Capturing Guangzhou and Annihilating Bai Chongxi’s Forces
(October 12, 1949)
To Comrade Lin Biao, with copies to Ye, Chen, Fang, Deng, Lai (21) and Liu, Deng, Zhang, Li口3
(I)
Your telegram of 21:00 on the 11th (4) contains excellent suggestions. Namely, if the enemy holds Guangzhou or if our forces have a chance to destroy significant enemy manpower either within or outside Guangzhou, then the Second and Fifteenth Field Armies (51) should continue advancing toward Guangzhou. However, Chen and Deng must first commit sufficient forces directly to Guangzhou and Wuzhou.
[1]
Lin Biao was at that time Commander of the Fourth Field Army and concurrently Commander of the Central China Military Region.
[2]
Ye refers to Ye Jianying, who served as First Secretary of the South China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander and Political Commissar of the Guangdong Military Region. Chen refers to Chen Geng, who was Commander and Political Commissar of the Fourth Corps of the Second Field Army. Fang refers to Fang Fang, who was Third Secretary of the South China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Deng refers to Deng Hua, who was Commander of the Fifteenth Corps of the Fourth Field Army. Lai refers to Lai Chuanzhu, who was Political Commissar of the Fifteenth Corps of the Fourth Field Army.
[3]
Liu, Deng, Zhang, and Li refer to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Jichun, and Li Da, who respectively held the positions of Commander, Political Commissar, Deputy Political Commissar cum Director of the Political Department, and Chief of Staff of the Second Field Army at the time.
[4]
This refers to the telegram sent at 21:00 on October 11, 1949, by Lin Biao, Deng Zihui, Tan Zheng, Xiao Ke, and Zhao Erlu to the CPC Central Military Commission. The telegram stated: Given that the enemy in Guangdong is not engaging us in a head-on battle, we still advocate temporarily refraining from capturing Guangzhou in order to avoid concentrating the Guangdong enemy forces. For now, only Deng Hua’s corps will remain in Guangdong to conduct mobile warfare and annihilate enemy living forces. However, should the enemy defend Guangzhou or if our forces can achieve the destruction of substantial enemy manpower inside or outside Guangzhou, then Chen Geng’s and Deng Hua’s two corps may proceed toward Guangzhou to accomplish the objective of total annihilation. Until the enemy’s intentions in Guangdong are clearly discerned and our ability to seize them is confirmed, Chen Geng’s and Deng Hua’s two corps shall continue advancing toward Guangzhou according to the original plan.
[5]
The “Chen-Deng Two Corps” refer to the Fourth Corps of the Second Field Army and the Fifteenth Corps of the Fourth Field Army, commanded respectively by Chen Geng and Deng Hua.

between the two cities, severing a section of the Xijiang River to block the enemy’s westward escape route and prevent the Guangzhou garrison from concentrating in Guangxi. Once it is confirmed that the enemy around Guangzhou is fleeing toward Guangxi, Chen Geng’s corps should pursue relentlessly into Guangxi. Conversely, if the enemy near Guangzhou is not retreating to Guangxi, then the two corps under Chen Geng and Deng Hua should proceed as originally planned to occupy Guangzhou without change. (II) The Seventh Army and four divisions of the Forty-Eighth Army, which were annihilated north of Qiyang, constituted the elite of the Guangxi clique. Although the Guangxi regular forces still include three divisions of the Forty-Sixth Army, one division of the Forty-Eighth Army, and two divisions of the Fifty-Sixth Army (stationed between Guilin and Quanzhou), none of these units are elite. Other troops outside the Guangxi clique are even weaker. Therefore, with the main force already positioned along the line from Qiyang to Wugang, there is ample strength to advance toward Guilin and Liuzhou｜. Nevertheless, the manner of this advance warrants careful consideration. Over the next few days, we can observe Bai Chongxi’s［I）dispositions. Should Bai Chongxi concentrate all his efforts on defending the areas around Lingling［2［and Quanzhou, you may mass your forces and launch a southern thrust to attempt to encircle and destroy that enemy group. If, however, learning from the recent annihilation of his elite units—an event that caught him by surprise—Bai Chongxi orders a large-scale retreat along the Guilin–Liuzhou line, then our forces should refrain from concentrated advance; instead, they should split into two parallel columns, one pushing north of Liuzhou and the other advancing toward Guilin. By mutually supporting each other while maintaining the option of regrouping for a decisive engagement at any time, we can prevent the bandit forces from withdrawing into Guizhou｜.
(III) Order the Fifth Corps of the Second Field Army to swiftly advance into Guizhou, and instruct the Eighteenth Army to be the first to enter Guiyang.
Mao Zedong
6:00 a.m., October 12
[1]
Bai Chongxi was at that time the Chief of the Central China Military and Political Headquarters of the Nationalist Army.
[2]
Lingling was an old county name that was merged into Yongzhou City, Hunan Province, in 1984.

Capturing Guangzhou and Annihilating Bai Chongxi’s Forces
A handwritten draft of Mao Zedong’s telegram to front-line commanders.
In October 1949, the People’s Liberation Army achieved victory in the Hengyang–Baoqing Campaign, destroying over 30,000 troops under Bai Chongxi and others.

On October 14, 1949, the People’s Army occupied Guangdong.
In 1949, the People’s Liberation Army advanced into South and Southwest China.