Speech at the First Meeting [l]
(October 20, 1949)
The current military situation is as follows:
The First Field Army consists of five corps (originally two from Northwest China; two were transferred to North China), totaling over 400,000 troops, under the command of Peng Dehuai [2].
The Second Field Army comprises three corps with a strength of 500,000, led by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping [3]. It is currently on the move, preparing to advance into Southwest China. The forces have now reached the Baoqing area, where they are equipping themselves with winter clothing. Once this is completed, they will proceed immediately.
The Third Field Army has four corps, numbering 600,000 troops, under the leadership of Chen Yi, Rao Shushi, and Su Yu, primarily tasked with countering imperialism. A portion of this army is currently engaged in combat operations around Kinmen and Dinghai [4]. Another section is making preparations for naval vessels to launch an attack on Taiwan. However, we plan not to deploy this field army at all.
The Fourth Field Army is commanded by Lin Biao [1]. This unit is quite large: it numbered 800,000 when it moved south from Beiping. Now, additional forces have been incorporated—those previously under Cheng Qian and Chen Mingren [2], as well as Li Xiannian’s units [3] from South China—bringing the total to over one million. The regions currently held by this army are mostly newly liberated areas; only Henan and Hubei have been under our control for two years, while most other areas were just recently liberated. This force has relatively few foreign-related issues, except for Guangzhou, where imperialist interference could come solely from Britain. We maintain two divisions stationed in Guangzhou, supported by extensive local militia forces throughout Guangdong Province.
At present, our primary focus against imperialism lies in two key areas: Shanghai and Tianjin. Qingdao remains less critical. We have already assembled fifteen divisions along the Beijing–Shenyang railway line [4], and the entire Shanghai sector is being handled by the Third Field Army.
The operation to advance into Southwest China involves three corps led by Liu and Deng, together with He Long’s [5] corps, totaling 600,000 troops. Their mission is to secure Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Xikang [6]. He Long’s forces will strike directly toward northern Sichuan and the Sichuan–Xikang border, while Liu and Deng’s units will move from the Dabie Mountains to the Emei Mountains. It is estimated that, barring Kunming, the rest of Southwest China can be fully liberated this winter. As for Kunming [!],
[1] Lin Biao was then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Central China and Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Field Army, concurrently serving as Commander of the Central China Military Region.
(2) Cheng Qian, formerly Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Government of the Kuomintang and Director of the Changsha Pacification Office, led a revolt in Changsha alongside Chen Mingren in August 1949. At that time, he served as a member of the Central People’s Government and Head of the Hunan Military-Administrative Committee. Chen Mingren, formerly Commander of the First Corps of the Kuomintang Army, also participated in the Changsha uprising with Cheng Qian in August 1949. He was subsequently appointed Commander of the 21st Corps of the Fourth Field Army and Deputy Commander of the Hunan Military Region.
(3) Li Xiannian was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Hubei Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
(4) The Beijing–Shenyang railway line refers to the section of today’s Beijing–Harbin Railway.
(5) He Long was then Second Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander of the Northwest Military Region. By this time, he had already been appointed Third Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander of the Southwest Military Region, though he had not yet assumed these new posts.
(6) “Xikang” refers to the former province of Xikang, which was abolished in 1955.

Due to General Chen Geng’s [11] need for a wide detour, the operation will take longer.
Regarding the Xinjiang issue in the Northwest, the vanguard division of the First Field Army arrived in Hami on October 15 and is currently negotiating with Tao Zhiyue [21]. Tao is very welcoming. The main force is expected to reach both Northern and Southern Xinjiang between November and December; otherwise, if they arrive any later, once snowfall begins, it will become impossible to organize next year’s agricultural production, and providing food for the troops would pose a major problem. The same applies to Southwest China: deploying such large armies presents significant logistical challenges. Therefore, we must recognize that these massive military formations also represent substantial productive capacity, and robust plans for agricultural production must be put in place for next year.
Our strategic deployment is also influenced by transportation conditions. We aim to complete repairs on all railways by the end of this year or early next year.
Since acquiring two large warships [31], we now hold the upper hand at sea. These ships are actively undergoing training, demonstrating their keen awareness of the current situation. Notably, the uprisings of both warships were not orchestrated by Communist Party members, which underscores the profound shift in public sentiment across China.
However, our air force remains relatively weak, leaving Shanghai and Nanjing highly vulnerable to enemy aircraft attacks.
Banditry has at times been a serious concern. As our main forces advance, these bandits are akin to lice lingering after combing—one cannot feel truly satisfied until they are completely eradicated. Fortunately, the campaign against them is nearly complete.
Such is the overall military situation and deployment. As for postwar military reorganization, that constitutes a separate matter. At that point, corps structures may no longer be necessary, and even individual armies could potentially be disbanded, given the reduction in regimental numbers. This would allow for the transfer of many officers to civilian roles, addressing the widespread personnel shortages we currently face.
[1] Chen Geng was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Fourth Corps of the Second Field Army.
[2] Tao Zhiyue, formerly Vice Chief of Staff of the Northwest Administrative Commission of the Kuomintang Army and Commander-in-Chief of the Xinjiang Garrison Command, led his troops in a proclamation of uprising in Xinjiang on September 25, 1949.
[3] Refers to the former Kuomintang Navy warships “Chongqing” and “Changzhi,” which defected on February 25 and September 19, 1949, respectively, joining the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

