Farewell, John Leighton Stuart
(August 18, 1949)
It is understandable that the U.S. White Paper was released on August 5, a date when Stuart had already left Nanjing and was en route to Washington but had not yet arrived. He was, after all, a symbol of the complete failure of U.S. imperialist aggression. Born in China to American parents, Stuart enjoyed extensive social connections there. For many years he ran church-affiliated schools and even spent time in a Japanese prison during the War of Resistance. Usually presenting himself as someone who loved both America and China, he managed to deceive a segment of the Chinese public. It was for this reason that he caught Marshall’s eye and was appointed U.S. Ambassador to China, becoming one of the prominent figures in the Marshall system. From the Marshall system’s perspective, his only “shortcoming” was that his entire tenure as ambassador coincided precisely with the period when that very policy was utterly defeated by the Chinese people—a responsibility hardly a small one. Therefore, it made perfect sense for the White Paper, intended to shift blame, to be published just before Stuart’s arrival.
The war in which the United States provided funds and weapons, Chiang Kai-shek supplied the troops, and together they fought on behalf of American interests, slaughtering the Chinese people in order to turn China into an American colony, constituted a major component of U.S. imperialism’s global aggressive strategy following World War II. This strategy had several prongs: Europe, Asia, and the Americas—these were its principal axes. Central to this plan was Asia, with China at its heart—an enormous nation of 475 million people. Once China was subdued, the rest of Asia would fall under U.S. control. With its Asian front thus secured, U.S. imperialism could then concentrate its forces on Europe. Meanwhile, the U.S. considered its position in the Americas relatively stable. Such was the grand scheme of the American aggressors.
However, two factors thwarted this plan. First, neither the American people nor the peoples of the world desired war. Second, the rising consciousness of the European working class, the emergence of people’s democratic states in Eastern Europe, and above all, the unprecedented strength of the Soviet Union—a mighty bastion of peace standing between Europe and Asia—resisted U.S. aggression tenaciously, drawing most of Washington’s attention away from Asia. Most importantly, however, the Chinese people had awakened. The armed forces under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, together with the broad popular organizations, had grown stronger than ever before. Faced with this reality, the ruling circles of U.S. imperialism were compelled to abandon their plans for a large-scale, direct military invasion of China and instead opted to support Chiang Kai-shek in waging a civil war against the Chinese people.
The U.S. Navy, Army, and Air Force had already been actively involved in the conflict within China. Naval bases were established in Qingdao, Shanghai, and Taiwan. U.S. troops were stationed in Beiping, Tianjin, Tangshan, Qinhuangdao, Qingdao, and Shanghai. The U.S. Air Force maintained air superiority over the entire country, systematically mapping out strategic locations through aerial photography. Near Anping Lock near Beiping, in Jiutai near Changchun, in Tangshan, and on the Jiaodong Peninsula, U.S. forces or personnel had engaged with the People’s Liberation Army on multiple occasions, often ending in capture. Claire Chennault and his Flying Tigers also played a significant role in the war. Beyond transporting Nationalist troops, the U.S. Air Force bombed and sank the rebel cruiser Chongqing. All of these actions represented direct military involvement, though they were never officially declared as such.
Why didn’t the U.S. simply adopt the first option? Acheson explained: “I believe that at the time, American public opinion held that the first choice would amount to abandoning our international responsibilities and our traditionally friendly policy toward China without making any serious effort to rectify the situation first.” In other words, what the U.S. referred to as “international responsibility” and “a tradition of friendly relations with China” was, in fact, nothing more than intervention in China. To intervene was to fulfill one’s “international duty”; to refrain from doing so was deemed unacceptable. By framing it this way, Acheson effectively manipulated public opinion—though it was the voice of Wall Street rather than that of the American people themselves.
