Talk with Leading Members of Suiyuan

[1]

(October 24, 1949)

The peaceful liberation of Suiyuan has been under discussion for over half a year, and only now has the first step been realized. On September 19, Dong Qiwu [2] and others issued a telegram declaring their uprising, and Commander-in-Chief Zhu and I also sent a telegram in reply. [3] Now we must take the second step, that is, to achieve cooperation. This step is very important. We must resolutely carry out this telegram from the Central Committee, which sets forth the Party’s basic policy for Suiyuan. It requires not only their implementation, but even more so, the implementation by the Communist Party.

Suiyuan falls within the scope of Inner Mongolia’s regional autonomy, and under the province, league people’s government committees are to be established. Regarding the Ih Ju League, the North China Bureau should consult with the Northwest Bureau and obtain their consent to place it

—— over forty years ago in the book Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. VI.

Talk with Leading Members of Suiyuan

under the leadership of Suiyuan, [1] with the league government’s seat possibly located at Dongsheng or elsewhere. A league people’s government committee is also to be established for the Ulanqab League. Both the Ih Ju League and the Ulanqab League should set up military sub-districts. Both Mongolian and Han nationalities in the two leagues should have representatives on the government committees; this also needs to be discussed with them.

A military and political committee is to be established in Suiyuan. This committee will be directly under the leadership of the Central Committee, with the provincial government and the military area under its leadership. Let Fu Zuoyi [2] serve as chairman, with Ulanhu [3] as vice-chairman, to exercise unified leadership over military, political, economic, and cultural and educational affairs in Suiyuan. Fu Zuoyi should bear the primary responsibility, because the area under his jurisdiction has a larger population — 1.2 million people — whereas the liberated area in eastern Suiyuan has only 800,000; he also has more troops. The military area also needs to be unified, with Fu Zuoyi as commander, Ulanhu and Yao Zhe [4] as deputy commanders, and Bo Yibo [5] as political commissar. Mr. Fu may nominate additional deputy commanders and vice-chairmen of the military and political committee. In the government, Dong Qiwu should serve as provincial chairman and Kui Bi [6] as vice-chairman. The government is also to be a united front, and we must ensure good cooperation. You should help comrades understand the necessity and significance of this cooperation, its benefits, and

the reasons behind it. It must be made clear that everything is for the benefit of the people. Fighting wars is for the liberation of the people; peaceful liberation and uniting and reforming people are also for the benefit of the people. When you go back, hold a Party congress or a cadres’ meeting, with Bo Yibo going there to speak for about an hour; spend a few days enabling the comrades to thoroughly discuss this issue. This is a matter of the united front, and Mr. Fu also needs to do some work on this.

The policy of uniting with and reforming the personnel of the Suiyuan uprising was set long ago. The actual work should proceed according to the four principles and three steps proposed by Mr. Fu, [1] and it should be carried out in a step-by-step manner, achieving greater results for the whole country to see. Unite to do things well. Both sides were enemies in the past, but have now become friends. Of course, after cooperation, we must also anticipate that some problems may arise, and it will still require hard work and struggle. It would be good to achieve this within one year; otherwise, it can take two years. Now that there is no war, some things cannot be carried out very quickly; haste will cause problems. We must first carry out ideological reform, and then reform the old system, reaching the goal step by step. The principles were already stated in the Central Committee’s telegram: unite as one, strive for progress, reform the old system, implement new policies, and struggle to build a new Suiyuan for the people. The troops will remain temporarily unchanged for now, and will be reorganized according to the PLA’s system when conditions are ripe. This matter must be made especially clear within the Party; we can strive to reach the goal within one year, but we must not be impatient. Chiang Kai-shek ruled for twenty-two years and could not do a good job — isn’t it good enough if we can accomplish it in one year?

The troops should organize production; production is also a form of combat. Cadres should take part in directing production and in physical labor. Labor can reform thinking and reform people. When soldiers see that cadres also dig the earth, the relationship between officers and soldiers can improve, and this is political work. Government employees can engage in production during their spare time, working one or two hours a day, mainly planting vegetables and raising pigs.

