Telegram to Lin Biao and the Central China Bureau Regarding the Reorganization of Chen Mingren’s Unit (October 5, 1949)

Comrade Lin Biao, Central China Bureau, with copy to the Hunan Provincial Committee: (1) Based on their current conduct, both Cheng Qian and Chen Mingren appear determined to stand with us. During my talks with them, Li Minghao spoke on their behalf, noting that they had too few men and weapons and asked whether reinforcements could be provided. He also requested that we promptly dispatch cadres to assist in retraining their forces and that they be allowed to participate in operations against Bai Chongxi and elsewhere so as to earn merit through combat.

(2) Your decision to assign two armies comprising six divisions to Chen’s unit, given its present strength, is appropriate. The Military Commission has already approved designating it as the 21st Corps, with the 52nd and 53rd Armies and the 214th through 219th Divisions. I have discussed this matter with Cheng Qian, Chen Mingren, and Li Minghao, and they have all agreed. However, Chen Mingren believes it would be advisable first to clarify the situation to the officers and to arrange for the surplus personnel—by sending them for training—to alleviate their concerns. Only then should the reduction to two armies and six divisions be announced. I consider Chen Mingren’s suggestion reasonable. Around October 10, Chen Mingren and Li Minghao will depart from here via Hankou for Hunan. Please wait until they return and have further discussions before determining the specific steps for announcement and implementation. Cheng Qian will remain in Beijing for a few more days before returning to Hunan.

(3) In order to reassure all officers and soldiers of this corps, starting with Chen Mingren himself, and to strengthen their resolve for thorough transformation, demonstrating that we regard Cheng, Chen, and the entire corps as one of our own, we believe that, if feasible, a contingent of men and weapons should be supplemented once some progress has been made in the corps’ reorganization and discipline. These supplies could be drawn from spoils seized in operations against Bai Chongxi. Such action would enhance our leadership and influence over this unit. Furthermore, after the pacification of the entire province of Hunan and the implementation of land reform—approximately one year hence—if the corps continues to perform well and our local units, such as independent brigades and regiments, can be consolidated, consideration might be given to incorporating an additional army into the corps, bringing Chen Mingren’s total to three armies. This would be conducive to the transformation of the corps. I have conveyed these general points to Cheng, Chen, and Li.

(4) Cheng, Chen, and Li have proposed abolishing the Hunan Military-Administrative Committee immediately, with Cheng Qian assuming a post in Beijing and Chen Mingren focusing solely on military duties without retaining the title of provincial chairman. I explained to them that the committee needs to remain in place for a considerable period. Abolishing it too soon could lead to misunderstandings among Cheng and Chen’s subordinates and would not be conducive to national stability. Similarly, any reorganization of the provincial government should only be undertaken when the province is fully pacified and Chen Mingren has advanced his forces to the front lines. For the time being, over the next few months, Chen should continue to hold the position of provincial chairman, while concentrating his efforts primarily on military affairs.

(5) Chen Mingren has repeatedly expressed his desire to go to the front to engage in combat and distinguish himself. I told him that his aspiration is commendable, but since his troops have not yet been properly trained, sending them into battle at this stage would likely result in widespread desertion. Once preliminary training has been completed, however, seizing opportunities to participate in a few engagements would indeed be beneficial. I urge you to keep this in mind and, when circumstances permit, allow him to take part in one or two combat operations.

(6) Both Cheng Qian and Li Minghao mentioned that there are as many as 150,000 unemployed officers in Hunan, all seeking placement, which has become a significant burden for them. I pointed out that this is a social issue requiring the state to provide systematic solutions to help these individuals find employment. Please discuss this matter with them when they return. I also ask that you pay due attention to this point.

(7) What are your views on the above matters? Kindly reply.

(8) Cheng, Chen, and Li have expressed very positive impressions of the current Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and expressed confidence in continuing their work. I informed them that matters such as supplementing personnel and weaponry would only be considered once the necessary resources had actually been received; no announcements should be made beforehand to avoid disappointment. They were instructed to focus on thoroughly training their existing force of over 30,000 men, to manage expectations prudently, and to prepare themselves mentally for various difficulties and potential dissatisfaction. On our part, we will do everything possible to assist them, striving to meet their needs as much as possible and to alleviate their challenges. By adopting this approach, we may successfully accomplish our objectives.

Printed from the original manuscript by Mao Zedong on Youwei day. Notes [1] Chen Mingren, formerly a Nationalist government army general, led a revolt in Changsha together with Cheng Qian in August 1949. At that time, he served as Deputy Commander of the Hunan Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army. [2] Lin Biao, then First Secretary of the Central China Bureau of the CPC, Commander of the Fourth Field Army of the PLA, and Commander of the Central China Military Region. [3] Cheng Qian, formerly a Nationalist government army general, led a revolt in Changsha together with Chen Mingren in August 1949. At that time, he was a member of the Central People’s Government and Director of the Hunan People’s Military-Administrative Committee. [ ] Li Minghao, formerly a Nationalist government army general who defected to the North China Liberated Area in 1948. He participated in the peaceful liberation of Beiping and contributed to the August 1949 uprising led by Cheng Qian and Chen Mingren. At that time, he served as Secretary-General of the Hunan People’s Military-Administrative Committee. [ ] Bai Chongxi, appointed in April 1949 as Chief Executive of the Nationalist Government’s Central China Administrative Office.