war, some tasks cannot be rushed; haste often leads to mistakes.
We should first undertake ideological reeducation, then gradually reform outdated institutions, proceeding step by step toward our objectives.

The guiding principles have already been clearly stated in the Central Committee’s telegram: maintain unity, strive for progress, reform old systems, adopt new policies, and work together to build a new Suiyuan for the people.
For the time being, no changes will be made to the military; adjustments to bring it into line with the PLA system will be carried out when conditions are ripe.
This matter requires particularly clear explanation within the Party, with the goal of achieving results within one year, though impatience should be avoided.
Chiang Kai-shek ruled for twenty-two years without accomplishing this; shouldn’t we consider it a success if we can complete it in just one year?
Troops should engage in production activities, for production is itself a form of combat.
Cadres must participate in directing production and in manual labor.
Such work can transform one’s thinking and character.
When soldiers see their officers digging in the fields alongside them, relations between officers and men are greatly improved—this is precisely the essence of political work.
Government employees may also engage in productive activities during their spare time, dedicating one to two hours each day primarily to vegetable gardening and pig farming.

Our policy toward those who have risen up is to unite and transform them simultaneously.
Unity alone is insufficient; transformation is indispensable.
Reactionary elements and counterrevolutionaries will never cease their conspiratorial sabotage, and they will continue to wage a desperate struggle against us.
This struggle will be prolonged, and we must remain vigilant.
While former adversaries have now become friends, this friendship is conditional.
All those who are willing to cooperate with us and those whom we can persuade to do so must be patiently assisted, educated, and transformed.
Through close cooperation and gradual transformation, we must eradicate every vestige of the past reactionary forces and their political influence, replacing their reactionary ideology with Marxist–Leninist thought.
As for those counterrevolutionaries and agents who stubbornly resist transformation or actively undermine it, they must be firmly suppressed.

We should seek to unite the majority; even among them, there are extremes at either end and a broad middle ground.
Those with radical views may be encouraged, while those progressing more slowly can be given time.
We must uphold the basic policy while allowing for differences.
Coercive methods are inappropriate; heavy rain does not penetrate deeply, whereas a gentle drizzle can seep in gradually.
Ideological and political education should be tailored to their specific circumstances and conducted in a manner they can readily accept, rather than being imposed upon them.

For the time being, political workers will not be assigned below the regimental level.
Those dispatched should receive thorough training, emphasizing careful study of the situation, understanding of others’ psychology, and mastery of new working methods, so that their presence does not lead to complications.
They must understand that failure to perform effectively could result in their removal, and even if they are not expelled, their inability to establish credibility will ultimately compel them to leave.
We learned a valuable lesson when we took over factories in Shijiazhuang.
Some of our cadres failed to provide practical assistance or conduct proper investigations; instead, they spent three days delivering lengthy lectures denouncing imperialism and the Kuomintang.
Once those speeches were exhausted, they had nothing further to offer, and the workers lost interest and refused to listen.
Only later did these cadres resume learning, working alongside the laborers, conducting investigations, engaging in struggle against hostile forces, and gradually mastering their duties.
By doing so, they earned the trust of the workers, and people began to appreciate their counsel.
Many of our comrades act without first studying new situations or matters, lacking both knowledge and understanding, and thus fail to achieve meaningful results.

The same holds true for newly formed units: if you do not grasp the local context, old methods will simply not work.
Those sent to carry out this task must be fully mentally prepared and expect potential friction.
In fact, both sides are observing each other, gauging how the other treats them.
The situation there is particularly complex: many individuals hail from the old society, and Kuomintang agents are concealed among the populace.
Following the peaceful liberation of Beiping, twelve thousand officers returned to Suiyuan, where they exerted a detrimental influence, carrying out what amounted to “political work.”
This experience compels us to reflect: our previous efforts fell short because we approached them with hostility, failing to treat them as comrades.
The Communist Party’s representatives now present here should acknowledge our past shortcomings and demonstrate a sincere commitment to rectifying them.
I, too, am setting an example for my comrades, striving to ensure that our future cooperation with them proceeds smoothly.