As for the second option—large-scale military intervention to crush the Communists and establish full Nationalist control over China—Acheson dismissed it as impractical: “From both a theoretical standpoint and in retrospect, this course of action, though appealing in principle, has proven entirely unworkable. Over the past decade, the Nationalists have repeatedly failed to destroy the Communists. Now, in the postwar period, the Nationalist forces are weakened, demoralized, and have lost popular support, as previously noted. In regions recently liberated from Japanese occupation, the corrupt and brutal behavior of Nationalist officials quickly eroded whatever remaining trust the populace might have had in them. Meanwhile, the Communist forces are stronger than ever, controlling nearly all of North China. Judging from the dismal performance of the Nationalist army, it seems only U.S. military force could possibly drive back the Communists. Yet such a massive undertaking—whether carried out in 1945 or later—would undoubtedly face strong opposition from the American public. Consequently, we chose the third option…”
Thus, the U.S. provided money and arms, while Chiang Kai-shek supplied the soldiers, to fight on America’s behalf, “destroying the Communists,” turning China into an American colony, thereby fulfilling America’s “international responsibilities” and upholding its “traditional friendly policy” toward China. Despite the Nationalist regime’s corruption and incompetence—its demoralization and loss of popular support—the U.S. continued to arm and finance it for war. While direct military intervention might have seemed plausible in theory—and even personally appealing to certain U.S. leaders—it was ultimately rejected because it lacked public approval. It was not that Truman, Marshall, Acheson, and their cohorts lacked the will to act; on the contrary, they were eager to do so. However, the circumstances in China, in the United States, and on the international stage—as Acheson failed to acknowledge—simply did not permit it. Forced into a compromise, they settled on the third path.
To those Chinese who believed victory could be achieved without foreign assistance: Acheson was delivering a lesson to you. A truly dedicated educator, he spoke candidly and exhaustively, laying bare the whole truth. The reason the U.S. did not launch a full-scale invasion of China was not due to any reluctance on the part of the U.S. government, but rather to genuine concerns. First, the fierce resistance of the Chinese people would ensnare U.S. forces in a quagmire from which they could never escape. Second, widespread opposition within the United States made it politically untenable to issue a mobilization order. Third, the combined resistance of the Soviet people, the Europeans, and other nations around the globe posed an immense risk. Acheson, however, stopped short of fully disclosing this last concern, fearing embarrassment before the Soviet Union and appearing to admit defeat when, in reality, he sought to maintain the illusion of success.
We Chinese possess indomitable spirit. Many former liberals or so-called “democratic individualists” stood firm in the face of U.S. imperialism and its puppet, the reactionary Kuomintang. Wen Yiduo rose indignantly, glaring defiantly at the Kuomintang’s guns, preferring death to submission. Zhu Ziqing, gravely ill, chose starvation over accepting U.S.-provided “relief food.” Han Yu of the Tang Dynasty composed a eulogy praising Bo Yi, a man who abandoned his duties to his own people, fled in disgrace, and opposed King Wu’s campaign to liberate the oppressed masses—a piece of writing that now seems deeply misguided. What we ought to celebrate are the eulogies to Wen Yiduo and Zhu Ziqing, for they embody the heroic spirit of our nation.
What are a few difficulties compared to such trials? Let them impose a blockade—for ten or twenty years if they must; all of China’s problems will still be resolved. If we are not afraid even of death itself, why should we fear temporary hardships? As Laozi said, “If the people no longer fear death, why should we frighten them with the threat of death?” Today, U.S. imperialism and its lackey, the Kuomintang reactionaries, not only threaten us with death but actively seek to take our lives. Beyond Wen Yiduo and others, over the past three years alone, millions of Chinese citizens have been killed by U.S.-supplied carbines, machine guns, mortars, rocket launchers, howitzers, tanks, and aerial bombs. That dark chapter is now drawing to a close: the aggressors have been routed. We are the ones who have prevailed; they are nearing their end. The challenges that remain—blockades, unemployment, famine, inflation—are indeed difficult, but they pale in comparison to the horrors of the past three years. Having already surmounted that earlier ordeal, can we not overcome these current difficulties? Must we really depend on the United States for survival?
