Winning over Cheng Qian and Others to
Our Side Would Have an Enormous Political
Effect
 (August 6, 1949)
To the Central China Bureau and Hunan Provincial Committee:
	 1.	 We received the telegram from Lin Biao and Deng Zihui of 12:00 on the
5th.1 Everything was handled extremely well.
	 2.	 After our army enters Changsha, with the exception of the reactionary newspapers that we should prepare to shut down, we should not shut down the
other newspapers under Cheng Qian’s system. We should instead use them
to publish our news and documents. Break up the parties, government, and
armies of Cheng Qian and Chen Mingren’s system:2 Give weapons to progressive elements, educate and win over most of the middle elements, and
isolate the reactionary clique. At the same time, ask the Hubei Workers’
Committee to talk with Cheng Qian about instructing any newspapers that
he has in Xinhua3 to use Xinhua News Agency manuscripts as a tool to educate and rally most members of Cheng’s administration to attack reactionary
elements.
	 3.	 Please consider finding a certain number of enlightened elements in Cheng
Qian’s system, and if they and he agree, have them serve as advisers to the
Military Control Commission in Changsha. If you believe it is possible to do
this, please immediately begin the search, and send us a telegram with a list
of names.

	 4.	 Winning over Cheng Qian, Chen Mingren, and their followers to our side
would have great political utility in terms of splitting Taiwan, Guangzhou,
Guangxi, Kunming, Sichuan, and other places—especially Taiwan and Song
Xilian’s area.4 It would also directly facilitate taking Hunan and remolding
Cheng and Chen’s system. You should treat this as important work. You
should dismantle Cheng Qian’s temporary apparatuses quickly but not in a
rush. The provincial government may be kept for about another month so
that Cheng Qian will have time to initiate educational work, thus facilitating
future remolding and reorganization.
	 5.	 When we eventually accept the reins of the provincial government and reorganize the military, apart from giving Chen Mingren a military appointment,
we should also give positions to Cheng Qian and other enlightened elements
and absorb them into participating in our work. Such a method will use people from both sides to organize the Hunan Military Political Commission.
Cheng Qian should be chairman, and one of our people vice-chairman. The
Hunan Provincial Government should also be organized in this fashion,
constituting a temporary transitional apparatus of the united front. Please
consider whether this way of doing things is possible. For the time being,
however, do not reveal this to outsiders. First observe the behavior of Cheng
Qian and his followers and then decide.
The Central Committee
Region Pacification Office.

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 317–18, where it is reproduced
from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.

--- Notes

1.  The telegram from the Central China Military Region’s commander, Lin Biao, and
Second Political Commissar Deng Zihui stated that they did not want to advance the struggle against Chen Mingren too hastily, but rather they wished to focus on coming together
in order to facilitate discussions on all issues.

2.  Cheng Qian was formerly chairman of the Guomindang Provincial Government of
Hunan and director of the Changsha Pacification Office. On August 4, 1949, he announced
in Changsha that he was rebelling, together with Chen Mingren, formerly commander of
the Guomindang’s First Army Group, and thereafter Hunan was peacefully liberated.

3.  Xinhua is a city in central Hunan.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-300

4.  Song Xilian was director of the Guomindang army’s Sichuan-Hunan-Hubei Border