The recent upsurge in study and self-criticism among the people of Gui-Sui provides compelling evidence that these individuals can indeed be transformed and united through cooperative efforts.
In this regard, Comrade Fu also bears responsibility and should adopt a friendly attitude.
Our cadres must approach their counterparts with openness and avoid any attempt to marginalize them.
If we do marginalize them, their distrust will be entirely justified.
At the same time, those twelve thousand individuals need to feel that cooperating with the Communist Party is beneficial—that the new policies are sound, that their thinking can advance, and that their lives are secure and improving.
Should we fail to meet these expectations, our efforts will be deemed unsuccessful.

To convince the two million residents of Suiyuan, along with its hundred thousand troops and cadres, that cooperation yields positive results superior to the past, we must make them believe in us.
Otherwise, mere lip service will only breed dissatisfaction.
In short, as long as we do good and refrain from wrongdoing, the people will welcome us—a truth that becomes increasingly evident day by day.
By sharing greater responsibility and each side fulfilling its duties, we can resolve this issue.
Comrade Fu’s visit to Gui-Sui proved highly effective; by demonstrating concrete actions that benefit the people, we can cultivate many capable cadres for the future.
Naturally, the Communist Party bears an even heavier burden.
When our cadres arrive, the local population may become anxious, wondering whether we are reasonable, whether we respect them, or whether we will drive them out, leaving them with no place to live, no food, no means of sustenance, and no prospects for employment.
We must show them tangible progress—political advancement, secure livelihoods, and bright prospects—for them to perceive us favorably and develop genuine admiration.
Under no circumstances should we resort to the tactics employed by Kuomintang agents.

