(October 11, 1949)
Lin, Deng, Tan, Xiao, and Zhao; also informing Ye and Chen121:
We have received your telegram of 10:00 a.m. on the 11th131. (1) Regarding the redeployment of Chen’s Corps along the Shaoguan–Yingde line directly into Guangxi, we replied this morning that we approve such a move. Please issue direct orders to Chen’s Corps to carry it out.
(2) As for not forcing the enemy in Guangdong to retreat into Guangxi, we consider this correct as well. Therefore, the Fifteenth Corps should not yet launch an offensive against Guangzhou. Apart from maintaining a small force around Shaoguan and Yingde, the main body should advance northwestward from north of Yingde toward the southwest to seize Deqing and Gaoyao, thereby severing communications between Guangdong and Guangxi and isolating Guangzhou. If this can be accomplished, the enemy in the Guangzhou area will find itself cut off. I
[1]


This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to Lin Biao, Commander of the Fourth Field Army and concurrently of the Central China Military Region; Deng Zihui, Second Political Commissar; Tan Zheng, Deputy Political Commissar and Director of the Political Department; Xiao Ke, Chief of Staff; and Zhao Erlu, Second Chief of Staff.
[2]


Ye refers to Ye Jianying, who at that time served as First Secretary of the South China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, as well as Commander and Political Commissar of the Guangdong Military Region. Chen refers to Chen Geng, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Fourth Corps of the Second Field Army.
[3]


Refers to the telegram sent at 10:00 a.m. on October 11, 1949, by Lin Biao, Deng Zihui, Tan Zheng, Xiao Ke, and Zhao Erlu to the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee. The telegram stated:
In order to prevent the enemy in Guangdong from withdrawing into Guangxi, we should temporarily refrain from continuing our offensive there and instead use Guangdong’s major cities and strategic areas as bait to keep the enemy concentrated in that province. At the same time, this would allow us to concentrate superior forces against the enemy in Guangxi, first annihilating them and then, through coordinated military and political efforts, using Fourth Field Army units to deal with the enemy in Guangdong. Accordingly, we propose that both Chen’s and Deng Hua’s corps should not continue their southward advance. Instead, Deng Hua’s two armies should monitor the enemy in Guangdong while concentrating their strength on regularly destroying its scattered detachments. Meanwhile, Chen’s corps should move westward to join the operations in Guangxi. Once the enemy in Guangxi is defeated, many of their units may be persuaded to surrender peacefully. Therefore, the annihilation of the enemy in Guangxi has become the central link in the overall campaign situation.


Under pressure from the Fifth Corps and the forces led by Zeng Sheng and Lin Ping (I］, internal defections may occur, with elements coming over to our side to negotiate surrender or reorganization. Should this happen, we could still liberate Guangzhou earlier, which would be advantageous for supplying Guangxi with cadres and certain materials.
(3) Regarding whether the Fifteenth Corps can proceed sooner to occupy Deqing and Gaoyao, please have the Ye side (2］ consult with the Deng-Lai side (3J and report back by telegram.
(4) It seems advisable for the units under Zeng Sheng and Lin Ping to advance to the Xinfeng, Longmen, and Fogang areas, rather than moving further south toward Huizhou or beyond.
Central Military Commission
24:00 on the 11th
[ 1]


Zeng Sheng was then commander of the Two Guangdong Column of the Fourth Field Army. Lin Ping was commander and political commissar of the Yue-Gan-Xiang Border Column of the Fourth Field Army.
[2]


Ye refers to Ye Jianying. Fang refers to Fang Fang, who at that time served as Third Secretary of the South China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
[3]


Deng-Lai refers to Deng Hua and Lai Chuanzhu, who respectively held the positions of commander and political commissar of the Fifteenth Corps of the Fourth Field Army at the time.