Telegram to Lin Biao [1] Regarding the Operational Policy for the Southwest Region (October 19, 1949) Comrade Lin Biao, with copy to Ye and Chen [2]: Your telegram of 12:00 on the 18th has been received.   (1) Your plan to first execute a wide encircling maneuver to cut off the enemy’s retreat into Yunnan is very sound.   (2) The strategic focus of the Southwest lies in Sichuan. The main forces of our Second Field Army must occupy the Xufu–Chongqing area by December, while He [3], leading the Eighteenth Corps, should seize the Chengdu region in January and swiftly expand control over the entire province, making arrangements for next year’s spring plowing; only then will it be conducive to production and construction. Therefore, regardless of whether Bai Chongxi [4] retreats to Yunnan or not, our Third and Fifth Corps should prepare to dispatch only one corps—the Eighteenth—to capture Guiyang and administer Guizhou. The remaining five corps, together with the two corps headquarters and the units directly under the Second Field Army, are to advance via western Hunan in separate columns straight toward Xufu, Shanghai, and Chongqing (with a portion left around Zunyi), ensuring arrival in that area by December to establish the Southwest Military and Political Committee and coordinate overall operations throughout the Southwest. Otherwise, the financial and logistical problems involving 1.5 million people will fall into extreme difficulty. By “1.5 million people” we mean our own 600,000 troops (including the entire Second Field Army of 500,000 and He’s unit of 100,000), plus approximately 900,000 Nationalist military and administrative personnel belonging to Zhang Qun [ ] across Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Xikang provinces, most of whom are concentrated in Sichuan.   (3) Based on your proposed wide encirclement plan, it is estimated that half or more of Bai Chongxi’s forces may be annihilated within Guangxi, leaving relatively few to withdraw into Yunnan. Assuming now that the main body of Bai’s bandits does indeed retreat to Yunnan, together with enemy units from Guizhou also withdrawing there, plus Lu Han [ ] and other formations already stationed in Yunnan, there will be roughly 150,000 enemy troops in total. Under these circumstances, we should still deploy only Chen Geng’s corps of 100,000, supplemented by local guerrilla forces (reportedly numbering over 20,000), to maintain the initiative. Given the long distances, food shortages, and the difficulty of repeated movements, sending two corps—totaling 200,000 men—would risk entrapment in a difficult situation. It is anticipated that Chen Geng, with 100,000 troops entering Yunnan and employing a strategy of defeating the enemy piecemeal, can resolve the issue, albeit at the cost of slightly prolonging the timeline.   (4) Please make dispositions in accordance with the above guidelines.   (5) Liu and Deng [7] will depart Beijing tomorrow or the day after, passing through Wuhan en route to Hunan, to direct the Second Field Army’s advance into Sichuan. The Third and Fifth Corps are hereby ordered to complete their winter clothing supplies and move to the Hunan–Guizhou border to await further orders.

Mao Zedong Youhao Printed from the manuscript. Notes [ ] Lin Biao, at the time Commander of the Fourth Field Army of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Commander of the Central China Military Region. [ ] Ye refers to Ye Jianying, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Guangdong Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Chen refers to Chen Geng, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Fourth Corps of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. [3] He refers to He Long, then Commander of the Northwest Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In October 1949 he was appointed Commander of the Southwest Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, though he had not yet assumed office. [4] Bai Chongxi was appointed Chief of the Central China Administrative Office of the Nationalist Government in April 1949. [ ] Zhang Qun was appointed Chief of the Southwest Administrative Office of the Nationalist Government in April 1949.
[6] Lu Han, a former Nationalist general, led his troops in an uprising in Kunming on December 9, 1949. [7] Liu refers to Liu Bocheng, then Commander of the Second Field Army of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Deng refers to Deng Xiaoping, then Political Commissar of the Second Field Army. £·