Peaceful transformation is indeed achievable, and given the current favorable conditions, we should have confidence in our ability to succeed.
With three million Party members, four million troops, and four hundred million people behind us, why should we fear failure?
The people of Gui-Sui, too, should take heart and look to the future.
In the past, when we studied the Suiyuan question, we recognized the possibility of a peaceful resolution and remained confident in this prospect.
However, doubts persisted regarding whether all aspects could be successfully addressed through peaceful means.
Now, reality has proven otherwise.
Even during Comrade Fu’s visit to Gui-Sui, some expressed skepticism, fearing a lack of prospects; yet once they saw that a viable path existed, they became eager to cooperate.
You must pay particular attention to this concern—their fear of having no future.
After the peaceful settlement in Beiping, we hesitated to employ military force again against Suiyuan, leading to the decision for its peaceful liberation.
Nevertheless, that was merely the first step; the second step involves peaceful cooperation.
The current situation is highly encouraging: the whole nation is on the verge of liberation, and the people of Gui-Sui are actively studying Marxism–Leninism.
Your presence there also marks a period of mutual observation.
Words must be backed by deeds; deception will not be tolerated.
If the Communist Party acts contrary to its words, it will resemble the Kuomintang—sweet talk followed by harsh measures—and critics may accuse us of emulating Chiang Kai-shek’s strategy of “saying all the right things while doing all the wrong ones.”
Moreover, Comrade Fu risks losing the trust placed in him.
Therefore, in the second, third, and fourth stages, we must continually deepen our engagement with them, steadily building their confidence in us.
Agents, too, deserve to be treated fairly.
The participants in the New Political Consultative Conference came from diverse backgrounds, and no one criticized its proceedings as poorly organized.
On the contrary, the conference proceeded with meticulous care, extensive consultation, and a spirit of goodwill.
It has set a commendable example for the nation.
Today, the Communist Party has grown into a nationwide mass organization, and with the establishment of the National Committee of the CPPCC, I, as its chairman, bear the responsibility of ensuring that the conference benefits all parties involved—not just ourselves—lest discontent arise, criticism ensue, or even regime change occur.
The same principle applies to Suiyuan: Gui-Sui is home to two distinct “parties”—ours and Comrade Fu’s. The military–political committee stands at the intersection of these two factions and must navigate this tension skillfully.
Nationwide, the united front is now firmly in place, and governments across central and southern China are likewise united-front administrations.
Rural and urban areas differ, yet non-Party cadres are invariably included in government bodies; their absence would lead to serious problems.
The Communist Party must perpetually collaborate with non-Party figures to prevent corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency.
In the Soviet Union, too, such cooperation was practiced: Pravda reported that three-quarters of government officials were Party members, with the remainder being non-Party personnel.
China has long maintained an alliance between the Party and non-Party elements, fostering sustained cooperation.
Both sides should regard all cadres as their own, breaking down the barriers of isolationism.
Isolationism has indeed existed in the past, as evidenced by the so-called “three fears.”
Without the united front, revolution cannot triumph, nor can victory be consolidated.
How can we engage in united-front work while fearing trouble, disruption, or the prospect of others benefiting at our expense?
We must absolutely avoid the kind of superficial enthusiasm exemplified by the story of Lord Ye’s love for dragons [11]. The Long March of twenty-five thousand li was not undertaken because of the existence of a united front, but rather due to excessive purity and adherence to rigid principles.
In the current composition of the government, we should maintain an equal balance between Party members and progressive figures, embracing talents from all regions.
Those who supported the Communist Party during the difficult period of the democratic revolution—speaking up on our behalf and offering assistance—deserve our gratitude and recognition after our victory.
Comrade Fu’s surrender of Beiping necessitates a different approach to resolving the Suiyuan issue.
This demonstrates the correctness of our policy and underscores the need to continue proving it in the future.
China now belongs to the people; every blade of grass and every tree is theirs.
We bear full responsibility for managing all matters and must not pass them off to others as if kicking a ball down the street.
We must also provide for the ten million Kuomintang cadres, officials, and military personnel, including those in Suiyuan, properly caring for agents as well, so that everyone has a way forward.
Without this comprehensive approach, focusing solely on the eight hundred thousand people in the liberated eastern part of Suiyuan would lead to grave errors.
In Hunan, there are one hundred thousand unemployed military and political cadres, along with countless widows and orphans left unattended.
If we attend only to the needs of Party-affiliated orphans, chaos will ensue—such action would resemble the mismanagement of Bo Gun rather than the successful flood control efforts of Yu the Great [12]. Therefore, we must adopt a holistic perspective, ensuring that cadres prioritize both long-term prospects and the overall situation.
Even peaceful transformation may involve unpleasant experiences, requiring a tortuous and sometimes intense struggle to achieve.
In the early stages of the War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek regarded the Communist Party as a purely political problem and sought to resolve it through “absorption,” unaware that we were like gold refined by fire: the more he tried to dissolve us, the stronger we became, ultimately seizing power from the Chiang family and placing it in the hands of the people.
