Carefully consider the plan to encircle and annihilate Bai Chongxi’s forces
and strive to ensure absolute certainty.
(October 12, 1949)


Comrade Lin Biao:
According to your telegram of 7:00 a.m. on the 10th, Bai Chongxi has dispatched his entire 131st Division to reinforce the enemy north of Qiyang. As a result, that enemy force has been completely put on the defensive, creating the possibility of wiping out Bai’s main body along the Hunan-Guangxi border. Therefore, we concur with your suggestion that Chen Geng’s Corps advance directly from its current position toward Guilin to cut off the enemy’s lines of communication and strike at their rear. However, your telegram of 10:00 a.m. on the 11th indicates that the reinforcements originally intended for the front have now halted along the line stretching from Dong’an and Lengshuijie to Lingling. They have not moved north. Under these circumstances, regardless of whether the enemy north of Qiyang is destroyed or not, Bai Chongxi may order his main forces to withdraw into central, western, and northwestern Guangxi—taking up positions with Yunnan and Guizhou at his back and facing northeastern and eastern Guangxi—where they would adopt guerrilla tactics, avoid decisive engagements, and engage us in a protracted standoff. In such a scenario, despite our desire for a swift conclusion, we would be unable to achieve it. At present, since Chen Geng’s Corps has already entered Guangxi, the Guangdong issue remains unresolved,
and the problem of Guangxi likewise cannot be quickly settled. Should our forces press forward into central, western, and northwestern Guangxi, Bai’s troops could retreat into Yunnan and Guizhou. If the Fourth Field Army were to follow them into those provinces, we would lack the necessary troop strength to simultaneously tackle the Guangdong question. Conversely, if the Fourth Field Army did not enter Yunnan and Guizhou, the entire burden of dealing with Bai would fall upon the Second Field Army. Accordingly, I urge you to carefully weigh whether the plan to encircle and destroy Bai’s forces in the region north of Guilin and Liuzhou, yet south of Qiyang and Baoqing, can be executed with genuine confidence. If so, your plan is indeed sound; otherwise, our forces risk being placed in a highly disadvantageous position. To allow for thorough deliberation, it would be advisable for Chen Geng’s Corps to remain in place and stand by for further orders over the next few days.


Mao Zedong
3:00 p.m., October 12th
[1]
Baoqing refers to Shaoyang in Hunan Province.