Our policy toward the uprising personnel is both to unite with and to reform them. Unity alone, without reform,

Talk with Leading Members of Suiyuan

will not work. The sabotage activities conspired by reactionary classes and counterrevolutionaries will not cease; they will continue to wage life-and-death struggles against us, and the duration of these struggles will be very long. We must absolutely not let down our guard. They were enemies in the past and have now become friends — but this is conditional. All who are willing to cooperate with us and who can be brought to cooperate with us must be patiently helped, educated, and reformed. We must cooperate well with them and, through reform, gradually eliminate all remnants of the past reactionaries and their political influence, replacing the reactionary thought of the Kuomintang with Marxism-Leninism. As for those counterrevolutionary elements and secret agents who resolutely oppose and sabotage reform, they must be dealt blows and suppressed. We must strive to unite with the majority. Within their ranks, too, it is a case of “small at both ends and large in the middle”; those with more radical thinking may be encouraged, while those who progress slowly may be awaited. The basic policy must be upheld, but differences may be tolerated. We cannot use crude methods with them; we cannot pour down a rainstorm, but must seep in like a light drizzle. Ideological and political education must be conducted according to their specific circumstances and their ability to accept it; we cannot forcibly indoctrinate them.

Regarding political personnel, for the time being, none are to be sent below the division level. The comrades we send should be educated, and they should be instructed to study the situation, understand the psychology of others, and grasp new methods of work, so that these cadres will not cause problems after they go. They should be made to understand that if they do a poor job, they will be driven out by the others; even if they are not driven out, if they cannot hold their ground, they will still have to leave. We had a lesson from taking over the factories in Shijiazhuang. The cadres we sent could not help in professional matters, nor did they conduct specific investigations and studies; they simply spent three days loudly preaching the great principles of anti-imperialism and anti-Kuomintang, and when they had nothing new after finishing, the people were unwilling to listen and did not approve of them. Later, those cadres became students again, studying and working together with the workers, making investigations studies, carrying out struggles against the enemy, and becoming experts in professional matters. Only then did they become trusted friends of the workers, and people then liked to listen to what they had to say. Many of our comrades neither investigate nor study new situations and new things, and understanding nothing themselves, they proceed to handle affairs there. If you do not understand the goods, you cannot judge their quality; how can they do things well then? The same goes for the new troops; if you do not understand the situation, sticking to the old methods will not work. The people we send must be fully mentally prepared and must anticipate possible friction. In fact, both sides are observing each other, watching to see how

the other side treats them. The situation over there is rather complicated. Not only did the people come out of the old society, but there are also Kuomintang secret agents hidden among the masses. During the peaceful liberation of Beiping, another 12,000 officers returned to Suiyuan. They did not exert a good influence but did their own “political work” there. This deserves our self-criticism. In the past, we failed to handle this matter well because, under a kind of hostile sentiment, we did not treat them as comrades. This time, the comrades the Communist Party sends must make clear our attitude and admit that we did not do a good job in the past. I, too, am doing work to show our comrades, so that from now on we can cooperate well with them. The recent upsurge of study in Guisui proves that it is possible to reform and unite with these people through cooperative methods. In this regard, Mr. Fu must also shoulder responsibility and adopt a friendly attitude. When our comrades go there, they must certainly adopt a friendly attitude and must not push these people aside; if you push them aside, they will have good reason not to trust you. Those 12,000 men must also be made to feel that cooperating with the Communist Party brings benefits — that the new policies are good, that they can advance in their thinking, that their livelihood is assured and can be improved. If we fail to meet these demands, then our work will have failed. We must make the two million people, the one hundred thousand troops, and the cadres in Suiyuan all feel that the cooperation yields good results, which will be better than before; only then will they have faith in us. If we remain at the level of words alone, they will be dissatisfied. In short, if we do good deeds and not bad ones, they will welcome us, a point that is being proven day by day. Both sides bearing heavier responsibilities and both doing good work will solve the problem. Mr. Fu’s visit to Guisui has had an effect. You can show them what you do; this is beneficial to the people, and many good cadres can be cultivated in the future. Of course, the responsibility on the Communist Party side is even greater. When they see the people we send, they may become nervous — for instance, wondering whether the Communist Party is reasonable, whether it looks down on people, whether it will push people so hard that they cannot hold their ground, have nowhere to go, nothing to eat, no way to make a living, and no jobs. You must do a good job and show them, so that they will progress politically, have security in their livelihood, and have prospects for development. Only then will they feel that we are good and come to admire us. On no account can we adopt the methods of Kuomintang secret agents.

