(August 26, 1949)


To Peng and Zhang, with notification to He and Xi:
Your telegram of the 24th has been received (No. 31).

(1) If you capture Lanzhou on the 25th, the situation will have changed.


(2) If you fail to capture it, then treat this operation as a reconnaissance in force. The entire army will thereby gain valuable lessons from this costly reconnaissance engagement and secure victory in a subsequent attack.


(3) Should you not succeed on the 25th, please proceed according to the resolve stated in your telegram of the 24th: first engage and defeat the enemy reinforcing Lanzhou, then attack the city. In that case, you must order the four or three corps defending the city to establish strong defensive positions. You should also allow ample time for both the battle to intercept the reinforcements and the assault on the city—estimating at least half a month, though it may take a full month or even longer.


(4) To ensure supplies for one or two months,
[1]
This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the

Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, addressed to Peng Dehuai, Commander and Political Commissar of the First Field Army, and Zhang Zongsun, Deputy Commander.
[2]
He and Xi refer to He Long and Xi Zhongxun, who at that time served respectively as Commander and Political Commissar of the Northwest Military Region.
[3]
Refers to the telegram sent by Peng Dehuai and Zhang Zongsun to the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee at 21:00 on August 24, 1949. The telegram stated:
In accordance with the instructions received in the telegram of August 23, we have decided to employ three corps to attack Lanzhou. Ma Hongkui of Ningxia has dispatched three divisions and is likely to reinforce Lanzhou via the left bank of the Yellow River. Should the two Ma forces converge on Lanzhou, together with the units of Zhou Jiajin and Huang Zuxun, they would total 130,000 troops, firmly entrenched within the city. Even if we concentrate all three corps, it would be difficult to capture the city in a short period; moreover, supplying food and ammunition would be challenging, making prolonged combat unsustainable. Therefore, we have decided to encircle Lanzhou before Ma Hongkui’s forces arrive, aiming first to eliminate the main body of Ma Bufang’s Qinghai forces. If we have not yet dealt with Ma Bufang’s army but Ma Hongkui’s reinforcements are drawing near, we will then encircle Lanzhou with four corps and commit five corps to engage Ma Hongkui’s forces. The Second and Nineteenth Corps have completed their preparations for the assault, yet they remain fatigued, lack sufficient food, and face continuous counterattacks from Ma Bufang’s troops, making rest virtually impossible. Based on our current state of preparation, we estimate there is a sixty to seventy percent chance of capturing Lanzhou, and thus we have decided to launch the attack at dawn on the 25th.


Furthermore, regarding the supply of food oil, ammunition, and cotton clothing from Xi’an, please instruct the Eighteenth Corps to make every effort to conduct raids into the gap areas where Hu Zongnan’s Third Army is stationed, thereby securing Tianshui and Highway 121 between Shaanxi and Gansu to facilitate transportation. At the same time, grain should be systematically collected within a radius of two to three hundred li around Lanzhou. The Northwest Bureau is requested to provide full support for the needs of the Lanzhou front.
Central Military Commission
1:00 a.m., 26th
[I]
Hu Zongnan was at that time the Director of the Pacification Office for the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Border Area of the Nationalist Army.
[2]
The Xilan Highway refers to the road connecting Xi’an in Shaanxi Province with Lanzhou in Gansu Province.