(October 7, 1949)
To the Central China Bureau, the South China Branch, the Front Committee of the Second Field Army, the Northwest Bureau, and the Front Committee of the First Field Army:
This report from the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee is highly worthy of attention. Please study it carefully to avoid repeating the same mistakes. The style of this report is also quite novel.
Mao Zedong
October 7
[1]
Refers to the comprehensive report dated September 25, 1949, submitted by Tan Zhenlin, Secretary of the CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee, and Tan Qilong, Deputy Secretary, to the East China Bureau and concurrently to the Central Committee, concerning the work of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee from May to August. The report covers four areas: military affairs, urban development, rural reconstruction, and the integration of cadres who had advanced south with local cadres. The main contents are as follows:


I. On Military Affairs. The handling of prisoners of war was very rough. Apart from incorporating a small number into the troops, a large contingent was simply disbanded on the spot, leading to bands of marauders along the routes who inflicted great harm on the populace. Many who could not return home scattered into the countryside, becoming loose bandits. This became one of the sources of banditry and counter-revolutionary activities in Zhejiang. Had our field armies not been constrained by immediate difficulties and had they refrained from hastily discharging prisoners, instead conducting proper screening and re-education before organized demobilization, such problems could have been avoided. Moreover, our units entering Zhejiang, being continuously engaged in combat, failed to launch timely mopping-up operations, thereby giving security forces, county and district self-defense units, and remnants of enemy detachments that had not been completely wiped out, an opportunity to regroup and reorganize. In July, after the main force moved south, these residual enemy elements launched attacks against us, putting us temporarily on the defensive. Furthermore, the task of localizing certain main-force units was also carried out too late. It was not until August that Zhejiang began to address this issue, resulting in considerable losses. In newly liberated areas, relying on a single main-force unit to reorganize local armed forces, suppress bandits, and consolidate political power is an indispensable step.

II. On Urban Work. The first priority upon entering a city should be financial stability and price control. The Provincial Party Committee, together with municipal party committees and governments, should devote most of their efforts not only to dealing with counterfeit currency and silver dollars, but more importantly to streamlining tax collection and strengthening the exchange of goods between urban and rural areas. Only in this way can financial and price problems be gradually resolved. In Zhejiang, however, tax collection and urban-rural relations did not get back on track until August. Efforts to organize workers consumed the greatest amount of energy, yet yielded meager results, primarily due to lack of experience and a shortage of cadres with prior experience in working among laborers. Additionally, there was an initial reluctance to boldly educate and organize workers, coupled with the failure to conduct concentrated training for cadres beforehand, which led to haphazard and directionless action. It was only after holding worker training classes in July that this issue began to be addressed systematically. Cooperation with capitalists was insufficiently pursued; distrust on their part remained largely unalleviated. Regarding labor-capital relations, it was crucial to first consult with the working masses and conduct internal negotiations, resolutely siding with the working class when capitalists obstructed progress. As for state-owned enterprises and institutions—such as trading companies, railways, post offices, telephone bureaus, and banks—seeking independence from Party leadership presented a serious political problem. In many cases, they emphasized their direct hierarchical structures, thereby hindering the overall work. Ideally, until all aspects of the work were properly established, no such independent structures should be allowed; all matters should be channeled through local Party leadership. Concerning the resumption of production, initial calls for its restoration and development were somewhat indiscriminate. Due to the slack season, most production came to a halt, while a severe food shortage drove grain prices far above procurement levels, placing production in a difficult position. Moreover, since the entire effort lacked a clear focus centered on production, it was not until August that conditions began to improve. With regard to public security, Hangzhou City achieved notable success in combating bandits and counter-revolutionaries. The key lessons learned included boldly utilizing enemy personnel, providing them with adequate living support while keeping firm political control, thus enabling the preemptive detection and suppression of subversive activities; promptly resolving issues related to the public security apparatus; and actively assigning capable cadres—those open to new ideas, willing to work diligently, and able to think critically—to relevant tasks. Overall, security work was conducted under unified leadership. As for the process of taking over government organs, most former employees initially adhered to the principle of maintaining the status quo and awaiting orderly handover, allowing the takeover to proceed in a step-by-step manner, provided that they were given sufficient living allowances. However, starting in July, budgetary constraints led to the hasty dismissal of some former staff, which had an adverse impact.

III. On Rural Work. The rural population of Zhejiang, caught up in the whirlwind of the Great Revolution like dry wood in a raging fire, placed high hopes on us. Initially, owing to the scarcity of our own rural cadres and the troops’ fear of making inappropriate statements, we confined ourselves to propagating the Eight Articles of the Provisional Constitution. Coupled with the delayed suppression of bandits and counter-revolutionaries at that time, doubts arose among the masses. Beginning in the latter half of July, large teams were dispatched to the countryside to carry out extensive propaganda campaigns, dramatically changing the rural landscape. By August, mass mobilization had been initiated in over 400 townships, with farmers generally demanding an end to local tyranny and reductions in rent and interest rates, while those in former guerrilla zones called for land reform. The main challenges faced in rural work were that cadres who had advanced south were hesitant to give full rein to the masses, fearing mistakes; they also tended to distrust local cadres and young students, believing that higher levels of education implied impurity. These issues were only broadly resolved at regional committee meetings held in July.

IV. On the Integration of Cadres. Generally speaking, there were no major problems in this regard. The critical issue at present lies with the Party organizations and cadres in the guerrilla zones, most of whom had developed around the time of crossing the Yangtze River, and whose ranks were relatively impure. Among the cadres who had advanced south, there was a tendency to overemphasize this aspect, accompanied by a lack of trust in local cadres and certain narrow-minded views. Consequently, a certain degree of estrangement persisted between the two groups. While relations at the county level and above remained relatively good, tensions were still quite pronounced among lower-level cadres, requiring urgent resolution.