Peaceful reform can be realized; the conditions for it now exist, and we should have confidence. We have a guarantee in our three million Party members, four million troops, and four hundred million people — how could we not succeed? Guisui

A Talk with Responsible Comrades of Suiyuan<sup>1</sup>


(October 24, 1949)


The Suiyuan side should also have confidence and see the future. When we studied the Suiyuan issue in the past, we thought there was a possibility for a peaceful settlement and were confident about it; but we still had doubts about whether everything could be settled successfully by peaceful methods. Now events have shown that it can be done. When Mr. Fu<sup>2</sup> went to Guisui<sup>3</sup>, some people were also suspicious and were afraid that there would be no future; they were only willing to cooperate if there was one. You must pay special attention to this—those people are simply afraid that there will be no future. After the peaceful settlement of the Beiping issue, we went soft and thought it inadvisable to attack Suiyuan, hence its peaceful liberation. But this was only the first step; the second step is peaceful cooperation. The situation is now excellent: the whole country will soon be liberated and the Guisui side is, for its part, studying Marxism-Leninism. After you have gone there, there will also be a period of mutual observation. You must live up to your word and not deceive people. If the Communist Party goes there and what it does is different from what it says, then it will be no different from the Kuomintang, which started with sweet talk and finished with rough treatment, and people will say that we have learned from Chiang Kai-shek, who “spoke only of the good and did only the bad”, and Mr. Fu will lose his good faith too. Therefore, in the second, third and fourth steps, we must improve our relations with them more and more and win their confidence. Special agents must also be fed. The New Political Consultative Conference comprises members from all circles, and nobody says it was badly organized. The reason is chiefly that the work has been done carefully and conscientiously, in consultation with people and with goodwill towards them. The New Political Consultative Conference has set an example for the whole country.

The Communist Party has now become a nationwide major party and in addition there is the CPPCC National Committee. As Chairman, I have the duty to benefit all sections of the community and make things go well for the other parties, otherwise we will incur dissatisfaction, be reviled and even overthrown. In Suiyuan we should also take care. There are two “parties” in Guisui, ours and Mr. Fu’s. The Military and Administrative Commission must be set up to straddle this contradiction and handle it successfully. At present the united front is being executed throughout the country, and the governments in central and southern China are likewise governments of the united front. Conditions in the countryside and cities are different and no members of other parties are part of the government, but there are non-Party cadres. If there were no non-Party cadres taking part in the government there would be trouble. The Communist Party must always cooperate with non-Party people; in this way it will not be easy for us to do bad things or become bureaucratic. Even in the Soviet Union there is cooperation between the Communist Party and non-Party people; Pravda says that Party members account for three-quarters of the cadres in the government and the rest are non-Party cadres. In China we too want a permanent alliance and prolonged cooperation between the Party and non-Party people. Both sides should treat the cadres of the other side as their own. We must break with closed-doorism. In the past there has been such a thing—“the white of the whites” is a case in point. Without the united front the revolution could not have been victorious, and even if it had been victorious, it could not have been consolidated. How can we fear trouble, fear complications, or be afraid that others will benefit at our expense when our work involves the united front? We absolutely must not be like Lord Ye who was so fond of dragons. We covered 25,000 lì on the Long March not because we had any united front at that time but because we were too pure. For the present government we should see to it that Communists and progressives each make up half the number and that people from all corners of the country are brought in. Others supported the Communist Party in the difficult periods of the democratic revolution, spoke up for us and helped us; we cannot discard them after our victory. Mr. Fu surrendered Beiping to us, so the settlement of the Suiyuan question must be made somewhat differently. This shows that our policy is correct and it will continue to confirm this in the future.

China now belongs to the people; every blade of grass and every tree belongs to the people, we must take responsibility for everything and manage it well, we cannot palm off our tasks on others like kicking around a ball. We shall also provide for the one million Party, government and army personnel of the Kuomintang, including those in Suiyuan, and we must keep special agents under beneficial control, so as to find a way out for everybody. If we don’t do this, it won’t do. If we keep only the eight hundred thousand people of the Suiyuan East Liberated Area before our eyes, we shall make a mess of things. In Hunan, one hundred thousand unemployed army men and government personnel and huge numbers of widows and orphans are uncared for; if we were to look after only the widows and orphans of Communists, the trouble would be tremendous. That would make us no different from Bo Gun, who tried to dam the waters, and not like Great Yu, who tamed the floods. Hence we must take all things into consideration and do our planning on an overall scale. We must make the cadres understand that first there is the future and second the overall situation. Even when people are won over peacefully there may be some unpleasantness, and the change can be brought about only through twists and turns and fierce struggles. In the early stages of the War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek regarded the Communist Party as a political problem and wanted to solve it by means of “melting down the Communists”, but he did not realize that we were true gold that had no fear of fire and that the more he melted us down the stronger we would become, until finally we seized the realm of the Chiangs and turned it over to the people. When the New Political Consultative Conference discussed and adopted the Common Programme put forward by us, it was the beginning of a direct trial of strength between our Party and the bourgeoisie. The capitalists want us to engage only in agriculture and to leave industry, commerce and communications to them. How could that be? We must not only learn how to wage political struggle but also learn how to do economic work; this is a matter of strategy.

