(July 23, 1949)
Comrade Dehuai:
I have received your telegram No. 121 of noon today. The victory in the operation against Hu [Hu Zongnan] on the 13th was a great one, which gives me much satisfaction. It was entirely correct to press forward without delay in the midst of the heat, launching the campaign against Ma [Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui] on the 14th.  After this battle is concluded, a brief period of rest and reorganization would be advisable before resuming the advance; however, the interval should not be too long. The main objectives should be to restore the troops’ strength, reorganize their formations, and fill vacancies. If the campaign against Ma can be completed in the first half of August, followed by a rest and readjustment of half a month to a month, and if we then advance westward in September to occupy Lanzhou, Xining, and the three prefectures of Gansu—Gan, Liang, and Su—in October, it may be possible to take Xinjiang during the winter, rather than waiting until next spring. Brother Chen [the Soviet Union] is very eager for us to seize Xinjiang at an early date and has offered various forms of assistance, including air support with several dozen aircraft. Shaoqi, Gao Gang, and Jiaxiang are currently there; once your plan for advancing is finalized, they will be able to consider matters of assistance.  Regarding the purchase of a large number of automobiles, there are two approaches: one is to order them
afterwards, transporting them via Northeast and North China to the Northwest, where our forces would then use these vehicles to advance into Xinjiang. This approach, however, would likely prolong the timeline, possibly requiring us to wait until spring or even summer before entering Xinjiang. The other option is to utilize the limited number of vehicles already available, together with any equipment that might be captured in Lanzhou and Xining, to push directly into Xinjiang. Once there, additional vehicles and industrial supplies could be brought in from the Ili region, thereby shortening the overall timetable. Please carefully weigh these alternatives and inform me of your recommendation. In my view, if the Pingliang Campaign can destroy the main forces of both Ma factions, the military situation in the Northwest will essentially be resolved. Thereafter, occupying Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang will largely be a matter of marching and taking over administrative control, without major combat operations. Given that Brother Chen can also provide air support, capturing Xinjiang should not be difficult. After the Pingliang Campaign concludes, please discuss this matter with Comrade Wang Zhen and others, and report your views.  Mao Zedong
Noon post
[1]
The Pingliang Campaign, also known as the Eastern Gansu Pursuit Battle. Following the Fumei Campaign in July 1949, the First Field Army decided to take advantage of the fact that Hu Zongnan’s and Ma Bufang’s forces were far apart. The main body of the Eighteenth Corps was tasked with pinning down Hu’s forces along the Baoji–Xi’an line, while the First, Second, and Nineteenth Corps were to converge and annihilate the main forces of the “Two Mas” in the Pingliang–Jingzhou area. From July 21 to 24, our troops launched successive offensives from Qian County, Liquan, Fengxiang, and Baoji. On the 24th of that month, Ma Bufang of Qinghai and Ma Hongzao of Ningxia had deployed their forces in eastern Gansu, attempting to block the First Field Army’s advance along the Xilan Highway toward Gansu and Ningxia. However, in order to preserve their respective strengths, both Ma Bufang and Ma Hongzao withdrew separately before our main forces drew close. Seizing this opportunity, our troops pursued them deep into eastern Gansu, and by August 10 had destroyed over 10,000 enemy troops, liberating a vast area of eastern Gansu.
[2]
Wang Zhen was at that time Commander and Political Commissar of the First Corps of the First Field Army.

--- Notes

[ l]
Dehuai refers to Peng Dehuai, who at that time served as Commander and Political Commissar of the First Field Army.
[2]
This refers to Peng Dehuai’s telegram to Mao Zedong dated July 20, 1949. The telegram stated: (1) In the Fumei Campaign, Hu Zongnan’s forces suffered approximately 50,000 casualties. (2) To liberate the provinces of Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai, preparations were being made to enter Sichuan this winter and Xinjiang in the following spring and summer. It requested that 1,000 to 2,000 vehicles be ordered from a certain party to equip the Northwest Military Region. (3) Lu Zhongliang in Ningxia and Ma Jiyuan in Qinghai each commanded three armies and were preparing to fall back to the Pingliang, Longxian, and Jingchuan areas. Their forces were quite dispersed, presenting opportunities for annihilation in separate engagements. I intend to launch an attack on the 26th with ten armies.
[3]
Hu refers to Hu Zongnan, who at the time held the position of Director of the Xi’an Pacification Office of the Nationalist Army.
[4]
Ma refers to Ma Bufang of Qinghai and Ma Hongzao of Ningxia, who at the time respectively served as Acting Chief and Deputy Chief of the Northwest Military and Political Headquarters of the Nationalist Army.
[5]
Brother Chen refers to the Soviet Union.