Demands and Proposed Recommendations for Handling the Matter
(October 5, 1949)
To Comrade Lin Biao, the Central China Bureau, with copy to the Hunan Provincial Committee:

(1) Based on their current conduct, both Cheng Qian and Chen Mingren appear determined to stand on our side. During my talks with them,
Li Minghu and Po raised the issue that they have too few men and guns,
asking whether we could supply additional personnel and weaponry,
and requesting that we promptly dispatch cadres to assist in reorganizing and training their forces. They also asked to be allowed to participate in operations against Bai Chongxi and elsewhere, so as to earn merit through combat.

(2) It is appropriate for you to assign formal designations of two corps and six divisions to Chen’s unit, given its present strength. The Military Commission has already decided to grant it the titles of the 21st Corps, the 52nd Army, the 53rd Army, and the 210th through 218th Divisions. I have discussed this matter with Cheng Qian, Chen Mingren, and Li Minghu, and they all agreed.
Lin Biao was then First Secretary of the CPC Central Committee’s Central China Bureau and Commander of both the Fourth Field Army and the Central China Military Region.
[2]
Cheng Qian had formerly served as Chairman of the Kuomintang Government of Hunan Province and Director of the Changsha Pacification Office of the KMT Army. In August 1949, he led his troops in an uprising in Changsha. At that time, he held the position of Member of the Central People’s Government and Chairman of the Hunan People’s Military–Political Committee. Chen Mingren had previously been Commander of the KMT’s First Corps. In August 1949, he likewise led his forces in an uprising in Changsha. He was then serving as Deputy Commander of the Hunan Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
[3]
Li Minghu had formerly been a member of the KMT government’s Ministry of National Defense. In 1948, he went to the North China Liberated Area and took up a post at the North China Military–Political University. He participated in the peaceful liberation of Beiping and played a role in facilitating the August 1949 uprising by Cheng Qian and Chen Mingren. At the time, he was serving as Secretary-General of the Hunan People’s Military–Political Committee.
[4]
Bai Chongxi was then Chief of Staff of the KMT’s Central China Military–Political Headquarters.

However, Chen Mingren believes that it would be advisable first to clearly explain the situation to the cadres and arrange for those who are surplus to undergo retraining, thereby reassuring them. Only after that should the reduction to two corps and six divisions be announced. I consider this suggestion by Chen Mingren to be reasonable. Around October 10, Chen Mingren and Li Minghu will depart from Hankou for Hunan; please wait until they return and have further discussions before deciding on the specific steps for announcement and implementation. Cheng Qian should remain in Beijing for a few more days before returning to Hunan.

(3) In order to ensure that all officers and soldiers of this corps, starting with Chen Mingren, can serve with peace of mind and strengthen their resolve for thorough transformation, demonstrating that we regard Cheng, Chen, and the entire corps as one of our own, we believe that, if feasible, when the corps has made some progress in reorganization and discipline, we should supplement it with additional personnel and arms, potentially drawn from spoils captured in operations against Bai Chongxi. Such action would enhance our leadership over and influence within this unit. Furthermore, once peace has been established throughout Hunan Province and land reform has been implemented—approximately one year from now—if the corps continues to perform well and our local units, such as independent brigades, can be consolidated, we might consider incorporating another army into the corps, bringing Chen Mingren’s total to three armies. This would be conducive to the transformation of the corps. I have already conveyed these points in essence to Cheng, Chen, and Li.

(4) Cheng, Chen, and Li proposed that the Hunan Military–Political Committee be dissolved immediately, with Cheng Qian taking up a post in Beijing and Chen Mingren assuming full military duties without retaining the title of Provincial Governor. I explained to them that the Military–Political Committee needs to remain in existence for a considerable period. Dissolving it too quickly could lead to misunderstandings among Cheng and Chen’s subordinates and might also have adverse effects nationwide. Similarly, any reorganization of the provincial government should only be carried out after the province has been fully pacified and Chen Mingren has advanced his forces to the front lines. For the time being, over the next few months, Chen should continue to hold the title of Provincial Governor, while focusing his actual work primarily on one army.

(5) Chen Mingren has repeatedly expressed his desire to go to the front lines to engage in combat and distinguish himself. I told him that his aspiration is commendable, but since his troops have not yet been properly trained, sending them to the front immediately would likely result in widespread desertion. Once preliminary training has been completed, if an opportunity arises, it would indeed be beneficial for him to lead his forces into battle a few times. Please also take note of this point and, whenever possible, allow him to participate in one or two engagements.

(6) Both Cheng Qian and Li Minghu mentioned that there are as many as 150,000 unemployed officers in Hunan, all seeking placement, which has become a major problem causing them considerable distress. I pointed out that this is a social issue, and it is the state’s responsibility to provide these individuals with avenues for making a living in a systematic manner. Please discuss this matter with them when they return.

(7) What are your views on the above points? We look forward to your reply.

(8) Cheng, Chen, and Li expressed very positive impressions of the recent CPPCC meetingII and expressed confidence in moving forward. I advised them that matters such as replenishing personnel and arms would only be considered settled once the necessary resources had actually been received, and that no announcements should be made to lower ranks to avoid disappointment. They were instructed to focus on effectively training their existing force of over 30,000 men, to manage expectations prudently, and to be mentally prepared for various difficulties and potential dissatisfaction. On our part, we should do everything possible to assist them, striving to meet their needs as much as possible and alleviate their challenges. By adopting this approach, both sides can work together to achieve a successful outcome.

Mao Zedong
Xiwēi
[1]
The CPPCC meeting refers to the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, held in Beiping from September 21 to 30, 1949.

--- Notes

[1]