In organizing the government of Suiyuan, we should also use the method of consultation, to achieve mutual understanding; this will make things go faster. Nothing should be done about which opinions still differ; with matters about which there is agreement, it is still necessary to ascertain whether the agreement is sincere or out of the lips only, and if it is forced, the matter should be deferred. Everything that concerns the army should also be handled through consultation. This is a special feature of China. On the one hand the agreement of Mr. Fu must be obtained, and on the other, that of the cadres. This is particularly so with the army, where carrying out things without agreement can easily give rise to trouble. You must regard non-Party comrades as your own people and cooperate with them over the long term. If this work is done well, it will represent a big step forward for the cadres of both sides. We must use new methods to do a job we have never done before, and we must use our brains. The problem lies before us, so we must go and do our work well.


Notes

1. Suiyuan was a province of China that was peacefully liberated on 19 September 1949, abolished in 1954 and incorporated into Inner Mongolia.

2. Fu Zuoyi (1894-1974) was the Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang’s North China Bandit-Suppression Headquarters. He was instrumental in the peaceful liberation of Beiping in January 1949 and subsequently became a member of the Central People’s Government Council and Minister of Water Conservancy.

3. Formerly the capital of Suiyuan Province; the present-day city of Hohhot in Inner Mongolia.

--- Notes

[1] Suiyuan refers to Suiyuan Province. At the time, its jurisdiction covered areas that are now the Ulanqab League, Ih Ju League, the eastern part of the Bayannur League, and the cities of Hohhot and Baotou in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It was abolished in 1954.


[1] During the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation, the work in the Ih Ju League was under the direct or indirect leadership of the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. After the peaceful liberation of Suiyuan, it was agreed upon by the North China Bureau and the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to place it under the leadership of Suiyuan Province of North China.


[1] The four principles proposed by Fu Zuoyi were: 1) Persist in unity; 2) Eliminate secret agents; 3) Rectify discipline; 4) Reorganize the troops into the People’s Liberation Army. The three steps were: 1) Thoroughly realize the transformation into a liberated area and the PLA, completely breaking away from the Kuomintang reactionary regime; 2) Restore transportation; 3) Send PLA cadres to carry out ideological reform.


[2] Dong Qiwu (1899–1989), a native of Hejin, Shanxi Province. He was formerly Chairman of the Kuomintang’s Suiyuan Provincial Government and Deputy Commander of the Northwest Military and Political Chief’s Office of the Kuomintang government. On May 28, 1949, he sent representatives to sign the Suiyuan Peace Agreement with Dong Biwu, Chairman of the North China People’s Government. On September 19, he led military, political, and all other circles, along with representatives of the Mongolian and Han nationalities, in issuing a telegram declaring an uprising in Guisui (present-day Hohhot).


[2] Fu Zuoyi (1895–1974), a native of Anchang Village, Ronghe County, Shanxi Province (now part of Linyi). He was formerly Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang’s North China “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters. In January 1949 he led his troops in accepting peaceful reorganization by the People’s Liberation Army, contributing to the peaceful liberation of Beiping and Suiyuan. At the time, he was a member of the Central People’s Government Council.


[3] On September 19, 1949, Dong Qiwu led his troops in issuing a telegram declaring an uprising. On September 20, Mao Zedong and Zhu De sent a telegram in reply, stating: “We have read your declaration of September 19. Your stand is correct. Since General Fu Zuoyi led the peaceful liberation of Beiping, the people have expressed welcome, while the reactionaries have expressed opposition. The reactionaries also attempted to undermine the efforts of the military and civilians in Suiyuan for peaceful liberation, but ultimately failed. You have now led your troops in an uprising, broken away from the reactionaries, and come over to the side of the people. We hope you will unite as one, strive for progress, reform the old system, implement new policies, and work hard to build a new Suiyuan for the people.”


[3] Ulanhu (1906–1988), a native of Tumd Left Banner, Inner Mongolia. At the time, he was Secretary of the CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Committee and Chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People’s Government.


[4] Yao Zhe (1906–1979), a native of Shaoyang, Hunan Province. At the time, he was Deputy Commander of the PLA Suiyuan Military Area.


[5] Bo Yibo was then First Secretary of the North China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Political Commissar of the PLA North China Military Area.


[6] Kui Bi (1903–1986), a native of Tumd Left Banner, Inner Mongolia. At the time, he was Deputy Secretary of the CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Committee and later became Vice-Chairman of the Suiyuan Provincial People’s Government.