The People’s Liberation Army crossed the Yangtze River, scattering the U.S.-backed colonial administration in Nanjing like birds and beasts. Ambassador Stuart sat motionless, eyes wide open, hoping to open a new shop and make a quick profit. What did he see? Besides columns of PLA troops marching past, along with workers, peasants, students, and other groups rising up in unison, he also observed a striking phenomenon: Chinese liberals and self-proclaimed “democratic individualists” joining hands with workers, farmers, soldiers, and students to shout revolutionary slogans. In short, no one paid him any attention, leaving him isolated and forlorn. With nothing left to do, he could only pack up his briefcase and depart.
There remains a segment of intellectuals and others in China who harbor illusions about the United States. It is crucial to engage in persuasive, outreach, educational, and unifying efforts to bring them onto the side of the people and prevent them from falling prey to imperialist deception. Nevertheless, the overall credibility of U.S. imperialism among the Chinese population has completely collapsed. The U.S. White Paper serves as a record of that bankruptcy. Forward-thinking individuals should seize this opportunity to use the document as an educational tool for the Chinese people. Stuart has left, and the White Paper has arrived—both developments are worthy of celebration.

Telegram to Ahmetjan [1]
(August 18, 1949)
Mr. Ahmetjan, Chairman of the People’s Government of the Ili Special District in Xinjiang:
Our people’s war of liberation against imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, and the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek is on the verge of achieving complete victory across the entire country. The new Political Consultative Conference of the Whole Nation, comprising all democratic parties, mass organizations, field armies of the People’s Liberation Army, liberated areas, ethnic minorities within China, and overseas Chinese compatriots, is being carefully prepared and is expected to hold its plenary session within the next month. At this session, in addition to adopting the Organic Law of the Political Consultative Conference of the Whole Nation and electing its national committee, the conference will also adopt the Organic Law of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China and elect the Central People’s Government Committee. Your long-standing struggle forms an integral part of the nationwide democratic revolution of the Chinese people. With the successful development of the Northwestern People’s Liberation War, the complete liberation of Xinjiang is imminent, and your efforts are about to reach final success. We sincerely welcome your delegation of five representatives to attend the plenary session of the Political Consultative Conference of the Whole Nation. Should you agree, please ensure their arrival in Beiping by early September. Hereby transmitted, with thanks for your reply.
Mao Zedong, Head of the Preparatory Committee for the New Political Consultative Conference
August 18th
Beiping

Letter to Jiang Yong (1)
(August 19, 1949)
Mr. Hu Yun:
I have carefully read your esteemed letter. Given the rapid developments in the political situation, there is an urgent need to convene the New Political Consultative Conference soon. I would like to invite you and Mr. Yan Junren to participate. May I inquire whether this is feasible? Regarding Mr. Xu, I have already instructed comrades specializing in legal affairs to follow up on the matter. I look forward to your prompt response. Respectfully,
Mao Zedong
August 19th
[1] Jiang Yong
(1878–1960), styled Pu Yun, was a jurist from Changting, Fujian Province. In the spring of 1949, he traveled north to Beijing in a private capacity to discuss peace negotiations with the Communist Party of China, alongside Yan Huiqing, Zhang Shizhao, and Shao Lizi. Later that autumn, he was invited to attend the inaugural plenary session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, he served as a member of the Central People’s Government’s Political and Legal Committee and as a deputy director of the Shanghai Institute of Historical and Cultural Research.
[2] Yan Junren refers to Yan Huiqing (1877–1950), a native of Shanghai. He had previously served as Premier of the Beiyang Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and as the Kuomintang’s ambassador to the United States and the Soviet Union. In the autumn of 1949, he was invited to attend the first plenary session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Following the establishment of the PRC, he held the position of Vice Chairman of the East China Military and Administrative Commission and served as a member of the Central People’s Government’s Political and Legal Committee.
[3] Refers to Jiang Yong’s recommendation of Xu Zaofeng, a legal expert, to Mao Zedong.