The adoption of our Common Program at the inaugural session of the New Political Consultative Conference marked the beginning of our direct confrontation with the bourgeoisie.
Capitalists wanted us to confine ourselves to agriculture, while they monopolized industry, commerce, and transportation.
This was unacceptable.
We must therefore master not only political struggle but also economic work, as this constitutes a strategic imperative.
In organizing the government of Suiyuan, we should likewise rely on consultation and mutual exchange of ideas, which significantly speeds up decision-making.
Matters on which there is disagreement should be deferred; even when consensus is reached, we must distinguish between genuine inner conviction and mere verbal assent, postponing implementation if the latter prevails.
The military must also engage in consultation.
This is characteristic of China: approval must be obtained from Comrade Fu at the higher level, while lower-level cadres must also give their consent.
Particularly in the military, failure to reach agreement can easily lead to turmoil.
We should regard non-Party comrades as our own and cultivate long-term cooperation with them.
If this work is carried out successfully, it will represent a major advance for cadres on both sides.
This is something we have never done before, requiring new methods and dedicated effort.
The challenge lies squarely before us, demanding that we rise to the occasion.
Printed based on the transcript of the conversation preserved in the Central Archives.
Notes [1] Suiyuan refers to Suiyuan Province, whose territory at the time encompassed present-day Ulanqab League, Yikezhao League, the eastern portion of Bayannur League, as well as Hohhot and Baotou cities in Inner Mongolia.
It was abolished in 1954. [2] Dong Qiwu (1899–1989), native of Hejin, Shanxi.
Formerly served as Governor of Suiyuan Province under the Kuomintang and as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Northwestern Military and Political Headquarters of the Kuomintang government.
On May 28, 1949, he dispatched representatives to sign the “Suiyuan Peace Agreement” with Dong Biwu, Chairman of the North China People’s Government.
On September 19, he led representatives from various sectors of the military and political establishment, as well as from the Mongol and Han ethnic groups, in issuing a proclamation of uprising in Gui-Sui (present-day Hohhot). [3] On September 19, 1949, Dong Qiwu led his forces in proclaiming an uprising.
The following day, Chairman Mao Zedong and Commander-in-Chief Zhu De replied: “Having reviewed your statement of September 19, we find your stance to be correct.
Since General Fu Zuoyi spearheaded the peaceful liberation of Beiping, the people have welcomed this development, while reactionaries have opposed it.
These reactionaries have even attempted to sabotage the efforts toward peaceful liberation of Suiyuan, but their schemes have ultimately failed.
You have now led your forces in uprising, breaking away from the reactionary camp and aligning yourselves with the people.
We hope that you will maintain unity, strive for progress, reform outdated institutions, and adopt new policies, thereby contributing to the construction of a new Suiyuan for the people.” [4] During the Anti-Japanese War and the Liberation War, the work related to the Yikezhao League was directly or indirectly overseen by the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
Following the peaceful liberation of Suiyuan, it was decided through consultations between the North China and Northwest Bureaus of the CPC Central Committee to place the Yikezhao League under the administration of Suiyuan Province in North China. [5] Fu Zuoyi (1895–1974), native of Anchang Village, Ronghe County, Shanxi (now part of Linyi). Formerly served as Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang’s Northern Pacification Headquarters.
In January 1949, he led his forces in accepting the peaceful reorganization by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, making significant contributions to the peaceful liberation of Beiping and Suiyuan.
He was also a member of the Central People’s Government. [6] Ulanhu (1906–1988), native of the Left Tumed Banner in Inner Mongolia.
Served as Secretary of the Inner Mongolia Regional Committee of the CPC and as Chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People’s Government. [7] Yao Zhe (1906–1979), native of Shaoyang, Hunan.
Served as Deputy Commander of the Suiyuan Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. [8] Bo Yibo, at the time served as First Secretary of the North China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and as Political Commissar of the North China Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. [9] Kui Bi (1903–1986), native of the Left Tumed Banner in Inner Mongolia.
Served as Deputy Secretary of the Inner Mongolia Regional Committee of the CPC and later as Vice-Governor of Suiyuan Province. [10] The four principles proposed by Fu Zuoyi are: first, uphold unity; second, purge agents; third, enforce discipline; and fourth, reorganize the military into the PLA.
The three steps are: first, thoroughly achieve liberation and PLA-style reorganization, completely severing ties with the Kuomintang reactionary regime; second, restore transportation networks; and third, dispatch PLA cadres to carry out ideological reeducation. [11] The story of Lord Ye’s love for dragons originates from Liu Xiang’s “Xin Xu·Zashi” written during the Han dynasty.
It is used metaphorically to describe a situation where someone outwardly supports the united front but inwardly fears engaging in it. [12] Yu the Great and Bo Gun were legendary tribal leaders in ancient China.
Bo Gun was Yu’s father.
Both were commissioned by Emperors Yao and Shun to control flooding.
Bo Gun’s attempt to dam the waters failed, whereas Yu succeeded by dredging rivers and constructing irrigation channels.