It is imperative that we find suitable employment for these military personnel. Additionally, there are approximately 400,000 former Nationalist officers still active today, about one-quarter to one-third of whom remain capable of contributing. In principle, we should arrange resettlement for all of them; failing to do so would be inappropriate. Similarly, former non-commissioned officers require proper handling so that they too can secure meaningful work and adequate sustenance.
Currently, we have over four million troops, a figure set to exceed five million within a few months. Including government personnel, the total exceeds six million. Such a massive scale is beyond the capacity of most nations to sustain, yet we must nevertheless prepare ourselves to support it at some point.
Regarding the transition of military units into productive activities: Wang Jian’an’s Seventh Corps [Ill] in Zhejiang once partially shifted to production, earning widespread approval from the local populace. When larger-scale conversions occur in the future, it will be necessary to provide certain production subsidies to encourage units to develop industrial or agricultural ventures, or to collaborate with civilians. This approach not only improves the living standards of the troops but also allows the state to continue funding them initially, gradually reducing or suspending support once they achieve a certain level of self-sufficiency. Each region should begin planning accordingly.
This session of the Military Commission has welcomed new members, injecting fresh blood into its ranks, reflecting the evolving nature of our national defense landscape. Previously, the Military Commission rarely convened, as frontline commanders were preoccupied with warfare, leaving only a small group of us to manage its affairs. Our operations relied heavily on field armies and regional commands. Within the military itself, three core democratic principles prevailed: [I] Wang Jian’an was then Commander of the Seventh Corps of the Third Field Army.

These included peer-to-peer education, officer-to-trooper instruction, and troop-to-officer guidance—the so-called “three teachings”—which enabled rapid combat readiness. During the Huaihai Campaign, soldiers were captured, trained, reinforced, and immediately returned to battle. A corresponding political work system was also in place. Today, approximately eighty percent of Su and粟’s units consist of former enemy personnel, and similar proportions exist in other formations. Despite this, they fight resolutely, driven entirely by our revolutionary spirit and mutual affection.
We hope that the newly added members of the Military Commission will unite sincerely to deliberate on pressing issues. Going forward, we intend to hold regular meetings in Beijing and exchange ideas. I endorse Mr. Zhang Wenbai’s [Il] proposal to establish a national defense research group, with Mr. Zhang serving as its leader, General Liu Fei [21] as deputy leader, and Messrs. Cai [31], Fu [call], and Nie [Rongzhen] as members. Nie Rongzhen [ISi] may also join, along with our Chief of Operations, Li Tao, and Luo Ruiqing [61]. Together, these seven individuals would engage in substantive work. Any materials needed should be requested from Nie Rongzhen.
Construction of our coastline is about to commence, a development of great importance.
[!] Zhang Wenbai refers to Zhang Zhizhong.
In January 1949, he served as the chief representative of the Kuomintang government’s peace negotiation delegation. On April 20, following the Kuomintang government’s refusal to sign the “Domestic Peace Agreement (Final Revised Version),” he withdrew from the Kuomintang administration. At that time, he was a member of both the Central People’s Government and the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission.
[2] Liu Fei, formerly Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kuomintang Ministry of National Defense, represented the Kuomintang government during peace negotiations in April 1949. In August, he joined 44 prominent Kuomintang figures in Hong Kong to publicly sever ties with the Kuomintang government. He was subsequently appointed a member of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission.
[3] Cai refers to Cai Tingkuo, who served as commander of the Kuomintang’s 19th Route Army in 1930. In 1933, he participated in the establishment of the Fujian People’s Revolutionary Government, which opposed both Japanese aggression and Chiang Kai-shek’s rule. He was later appointed a member of both the Central People’s Government and the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission.
[4] Fu refers to Fu Zuoyi, formerly Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang’s North China Pacification Headquarters. In January 1949, he led his forces in Beiping to accept peaceful reorganization. At that time, he was a member of both the Central People’s Government and the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission.
[5] Nie Rongzhen was then Deputy Chief of Staff of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission.
[6] Luo Ruiqing served as Minister of Public Security of the Central People’s Government.

On October 20, 1949, the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission held its first meeting. Pictured are Mao Zedong and several commission members posing together at the Yining Hall in Zhongnanhai.
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A letter of state bearing the “National Seal Number Check” signed in the handwriting of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.